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THE CHURCH IN POST-TRANSITION SOCIETIES: EVIDENCE FROM EASTERN EUROPE

A Dissertation

Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the
Louisiana State University and
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in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

in

The Department of Sociology

by
Mary L. Gautier
B.A., Louisiana State University, 1987
M.A., Louisiana State University, 1990
December 1995

dedicated to
Fr. Pat,
because for what you have lost
in sight
you have more than compensated
in vision

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ABSTRACT

I explore the relationship between religious affiliation and support for democratic values in postcommunist societies. Using the Tocquevillian idea of the institutional learning of democratic values within civil society, I examine three post-transition countries of Eastern Europe for evidence that the churches preserved and promoted democratic values during the years of Soviet regime control.

Comparative historical examination of the relationship between the institutional churches and the state during the years of communist regime control demonstrate how the churches worked to preserve and promote democratic values. In those countries where the churches were marginalized and excluded from power by the state (such as Poland and East Germany) church elites worked to promote the reemergence of civil society. But where the churches were able to maintain a base of power through cooperation with the communist regime (Hungary) church elites were less involved in the democratic transformation process.

Survey data on democratic attitudes in Poland, Hungary, and eastern Germany in the immediate post-transition period of 1990-1992 demonstrate that church attenders in these societies, similar to church attenders in western Germany, report higher levels of support for democratic values than non-attenders. Church attendance is strongly related to democratic values of confidence and trust in institutions, as well as support for a democratic form of government. Church attenders demonstrate more support for democratic values in societies where the church had an instrumental role in the recreation of civil society (Poland and eastern Germany) than they do in Hungary, where the church

cooperated with the regime and did little to promote democratic values. Some evidence of optimism, trust, and efficacy among church attenders in these post-transition societies is also attributed to the church's active participation in the transition.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

After 45 years of totalitarian domination, churches in Eastern Europe are free again to operate as they did before the communist takeover following World War II. Although the churches had not been abolished outright, they were strictly constrained by the Soviet-controlled governments and often severely repressed. Marxist teaching does not proscribe religion, but rather considers religion to be primitive and superstitious, and predicts that religion will tend to disappear in an enlightened communist society (Marx 1974). The official policy of the communist governments was to tolerate the churches for the social services they provided, while their normal practice was to do as much as possible to discourage people from active participation.

Nevertheless, the churches managed to persist in the harsh environment of Soviet totalitarianism. They not only provided social and spiritual services for the masses, they also played an important part in the prodemocracy movement which culminated in the democratic transformations of 1989. The churches in several of the countries of Eastern Europe were influential in providing structural support for those groups and organizations who sought to overthrow the Soviet regime. The churches also provided support for the expression and preservation of democratic values which were likewise suppressed by the regime.

Now that the democratic transformations have taken place in most of these formerly communist lands, it is possible for the first time to see just how much decline

the churches behind the Iron Curtain have experienced, and evaluate what remains of them. It is enlightening, surely, to examine the numbers and see what the figures for church membership and church attendance actually are in post-communist eastern Europe. However, church membership and attendance rates have been falling steadily (and in some places, such as the Netherlands, even dramatically) since World War II. We would expect church membership and attendance rates to have been significantly affected by the years of repression.

More important to an understanding of the persistence of influence of the churches behind the Iron Curtain, then, is an examination of the attitudes of those who remain affiliated with a church in eastern Europe. How much influence have the churches been able to retain over the moral and political values of their members? Are Eastern European church members' values significantly different than those of their western brothers and sisters? In addressing these questions I will be able to explore what remains of the churches in Eastern Europe today after two generations of communism.

In this paper I examine the moral and political values expressed by individuals living today in formerly communist countries. Using survey data collected in several countries of eastern and western Europe in 1990 and 1991, I examine the moral and political values of church attenders to see how much influence over those values the churches have been able to retain. For comparison with church members in western European democracies who have not had to contend with state repression of churches, I contrast several eastern European countries to the case of the western part of Germany, which has been a successful democratic state since 1945.

There exists a gap in the literature regarding the moral and political values of contemporary church attenders in Eastern Europe. I propose to address this gap by investigating the values of Eastern European church attenders in eastern Germany, Poland and Hungary. I chose these three specific countries of Eastern Europe because I believe they are roughly comparable to one another in several important ways, and at the same time share some interesting differences.

East Germany, Poland and Hungary were the first of the former Soviet bloc countries to achieve a democratic transformation, followed closely by Czechoslovakia. Free elections took place March 18, 1990 in East Germany and Hungary, May 27, 1990 in Poland and June 8, 1990 in Czechoslovakia. All three countries have historical ties to the West, consider themselves to be Europeans, and share a primarily Judeo-Christian religious heritage. Although East Germany was the most advanced in terms of industrial and economic development of all the nations in the former Soviet Bloc, Poland and Hungary were also relatively well industrialized and economically developed. For example, percent of GNP in industry for 1975 was 49% for East Germany, 48% for Poland and 39% for Hungary (East European Economies, Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress, 1977).

All three countries share a somewhat western orientation. Even during the years of Soviet domination, East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary preferred to refer to themselves as "Central Europe" to distinguish themselves from the more eastern orientation of the remainder of the Soviet Union. Historically, the distinction refers back to the split of the Catholic church into eastern (Orthodox) and western (Roman) spheres

of influence. The countries of "Central Europe" were under the influence of the Roman Catholic Church, as was the rest of Western Europe. The rest of the Soviet Union was territory that had been under the influence of the Eastern Orthodox Church. As for exposure to western culture, East Germany had the advantage of access to West German TV and radio. But Poland and Hungary had Radio Free Europe and the BBC. They also had the Roman Catholic Church. The western orientation of Catholicism and its historical significance in both Poland and Hungary helped shape both countries' national identification in terms of western culture. And the global organization of Catholicism provided links with the Western world, particularly through ties with international organizations (Johnston 1992).

Despite the similarities of their ancient religious histories, the particular religious cultures of these three countries are quite different. Eastern Germany is predominantly secular, with about 65% claiming no religious affiliation, but its primary religious affiliation is Protestant (about 30% of the population). Poland remains predominantly Catholic, with very few non-believers. Hungary is about 70% Catholic, about 20% Protestant, and about 5% non-believers. Each country also experienced a continuum of religious participation in the prodemocracy movement. Poland had very active church participation in the prodemocracy movement, East Germans were active participants in a few church-organized protests toward the end of the movement and during the transition, but Hungary had practically no participation by churches in the prodemocracy movement.

These three countries have enough in common, then, to allow me to formulate a conceptual model about church/state relationships in the totalitarian societies of Central

Europe, although the effect of this relationship was unique within each country and will be analyzed separately.

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The problem of interest in this analysis is what has remained of the churches in eastern Europe after 45 years of communism. Are church members' attitudes different from those of non-affiliates? What are the moral and political values of church attenders in eastern Europe? Are they significantly different from those who do not attend? How much influence has the church been able to maintain in these post-transition societies?

Very little research has been done on the political attitudes of church members in post-communist societies. There has been some historical documentation of the persistence of churches behind the iron curtain, but in all areas under Soviet domination the social sciences were severely repressed and compelled to reflect Marxist teaching. Empirical social research was carefully controlled by the Soviet regime, and the few opinion surveys that were fielded since 1945 have not been made available to the general public. Even if such data were made available, the representativeness of the results would be suspect.

In contrast, the richness of data available since the fall of communism in Eastern Europe allows me to conduct empirical research on the political and religious values of individuals immediately following the democratic transformations. These data are from 1990-91 and they provide a baseline measure of the extent of democratic values in postcommunist societies at the point of their democratic transitions. Likewise, baseline measures of church attendance and religious beliefs allow me to examine the extent and

depth of secularization in Eastern Europe. In these analyses, I measure how much influence the churches have been able to maintain in Eastern Europe and how much influence political repression of the churches has had on the political values of church attenders.

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Values in Society

There is an extensive literature on the relationship between institutions and values. Research from the 1950s and 1960s generally asserted that it was the preexisting political values which influenced the development of the subsequent political institutions (see, for example, Stouffer 1955, Lipset 1960, Almond and Verba 1963, and Easton 1965). A reaction to this admittedly functionalist view was provided by the literature of the 1970s and 1980s, which tended to assert the opposite -- that it is the political institutions which influence the political values of citizens (see Barnes and Kaase 1979, Almond and Verba 1980, and Alford and Friedland 1985). These structuralist interpretations are now being challenged by theories which suggest a synthesis between the two poles -- an interaction between political institutions and political values (see Weil and Gautier, eds., 1994, especially the articles by Weil, Kaase, and Steinmetz; see also Casanova 1994).

I agree that the relationship is a complex one, with values and institutions interacting together to produce the political culture. Another important aspect of this relationship, though, is the realization that the various institutions of society also interact to influence the political culture. In particular, I point out the influence of the church, as

an institution of civil society, on the political culture. And I assert that the church affects political culture in two ways -- as an institution itself and through the actions of individual church members.

Civil Society and Political Culture

Civil society is understood here as that sphere of social interaction existing independently from the State.[1] In a totalitarian state, such as the Soviet Union, civil society is officially nonexistent, as the state ostensibly controls all aspects of public life. However, even in a totalitarian state, structures exist which are self-organized outside the institution of the state. In particular, churches are an example of an institution which is organized outside the realm of the state, which retain an autonomous, if circumscribed, existence even while under the domination of the state.

Civil society is important to the state, for it is the arena in which political socialization takes place. Political socialization is a very important factor in regime support. Every state tries to socialize its citizens to assimilate its dominant political values. Every institution of society has a role in that political socialization. And of all the institutions of society, such as families, schools, and other government bodies, the churches have probably the greatest possibility of autonomous existence in civil society, outside the realm of direct influence by the state. Whether in a democratic or a totalitarian society, the separation of church and state implies the autonomous existence

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[1] For a more thorough development of the concept of civil society see Seligman, 1992; Casanova, 1994; Cohen and Arato 1992; and Frentzel-Zagorska, 1990.

of the church as a power in society apart from the power of the state. Therefore, the churches can exert a powerful influence on political values.

The Church as It Influences Values

The church has long been recognized as an important institution of civil society, significant to the regime for its support and promotion of the values important for the political culture (see for example, Lipset 1960; Tocqueville 1969). Together with schools, families, and a variety of political and other voluntary interest organizations, church involvement influences political attitudes. Max Weber's (1962) comparative study of the relationship between religion and the economy also demonstrated that religious values and ideas can be important agents for change in society.

Tocqueville, in his classic work Democracy in America, was particularly interested in the interplay between religion and politics. He observed that in his native France the oppositional relationship between the Catholic church and the newly established French liberal democracy seemed to be detrimental to both parties. But in America there appeared to be relative harmony between Christianity and democracy. He tried to understand and explain first the need for religion in a democratic community and second the effect of religion on a democratic society.

Churches influence political values in two ways. First, as an institution of civil society the church has a direct influence through the generalized support of the regime by the religious elite -- the clergy. The church has a direct interest in maintaining the stability of the political order, so that the power it possesses will not be diminished or threatened. Therefore the church, through its elites, will promote and support the

political values which will assure the maintenance of the political order as it is. This perception of the common good can serve to defend a traditional social order from radical social change.

Second, the church influences the political order indirectly through the religious values shared and promoted by individual religious believers acting in society. Tocqueville understood this to be the most significant way that the church influences the state. He used the word "mores" to mean the "whole moral and intellectual state of a people" and described in detail how the church, as an institution in civil society, "contributes to the maintenance of a democratic republic among the Americans" (Tocqueville 1969, p. 287). He noted a shared moral consensus among believers in America, whatever the denomination, which he attributed to a widespread Christian culture. This common culture creates a moral climate which promotes domestic tranquility, tolerance and civility. He described how religion, as it regulates domestic life, also helps to promote order in the state by creating a moral community (Tocqueville 1969, p. 291). Finally, he argued that the influence of religion extends even to the intellect, by setting ground rules which confine intellectual debate within parameters of moderation and reason. This indirect influence of religion on the state is, for Tocqueville, indispensable for liberal democracy: "Religion, which never intervenes directly in the government of American society, should therefore be considered as the first of their political institutions, for although it did not give them the taste for liberty, it singularly facilitates their use thereof" (Tocqueville 1969, p. 292).

The Priestly and Prophetic Influences of the Church

The Church has not always been seen as supportive of democracy. In fact, Tocqueville lamented the unhealthy oppositional relationship between the formerly established Catholic church and the newly formed liberal democracy in his native France. However, churches appear to have learned over time an appreciation for democracy. Share (1987) reports in his study of the democratic transition in Spain how the loss of the Church as a major ally of the authoritarian government helped bring about Spain's transition to democracy. Stephens (1989) also argued that the Catholic church was instrumental in helping organize the working class as a political force in Western Europe. More recently, Casanova (1993) discussed how the Catholic church in both Spain and Poland played a positive role in the processes of democratization

With the exception of Tocqueville, though, prior studies focused primarily on the role of elites in bringing about social change. I argue, with Tocqueville, that the effect of the church on political values is more subtle than the actions of its elites. In other words, the church operates at two levels simultaneously to affect society -- at an institutional level, where the influence of church leaders is most clearly observed, and at the level of the individual. And at each level there are two countervailing traditions in the church, both influencing support for the regime. These two traditions -- the priestly and the prophetic as they are known in political theology -- have their origin in the earliest Judeo-Christian tradition.

The priestly tradition was most clearly enunciated by Saint Augustine in his work The City of God (Paolucci 1962). The primary function of the state, according to

Augustine, is the maintenance and enforcement of peace and order. Augustine says that earthly authority descends from God, as a condition of original sin. If man were not a sinful creature there would be no disorder, and no need for earthly authority. But the nature of humanity has been tainted by original sin and this sin has brought disorder into the world. Therefore, obedience to authority is necessary to the preservation of order, no matter what form that earthly authority takes. The priestly tradition stipulates that it is better to be a servant to an earthly authority than to disobey that authority which comes from God. The legitimacy of the ruler derives from his position as one chosen by God, and his power is imposed on the people from above (see also Turner 1991, p. 179 on the descending and ascending principles of kingship).

The prophetic tradition, in contrast, also has a long history, originating in the writings of the Hebrew Scriptures. This tradition calls upon the individual to speak out against any earthly authority whenever that authority is being misused and is causing injustice. Obedience to authority is not the highest mandate here; rather, it is the call of the individual to speak out for righteousness and against injustice. According to the prophetic tradition, the individual prophetic voice is called from within the community to speak out against the existing power structure and to call for a return to justice. This call derives from God and has a higher level of authority than any earthly authority. Because the prophet comes usually from within the community, rather than from the hierarchy, the prophet receives his (or her) legitimacy from within the community, and the power of the prophet moves upward from within the community toward the existing power structure.

At both the institutional level and the individual level churches in Eastern Europe experienced repression from the totalitarian state. And at both levels the competing influences of the priestly tradition and the prophetic tradition operated to define the church's relationship to the state. Church support for democratic values emerged where the separation between church and state was sufficiently defined to allow for the gradual recreation of civil society by the church -- at both the institutional as well as the individual level.

At the institutional level the churches were officially repressed. Marxist teaching considers religion primitive and nonprogressive. Churches were handicapped by formal sanctions and church affiliation and participation were both subtly and directly discouraged. But at the institutional level the priestly tradition of obedience to authority was expressed most strongly. As an institutional body the churches had perhaps their greatest power, but at the same time they lacked a prophetic voice to speak out against injustice. On the institutional level the churches of Eastern Europe for the most part observed the priestly tradition of obedience to the state and managed in that way to coexist with the state as the only semi-autonomous institution of civil society. As long as they were left in relative peace by the state so that they could pursue their primary purpose of promoting traditional moral values, preserving ritual and providing for the salvation of souls, the churches were resigned to accommodate to the *status quo*. Institutional opposition to the communist regime varied by country, but may be characterized overall as sporadic and essentially conciliatory. The only exceptions to

this situation were the prophetic voices of a few outspoken church leaders, whose leadership had only a moderate influence against the communist regime.

At the individual level, church attenders were also repressed and sanctioned. Church affiliation was ridiculed as primitive and naive, and official substitutes for traditional church functions (such as state marriage ceremonies and confirmation ceremonies for youth) marginalized the role of religion in individual's lives. It was at this level that the prophetic tradition was most clearly expressed. Individual church attenders continued to believe and to practice their faith, despite official and unofficial pressures not to do so, and in so doing proclaimed their opposition to the regime. In some countries, in gradually increasing numbers, individual church attenders joined ranks to speak out and march in protest against the regime (Oberschall 1993). The influence of the priestly tradition continued at this level in the desire for, and support of, order and peace and a regime which would accomplish these desired goals. But the prophetic tradition was also expressed in the protest demonstrations, in the candlelight marches in Leipzig, and in the individuals who deliberately refused to acquiesce to the regime and its demands.

The Church and Democratic Values

As I stated before, the church has not always been known as a staunch supporter of democracy. In fact, the Roman Catholic church is still very hierarchic in its organization and has been reluctant to adopt many democratic reforms as an institution. The Protestant churches, in contrast, have been much more democratic in their organization and leadership. Churches in general, though, have been supportive overall

of democratic reforms and democratic movements, particularly since the end of World War II.

Some democratic values, such as individual and collective human rights, individual liberty, safeguarding of the collective common good and the dignity and worth of the individual are intrinsic to church teaching, whatever the denomination. These are cherished values to those who would affiliate with a church, regardless of the official regime form of their government. Therefore, even in communist countries, those who chose to affiliate with a church, despite official and unofficial sanctions against it, have continued to support those democratic values. In the face of increasing corruption, oppression and disregard for the common good in favor of individual privilege, committed church attenders interpreted the movement toward democracy as the appropriate regime change necessary to support and promote the humanitarian values in which they believed.

In a modern democratic society, the church will support and promote many democratic values. These values promote regime stability as well as the maintenance of the right of autonomous existence of the church. In a communist society, though, the church is faced with a dilemma. In order to promote the stability of society it must come to some sort of a compromise with a hostile state. Each of the churches of East Germany, Poland and Hungary addressed the problem of existence in an officially atheistic state in a different manner, which I will address in detail in the next chapter.

Democratic values promoted by the church include support for the democratic regime itself and confidence in the institutions of the regime. Other values promoted by

the church which are not directly related to the promotion of democracy yet at the same time are not contrary to democratic ideals include orientations toward authority, certain family values and values relating to the relationship between the church and the state. Church members will tend to value and respect authority; they will value traditional family arrangements; and they will support cooperation between church and state.

Certain other democratic values which may be conducive to the promotion of the democratic regime are not promoted by the church, usually because they are seen as promoting individual rights, and therefore contrary to the common good. These values include political tolerance, civil liberties, freedom of speech, and support for protests and demonstrations. Such democratic values are seen by the church as promoting the rights of the individual to the detriment of the common good. When it must choose between the two, the church always promotes the good of the community over the right of the individual.

Finally there are certain democratic values having to do with the orientation of the individual as an actor in a democratic society, particularly values of personal and political efficacy, which are sometimes promoted by the church because they relate to issues of the value and dignity of the individual within society. These values are not usually an issue for the church; as I stated above, the church teaches that the value of the community has precedence over the individual. But when the individual is being severely repressed by an oppressive society, such as was the case of religious believers in communist regimes, the church promotes individual rights in a prophetic call to overthrow injustice.

THE CONCEPTUAL MODEL: HOW CIVIL SOCIETY AFFECTS SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC VALUES IN POST-COMMUNIST SOCIETIES

The Church, in opposing the communist regime which actively sought its demise, worked to (re)establish autonomous civil society. This happened first in Poland, where the Church had a long and strong history of opposition to externally imposed State controls. The Polish resistance movement, which became known as Solidarity, originated from an organization of liberal intellectuals and church leaders called KOR (Ost 1990; Laba 1991; Michnik 1993). Poland is probably the best example of active involvement by the church in the revival of civil society.

In contrast, the church in Hungary had very little involvement in the revival of civil society, for three main reasons. First, the church was much weaker there. National identity was not tied to church affiliation in Hungary the way it was in Poland. And since participation was split between two major denominations -- Catholics and Protestants -- none of the churches could speak with authority as the unified voice of the people. Second, Hungarian political reformers began in 1968 to implement a series of political and economic reforms from above, so there was less pressure for alternative forms of opposition. Finally, the Church had never been as completely in opposition to the regime as it was in Poland -- church leaders served as party members and government officials all along in Hungary. They could seek reform politically.

In East Germany the church only very late and somewhat reluctantly joined the movement to reestablish civil society, pushed mainly by the activist peace groups which

co-existed within the protective spaces allotted to the churches. At the end, though, the church was quite influential in the democratic reform movement.

Therefore, I propose the following conceptual model of the relationship between civil society and democratic values. In communist societies in which the churches were excluded from participation in the state (Poland and East Germany), the church became drawn into the formation of civil society in opposition to the regime and actively promoted and supported democratic values. In communist societies which allowed for a measure of church participation in the state (Hungary) the church saw little value in opposing the regime and did little to promote or support democratic values. Consequently, church members in Poland and East Germany will be more supportive of democratic values than will church members in Hungary (who are less likely to recognize a connection between religious affiliation and democratic values).

CHURCH EXCLUDED FROM THE STATE ------> CHURCH OPPOSITION TO THE REGIME ------> SUPPORT FOR DEM. VALUES

OR

CHURCH INCLUDED IN THE STATE ------> NO CHURCH OPPOSITION TO THE REGIME -------> LESS SUPPORT FOR DEM. VALUES

The model is intended to reflect the relationship between civil society and support for democratic values, as it is filtered through the church. Civil society is a contextual variable here; it is the context within which the church operates to support democratic values. As I stated above, the church operates at two levels to support democratic values. At one level, the church as an institution, primarily through the words and actions of its elites, influences society in its support for democratic values. On another level, though,

individual church members also express support for democratic values, stemming from their attempts to live out their faith in society. The data that I have for this analysis are individual level data. Therefore, I can explicitly model and test church influence on democratic values at the individual level. Church influence on democratic values at the society level could also be formally modeled and tested, but the model would be overly complex. Adding this contextual variable would require a model which tests for interaction between a variable indicating the nature of civil society and individual attitudes of democratic support.

Instead of adding another level of complexity I have chosen to test this model at the individual level separately for each country. I then explain these individual results separately, within the context of the particular civil society/state context of each country. Since I do not have a direct measure of this contextual variable it is possible that between country differences in effect could also be due to other variables not captured in these models. Therefore, this relationship remains implicit and suggestive in this analysis, and I do not explicitly test alternative country-specific explanations of difference. But my results do point in the direction of context-specific differences in the effect of church attendance on support for democratic values.

From this context, then, I have proposed a conceptual model of the effect of civil society on church support for democratic values in these countries of central and eastern Europe. In countries where civil society has been severely repressed, where the church was excluded from any possibility of meaningful participation in the state, such as eastern Germany and Poland, the church has responded on both levels with strong support for

democratic values. In countries where the state/church relationship was less defined, such as Hungary, where the church had a legitimate voice in society and consequently felt that it had a role in the state, the church has not felt so strongly the need to preserve and express support for democratic values.

In the next chapter I provide a brief comparative-historical account of the relationship between church and state in each of these three countries, up to the point of their democratic transformations in 1989. I state formal hypotheses of the relationships between church attendance and particular democratic values for each of these countries. In chapter three I discuss the data and methods I use for my analysis of church support of democratic values.

In chapter four I provide a descriptive analysis of the present demographic characteristics and religious beliefs of church attenders in eastern Germany, Poland and Hungary, as of 1990 and 1991. I compare these characteristics and beliefs with the case of western Germany, as a comparable western democracy. In chapter five I examine the effect of church attendance on a variety of democratic values, separately for each of the countries. I focus in particular on the priestly vs. the prophetic influences, to see which influence predominates in support of democratic values in each of the countries. Finally, chapter six will summarize my findings and discuss directions for further research.

CHAPTER II

OVERVIEW OF THE ROLE OF THE CHURCHES DURING COMMUNISM

Each of the countries under Soviet control had their own state-level government organizations, and each State had some level of autonomy in determining policy toward their churches. Therefore, church-state relations in each of the countries under Soviet control varied, depending on the nature of state-level government policy toward the churches and the level of active participation or resistance of the churches in each country. In this chapter I will evaluate that relationship separately for each of the Eastern European countries in this study, to see how the churches reacted to communist domination in each country.

East Germany

In Germany, the Protestant church is more closely identified with the social structure and power of the State (Gauly 1991), whereas the Catholic church remains more closely identified with the power of the Vatican in Rome. For this reason, plus the fact that the former East Germany has traditionally been nearly entirely Protestant, it is more important for our purposes to focus on how the Protestant church developed as opposition leader of the democratization movement in eastern Germany.

The role of the Protestant church in Germany has been that of "State Church" -- the officially recognized and designated religious institution of the state (Herms 1989). Since the Peace of Augsburg (1555) and the rise of the modern state, Protestant church boundaries in Germany have been equated with state boundaries (Goeckel 1990). Each

state had its own *Landeskirche* -- State Church. The various *Landeskirchen* were united on a national level into the *Deutscher Evangelischer Kirchenbund* (1922) which evolved into the Evangelical Churches in Germany, or EKD in 1948. There was little competition from other denominations or sects, and in return for its loyalty the church received semi-autonomous status within the state. It was supported financially by a *Kirchensteuer*, a federally collected tax on individuals, and granted freedom of assembly and a limited free press (Gellner 1991). Although church leaders could provide advice to state leaders, there was little opposition to the regime in this arrangement. The church promoted civic values, educated good citizens and provided social services such as hospitals, homes for the infirm and counseling services.

Upon inheriting the eight *Landeskirchen* of East Germany at the end of World War II, the Stalinist regime saw a benefit in allowing the institution to continue to exist. The East German government managed quite successfully to use the Protestant church to promote cooperation of citizens within the socialist society, while at the same time marginalizing the place of the church among the population.[2] While in 1950 the proportion of religious adherents was nearly identical in eastern and western Germany,

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[2] The East German regime was less successful in its attempts to control the Catholic church (Ockenfels 1989; Zander 1992). However, because the Catholic church represents such a small constituency in eastern Germany, the Protestant church was by far the most significant political actor in the struggle. See Krisch 1985, Grass 1990, and Spohn 1991 for brief, but illuminating, explanations of the predominance of the Protestant church in eastern Germany.

approximately 90% of the population, by 1989 the proportion of adherents in the East had dropped dramatically, to approximately 36% of the population (Lemke 1989).[3]

Compromises of the East German Protestant Church

The East German regime managed this dramatic reduction in religious affiliation through a series of deliberate maneuvers designed to marginalize the effectiveness of the church. At the same time, it permitted the church enough autonomy to continue, as an institution of civil society, to legitimize the regime. For example, the church was totally excluded from the education of the young when the state took over the operation of the schools in 1946 (Hutten 1967). Although religious instruction in the schools was a right guaranteed to churches in the 1949 constitution, this practice was nevertheless forbidden by the state and the churches were compelled to set up alternative means of religious instruction for children. At the same time the *Kirchensteuer*, the federal tax collected to support the churches, was eliminated in East Germany, and the East German churches were forced to rely on private donations for support (McCauley 1983).

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[3] Lemke cited these membership figures as published by Gunnar Winkler, ed., in Sozialreport '90. Daten und Fakten zur sozialen Lage in der DDR (Social Report '90. Data and Facts on Social Conditions in the G.D.R., page 308). For comparison, Roski cites 1991 der Spiegel survey church membership statistics of 93% for western Germany and 32% for eastern Germany. Similarly, results from a survey conducted by the Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach in September 1991 show 86% of western Germans and 31% of eastern Germans claim membership in a church. The declining rates of church membership in eastern Germany are not a function of data manipulation on the part of East German demographers but rather a function of the powerful social pressure against church involvement exerted upon the East German population during 45 years of Soviet domination.

Young Christians faced severe discrimination in their educational opportunities, the churches faced great difficulties in building repair and maintenance, restrictions were placed on the activities of the church -- in these and many other ways church members were made to feel like second-class citizens (Childs 1983). These concessions provide evidence of the marginal position of the church relative to the state, but other compromises made by the church had even farther reaching consequences.

The church was compelled to accept the *Jugendweihe*, the secular confirmation ceremony in which young people profess their loyalty to the state. For a time, the church opposed this ceremony and refused the religious equivalent to those youth who had participated in the secular ceremony, but by 1960 the number of young people opting for religious confirmation had dropped so drastically that the church lifted its ban. It was clear that the social pressure to participate in the *Jugendweihe* was far stronger than the power of the church to oppose it (Dennis 1988).

Another way the church compromised its position relative to the state was in response to the militarization policies of the state. The church was a leader in the movement to allow alternatives to full military service in the 1960s, but was unsuccessful in its struggle against compulsory military science studies in the schools (Cordell 1990). Once again, the church took a strong oppositional stand each time a new policy was introduced by the state, but compromised or moderated its position in response to state pressure.

A final significant concession made by the church concerned the formation of a separate organizational body for Protestant churches in East Germany -- the League of

Evangelical Churches (BEK). The eight *Landeskirchen* of East Germany had been formally united with the other Protestant churches of West Germany through their pan-German national organization, the Evangelical Churches in Germany (EKD) since 1948. Although they managed to hold out until 1969, difficulties in traveling between East and West, as well as increasingly disparate problems of the two societies, finally led church leaders to acknowledge the need for separate coordinating bodies (Krisch 1985; Cordell 1990; Neubert 1991).

Each of these concessions and compromises marginalized the position of the church in East German society. Yet there were other instances where the church gained concessions from the state and thereby retained its place as an institution of civil society. The success of this persistence against the regime elevated the legitimacy of the church, which gradually assumed responsibility for the protection and promotion of the opposition prodemocracy movement.

Persistence of the East German Protestant Church

The Protestant church in East Germany maintained enough legitimacy in society to achieve certain concessions from the state which helped it to persist in society. Although the East German communist government was ideologically opposed to religion in society, the church provided certain social benefits which the regime recognized as useful and necessary. For example, it was a major force in health and social services during the years of state socialism, administering over 50 hospitals, 89 institutions for the physically handicapped and numerous other similar institutions (Krisch 1985). It was a major private employer, providing jobs for people who otherwise would have been

dependent on the state. It provided counseling and support for thousands, in a state threatened by alarmingly high rates of divorce, suicide and alcoholism (Smith 1985). The church was also the source of significant sums of hard western currency, generously provided by western churches to support the activities of the church in the East (Smith 1985).

To preserve this uneasy truce between church and state in 1971 Bishop Albrecht Schönherr, head of the BEK, announced that the church was willing to legitimize the regime, provided it was taken seriously as a partner. The new church attitude of loyal opposition was summed up in Bishop Schönherr's statement: "We do not want to be a church against, or alongside, but in socialism" (Krisch 1985). This compromise led to increased concessions by the state to the churches, including permission to establish new churches, increased access to radio and TV broadcast time, importation of some church literature from the West and increased state financial support for the churches (Smith 1985).

Opponents of Bishop Schönherr wanted the church to assume a more oppositional role at the time, but the church was not able to directly oppose the state for several reasons. First, although it was by far the largest religious denomination in East Germany, the church was not a majority organization. At best, no more than a third of the population were even nominal adherents by the mid 1970s. Second, because it was organized as a state church, most of its support lay within the boundaries of the state. Unlike the Polish Catholic church, which could mobilize support worldwide to sway

world opinion on the plight of workers fighting for democracy, the East German Protestant church had lost its last link with the West upon the establishment of the BEK.

Consequences of the "Church in Socialism" Policy

The advantage of the "church in socialism" policy for the church was a relaxing of the Party's control and an increase of the relative power of the church in East German society (Scharf 1984; Krisch 1985). The disadvantage was that by aligning itself with the state the church could be seen as just another arm of the state, and as the state lost legitimacy, so did the church. It was seen by some as having sold out to the regime; they felt the church had abdicated its legitimate opposition to the regime to preserve a few limited concessions. Therefore, although the church was allowed greater freedom of assembly, access to television and radio, as well as its own independent news agency, its message reflected at least superficial support of the regime (Childs 1983).

As the church became involved in the peace movement of the 1980's, this attitude began to change gradually and it gained recognition as an opposition force. The church became an organizational umbrella for various peace initiatives which evolved as a reaction to the increased militarization of East German society at all levels. These groups organized around public opposition to cold war policies such as mandatory defense studies in the schools and compulsory military service for young men. Despite its official policy of cooperation with the regime, the church helped create and later support a host of oppositional groups in East Germany in the 1980s (Ramet 1984). To a large extent, this change was caused by a radical church faction which called on the church to "set an

example and challenge the state where it feels morally obliged so to do" (Cordell 1990, p.56).

From this position, the church needed to make only a small step to support the various political reform groups of the late 1980s (Cordell 1990). These included citizens committees, or action groups, which evolved from the Peace Movement and became increasingly political throughout the decade. They organized mass protest rallies attended by thousands, and addressed issues which had long been forbidden in East Germany. Although continually harassed by the secret police, these action groups created a second public sphere which received strong support from the western media. They grew quickly, to nearly 500 separate groups by 1988, and most of them found shelter within Protestant churches (Neugebauer 1993). The consequence of the political reform movement was German reunification. For church members in particular, some of whom could claim an active role in the delegitimation of the communist regime, the end result was a mixture of feelings of increased self-worth: pride in being German, enthusiasm about reunification and optimism about their future.[4]

In sum, the loyal opposition of the Protestant churches in East Germany allowed them political latitude which was unavailable to any other institution in the regime. As a result, the church served as protective "free spaces" for organized protest against the

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[4]The correlation (among eastern Germans) between church membership and pride in being German is .14, between church membership and joy about reunification is .22, between church membership and optimism (when comparing the present to the past) is .17, and between church membership and optimism (when comparing the future to the past) is .15. All correlations are significant at $p<.001$. These data are from the Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach, survey 5055.

regime.[5] This protest activity gradually broadened from specific actions against particularly oppressive policies of the state to broader human rights issues, peace initiatives and calls for democratic reforms. As the church took an increasingly public stand on these issues, church members felt empowered to support political action, to speak out against abuses by the state and to take a stand on democratic reform.

The church, therefore, affected the democratic reform of East Germany in two important ways. First, as an institution of civil society, it operated to some extent as a loyal opposition to the regime, raising issues of reform and providing organizational support for reform movements. Second, church members were increasingly empowered by their own political actions within the action groups and by the support of the church around these action groups to take the steps necessary to bring about democratic reform.

Poland

Poland has been a Catholic country since 966, when Prince Miezko of Poland married the daughter of Catholic Prince Boleslaw of Bohemia (Tobias 1956). Although invading armies and changing national borders have influenced the ethnic and religious composition of Poland, its predominant religious affiliation has remained Roman Catholic up to this day.

The relationship between the Roman Catholic church and the nation of Poland has been, since the Middle Ages, one of close identification. What friction there has been between church and state has most often been between nationalistic Catholicism and

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[5]See Evans and Boyte (1986) for a more thorough discussion of the importance of free spaces, created within civil society, to enable democratic participation.

liberal Protestantism or between the Catholic state church and the non-Catholic churches. The power of the Polish state has traditionally been closely linked with the power of the Polish episcopate (Tobias 1956).

One particularly strong characteristic of Polish culture, though, is the fact of Polish nationalism. Lacking natural geographic boundaries, such as great rivers or mountains, and with an unfortunately weak political structure, Poland has been overrun many times in its history, and partitioned out of existence twice in the past 200 years. In 1795 Poland ceased to exist as a state, having been divided between Tsarist Russia, Prussia and Austria. This "century of partition" lasted till the end of World War I and severely affected Poland's political culture and national identity. It also strongly affected Poland's Roman Catholic identity. Of the three occupying powers, only Austria pursued a tolerant policy toward the Poles; both Protestant Prussia and Orthodox Russia posed more fundamental threats to Polish identity. Therefore, the link between Poland and Roman Catholicism was strengthened (Ramet 1987). Especially important was the church's role in maintaining the Polish language. The church was the only institution allowed to express itself in Polish during the years of the partition, and therefore it became permanently identified with the protection of Polish language and culture (Kennedy and Simon 1983). From the time that Poland was reestablished as a country at the end of World War I its national identity as Catholic was firmly established. Increasingly, from this time forward, to be Polish meant to be Catholic, and to be Polish Catholic meant to be fiercely nationalistic.

Once again, however, in September 1939, Poland was partitioned -- this time between Germany and Russia:

> In German-occupied Poland, on orders from the Foreign Office of the German Evangelical Church, the churches were reorganized: Lutherans were to be assimilated into the German Church. Polish literature and Bibles were destroyed and the theological faculty closed... In Russian-occupied Poland much church property was immediately confiscated and some monasteries were stripped. After the incorporation of Eastern Poland into the USSR as a republic, the Orthodox Church was temporarily protected from the oppression of the former Roman Catholic Church-State (Tobias 1956, p.384).

Following this partition the Poland which was reestablished was even more uniformly Catholic than before. In fact, the political borders established for Poland after World War II increased the proportion of Catholics to greater than 90% of the total population:

> The post-war border changes along with the German extermination of nearly three million Polish Jews made Poland, for the first time in centuries, an almost homogeneous Catholic country in which non-Catholics made up less than 3 per cent of the population. At the Teheran meeting in 1943, the Big Three agreed that the 1920 Curzon line would form the basis for Poland's eastern frontier. This meant that the Polish lands annexed by the Soviet Union in 1939, where the majority of Poland's non-Catholics lived, would remain in Soviet hands. Two years later, at Yalta, Poland's right to the lands annexed from eastern Germany was recognized, but without being defined. At Potsdam in 1945, the new Polish-German frontier, 220 miles west of the former one, was fixed, and Germans were expelled from Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary.
>
> The Catholic Church, with a structure equal to the Communist Party's and a wide social base that the Communists lacked -- the Party had only 40,000 members when the Red Army arrived -- was a worthy adversary. The church represented great power, with over 90 per cent of the people united in faith (Broun 1988).

It was this social base of the Catholic church in Poland which helped it to evolve into an institution of civil society, and an opposition force to the Communist regime in

Poland. The relationship between Poland and Russia has always been tenuous, and Poles were deeply resentful of the Soviet control of their society following World War II.

Opposition Between the Church and the State

The separation of church and state was formalized in the constitution of 1952. Questions about religious affiliation were removed from all application forms, the teaching of religion in public schools was forbidden, all church property and nearly all church-run schools were nationalized, and only civil marriages were recognized as valid (Strassberg 1988). In 1953 the state even took over responsibility for appointing bishops and pastors and determining parish and diocesan territorial boundaries. Tension between the church and the state was so high that the Polish primate, Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński, was imprisoned from 1953 to 1956 for refusing to cooperate with the government (Strassberg 1988).

One of the most effective ways for ordinary citizens to flaunt their opposition to the Soviet regime and its communist ideology was by continuing to support the churches. Attendance at Sunday Mass become not only a religious obligation, but also a reaffirmation of Polish identity and a subtle form of public protest against the regime (Nielsen 1991). Poles who continued to affirm their religious identity in the face of totalitarian power were at the same time asserting their autonomy. They delegitimated the power of the state and legitimated the power of the church by their actions.

While this action was not discouraged by the church, it was not the official policy of the Polish church to encourage disloyalty to the regime. Cardinal Wyszyński became convinced that it was necessary to reach a compromise with the state in order to maintain

an effective Catholic presence in Poland. So although the Vatican did not recognize the legitimacy of the Polish communist regime, Cardinal Wyszyński agreed in 1956 to a nineteen-point accord with the state that included concessions on both sides (Nielsen 1991). Religion could once again be taught in public schools; church authorities regained a voice in the selection of bishops, pastors, and chaplains; and while civil marriages remained the only form recognized as valid by the state, an additional religious ceremony was once again allowed (Strassberg 1988). Additional concessions by the church included a loyalty oath for all bishops, state regulation of church-sponsored organizations, and state permission before any church-sponsored construction could begin.

The church and the state continued their struggles for the allegiance of the people throughout Wyszyński's lifetime. When the regime ordered religious instruction banned in the public schools, the church opened its own catechetical centers, which functioned even more effectively. And for the millennial celebration of Christianity in Poland in 1966 the church planned a brilliant appeal to both Polish history and piety. The Cardinal called for a year-long round of Marian devotions, a "Great Novena." All Catholics personally were to take the vows of loyalty to God and the Virgin Mary made by Polish noblemen after they had successfully defended the monastery of Czestochowa against the Swedes in 1656. The icon of our Lady of Czestochowa, the "Black Madonna," was sent out to visit every church throughout the country. Communist officials made every effort to hinder the visitation, and the icon was occasionally "arrested." Many churches were visited only by its empty frame (Broun 1988, p.182). In retaliation, the state revoked

Wyszyński's passport, thus preventing him from attending the first bishop's synod after the Second Vatican Council (Strassberg 1988).

The Prophetic Voice of the Church

Church/state relations evolved in scale from a strictly Polish matter into a more international dialog during the 1970s, primarily due to two significant events. The first was the Vatican's recognition of state ownership of the western territories. Since World War II, the western territories of Poland had been under the direct jurisdiction of the Holy See. In 1972 Pope Paul VI acknowledged the Polish state as the rightful owners of this territory, and the state in turn transferred jurisdiction over them to the Polish bishops (Strassberg 1988). This led to more direct links between Polish state authorities and the Vatican.

The second significant event of the seventies was the election of Cardinal Karol Wojtyła as Pope John Paul II on October 16, 1978. From this moment on, Polish church/state relations assumed international proportions. The entire world watched as Pope John Paul II returned to his homeland for a nine-day visit in June, 1979. Speaking to a crowd of half a million people in the center of Warsaw, the pope issued a strongly prophetic appeal to the people for spiritual renewal. He said nothing which could be construed as an attack on the regime, nor did he exhort the people to rise in revolt. Instead, he spoke straight past the government and appealed to the strong link between nation and church of the Polish people. "He evoked an ancient Christian nation, as if Communist rule was a transient phenomenon of little importance " (Ascherson 1988). The effect of this visit was immediate, powerful, and long-lasting. The Polish people

realized finally that the message that KOR and the rest of the Polish opposition had been trying to put across was true: the Polish nation was ready for democracy.

The Church and the Solidarity Movement

The independent trade union Solidarity was formed in the late summer of 1980 as a result of the workers' strike at the Lenin shipyard at Gdańsk. The workers' opposition movement which encompassed it, though, had its roots in the mid-1970s in a coalition between intellectuals of the dissident Left and the Catholic church, called the Workers' Defense Committee (KOR). This unlikely alliance worked in Poland because both groups felt excluded by the state, and they found common ground in the discussion of liberal democratic values espoused by the left and essential human rights espoused by the church.

KOR did not directly organize the Solidarity Trade Union; Michnik and the other members of KOR initially opposed the demand for free trade unions as unattainable (Michnik 1993). Neither did the church have any direct role in the organization of Solidarity -- in fact, Solidarity always felt much closer to the church than the church felt to Solidarity (Ost 1990). Nevertheless, both organizations had an important influence on the origin and direction of Solidarity. KOR provided the intellectual framework for Solidarity; the church provided spiritual direction and institutional legitimacy.

Solidarity was inextricably linked to the church. Pictures of the Black Madonna of Czestochowa or the Pope accompanied all workers' protests. At the Lenin shipyard in Gdańsk during the strike the gates would open once a day to allow a priest to enter and pray with the striking workers (Ascherson 1988). The workers, for whom patriotism and

Catholicism were inseparable, simply assumed that because they were acting for Poland, they had the support of the church behind them.

The church was more interested in compromise than in conflict, though, fearing that an escalation might lead to Soviet intervention and suppression of existing rights. Thus there was no official statement either of support or protest by the Catholic hierarchy during this time, although several groups of Catholic laypersons became increasingly involved in the movement. Church officials soon became increasingly involved, whether they wanted to or not:

> Cardinal Wyszyński appeared on television to appeal for peace and work, and on August 26 the main council of the Polish bishops met at Jasna Gora in Czestochowa to discuss the reasons for social discontent, the issue of civil rights, and the question of social and moral revival in Poland. On August 31 representatives of Solidarity and the state signed the so-called Gdańsk Agreement, which allowed more religious freedom, including the broadcasting of Sunday masses. In early September Cardinal Wyszyński met for the first time with Solidarity's leader Lech Wałęsa, and from September 24 to the end of the year, a joint commission of the bishops and the government met eighty-one times. During the spring of 1981, after the riots in Bydgoszcz, the social tensions in Poland dramatically increased. Upon receiving a letter from the pope requesting that every possible effort be undertaken to solve the existing problems in a peaceful way, Cardinal Wyszyński met first with General Wojciech Jaruzelski and, two days later, with Lech Wałęsa. As a result of these meetings, the so-called Warsaw Agreement was signed on April 1, 1981, as the foundation for a peaceful compromise (Strassberg 1988, p. 194).

The succession of Cardinal Jozef Glemp as Primate of Poland upon the death of Cardinal Wyszyński in the Spring of 1981 signaled a turn away from active involvement of the church in the Solidarity movement. But social and political pressure continued to mount, and martial law was declared on December 13, 1981. The Solidarity trade union was outlawed and over 10,000 people were confined in internment camps or prisons,

including even Lech Wałęsa. The church opposed martial law and served as refuge and support for Solidarity activists, but it openly declared its willingness to work with the government in finding a solution to the civil unrest (Ost 1990). And the government increasingly expressed willingness to work with the church as a legitimate representative of civil society.

The conflict continued as it had before, but increasingly the church was drawn in as church activists became politicized. In 1983 there was a political battle in defense of the right of public schools to display crosses in the classroom. Special masses were held for Solidarity and many priests were guest speakers. The end of martial law in July, 1983, after a second papal visit, resulted in a consolidation of power in Poland between the Catholic church on one side and the military government of Jaruzelski on the other side. Since Solidarity was gone, except as an illegal opposition, the influence of the church increased substantially. Repeatedly, the church called for the restoration of Solidarity and civil rights, provided support for the internees and their families, distributed food, clothing, and medical supplies brought in by Western voluntary organizations, and in other ways provided assistance to the underground opposition.

Finally, in 1984, things came to a head in the conflict between church and state with the murder of a priest by a group of secret policemen from the religious affairs department of the ministry of the interior. Father Jerzy Popiełuszko was a very popular supporter of Solidarity, and had been the target of previous press attacks and police harassment. He was kidnaped and assassinated by three policemen in retribution for his anti-government sermons. The affair caused a tremendous outcry, and the three were

eventually convicted and given prison sentences. But instead of quelling the movement for Solidarity in Warsaw, the death of Father Popiełuszko created a martyr for the cause and galvanized public sentiment against the regime. Candlelight protest processions were organized in the churches and attended by thousands of frustrated citizens. Crosses were erected at street intersections to remind protestors of the cost of their sacrifice and to protect demonstrators from military intervention. And when the government at last sat down to discuss reforms at the Polish Round Table negotiations of February-April 1989, the church had an official negotiating seat at those talks.

In sum, the church in Poland influenced the regime change on a more institutional level than did the church in East Germany. In Poland, the church was primarily an institutional actor; it was legitimated by the people as an official voice of opposition to the regime. It received additional legitimacy from its supranational ties to the Vatican in Rome. While the church in East Germany had to rely on the combined voices of the bishops of the nine states of East Germany for their authority, Polish bishops could appeal to the Church of Rome for their authority. Thus, the church in Poland was a force to be reckoned with in the struggle to reestablish civil society. The prophetic voices of John Paul II, Father Popiełuszko, and other church leaders who spoke eloquently for a return to a democratic Poland certainly furthered the cause of democracy by galvanizing public opinion around the issue. But once the power of the institutional church in Poland had been mobilized behind the movement for democracy it is likely that success would have been only a matter of time, even without these voices.

Hungary

The relationship between church and state in Hungary was quite different from that of either Poland or East Germany. Though the churches in Hungary were also repressed by the communist regime, they chose cooperation early on as their preferred method of interacting with the regime. The church in Hungary operated alongside the state, and there was never the severity of antagonism between church and state which prevailed in Poland and East Germany.

Hungarians have always been religiously plural, about two-thirds Roman Catholic and one-third Protestant (Calvinist, the larger denomination, and Lutheran). But Catholicism has never been linked with nationalism the way it is in Poland; in fact, some Calvinists still regard themselves as the "true Hungarians" (Nielsen 1991). Nevertheless, since the naming of Emperor Franz Josef of Austria as King of Hungary in the middle of the 19th century, the country has been linked with Western Europe and identified as predominantly Roman Catholic. At this time, religious freedom was granted to almost all churches in Hungary. The law identified Roman and Greek Catholics, the Eastern Orthodox groups, the Reformed and Lutheran Churches, the Unitarians, and the Jewish congregations (since 1895) as "Accepted Religions." Three other denominations -- Baptists, Methodists, and Mohammedans -- were identified as "Recognized Religions" and enjoyed the same privileges of organization and freedom to conduct services and teach religion to their children, but they did not receive state support or have the privilege of collecting church dues as state taxes. Other religious groups were tolerated, but treated as persons "without religion" (Tobias 1956).

Roman Catholics were always the most numerous of the faiths and were also the most closely aligned with the government. In fact, the Catholic bishop of Esztergom held, by tradition, the rank of Prince and was second only to the King in political power. The Catholic church was the greatest landholder in Hungary; it controlled more than half of all schools and had the power to mandate obligatory religious instruction for all children. By the end of 1940 the churches were represented in Parliament by forty-eight religious leaders, of whom fourteen archbishops held their offices by "right of birth" (Tobias 1956, p. 430). Financing of the church's operations came from a long tradition of royal patronage, as well as income generated from its extensive landed estates. This cozy relationship between church and state in Hungary helped to protect the church from some of the more serious consequences experienced by churches in Poland and East Germany as a result of the significant transformations in the ensuing years of World War II and its aftermath.

The Hungarian religious hierarchy originally supported the nation's alliance with Nazi Germany, as the church gained lands and people in the alliance. Religious leadership was not threatened by the fascists, and the bishops were so adamantly opposed to any movement that was even remotely social democratic or communist that they interpreted the anti-Nazi activities of these groups as a threat to the established order. Church resistance to the Nazi presence in Hungary came primarily from a federation of Catholic organizations called the Catholic Social People's Movement. Formed in 1943 with the support of Prince Primate Seredi and Baron Archbishop Vilmos Apor of Győr, it eventually became the Christian Democratic People's Party and played a small part in the

postwar coalition government (Osa 1989). In contrast to the severe repression experienced by church in Poland, which was essentially forced underground for its operations, the church in Hungary continued to operate in the same manner as before, with the addition of some new restrictions imposed by the state.

With the Soviet takeover of Hungary after World War II, the Hungarian communist regime essentially sought to create a perfect new society. The entire institutional structure of society was rebuilt. In an attempt to create an ideal social system all the former elites lost their rights and power was delegated administratively. The primary effect of this restructuring for the churches was twofold. First, a complete restructuring of the religious hierarchy loosened the churches' grip on legitimate social power. All Catholic religious orders were banned and several bishops were placed under house arrest. Over half of all seminaries were ordered closed, and the church was compelled to submit all hierarchical appointments to the newly created State Office for the Church for approval (Ramet 1987). This move severely compromised the autonomy of the church.

Second, the state instituted a far-reaching series of land reforms, designed to redistribute income more equally. This had disastrous consequences for the church, which had been a major landowner. Most church income came from the revenue of its estates and the patronage of landed gentry. This money was used to support church programs such as schools, hospitals, and seminaries, as well as providing a major source of operating revenue for the dioceses. But there was tremendous support for land reform, especially among the peasantry, as Hungary transformed itself from a largely agrarian

society to an industrial society. The church tried to influence land reform so that its own economic base would not be seriously undermined, yet at the same time support redistribution in general. For example, in September 1945 Bishop Mindszenty urged Catholic farmers not to accept lands confiscated from the church (Tobias 1956). The church did manage to retain some 90,000 acres of property, and was subsidized by the government after 1951.

In general, the attitude of the church toward the Soviet occupied state was one of intransigence, primarily led by the Primate of the Catholic church, Cardinal Mindszenty. He refused to negotiate with the government and instead sent dramatic appeals to the United Nations, President Truman, and King George VI, publicizing the plight of Hungarians living in border areas of Czechoslovakia and Romania as a result of World War II border changes (Osa 1989). Mindszenty fought state takeover of the private schools, even though the state offered to leave teaching clergy in their jobs and to allow the continuation of religious instruction in the schools. The Primate refused to back down; he was arrested in the fall of 1948 and the compromises were revoked. His successor, Archbishop Joseph Grösz, signed the first agreement between church and state in 1950.

The signing of this agreement set the tenor for church/state relations from that point on. Those who were without political power -- most of the rural and elderly population -- retained ties with the church. Those who possessed or sought to acquire power distanced themselves from the church. As the state progressed from an agricultural economy to an industrial economy the church, in turn, moved from a position

of nearly equal power with the state to a position very much subordinate in power with the state. The process is popularly known in the sociology of religion literature as secularization, and is poignantly described by Tomka as follows:

> Rapid industrialization, urbanization, revolutionary growth in education, and, in consequence, an extreme mobility, destroyed both the strongly traditional religious culture and its interconnecting relationships based mostly on kinship and neighborhood, which had formerly sustained the religious culture. A crippled church could not substitute for this loss with a single hour of religious instruction and another hour's religious service per week; nor could it fully guarantee adequate religious socialization (Tomka 1988, p. 172).

In March, 1956, revolutionaries in Hungary attempted a revolt against the Soviet regime, which was violently quelled by Russian troops and tanks. All in Hungary suffered from this abortive revolution, and church leaders were among its innocent victims. Cardinal Mindszenty fled to the American Embassy. The Lutheran bishop, Lajor Ordass, was imprisoned. Clergy were forced to submit and conform to state policy, and those who refused to were forced out of their positions (Nielsen 1991). But the churches had not taken a leadership role in the revolution and thus were not singled out for reprisal by Stalin's troops. Instead, the church learned a valuable lesson about the devastating consequences of opposition to the Soviet regime from this failed revolution and decided that cooperation was the better course of action to follow.

Officially, the institutional church removed itself from the process of sociopolitical change and abdicated responsibility for influencing the evolution of the state. The churches operated under the control and supervision of the State Office for the Church, to whom they had to appeal for funds, appointments, buildings, and all

institutional functions. The church accepted as a self-limitation that it had nothing to do with the concerns of secular life, the public affairs of non-affiliates, or with social problems in society. In turn, the state removed all public expression of religious values from society and acknowledged the right of individuals to private expression of religiosity. So long as religion was a purely private and individual affair, religious practice was accepted as a human right. But all public expressions of religiosity were effectively marginalized. This meant that groups without social influence -- the poor, the elderly, the uneducated, and rural peasants -- were free to express their religiosity. But middle and upper class urban dwellers -- those who had a place in society and those who sought to improve their place in society -- had to subjugate and strictly privatize their religious beliefs or risk losing their place in society . This "social schizophrenia" helped bring about a sharp decline in religious practice in the 1960s and 1970s (Tomka 1988). Publicly, religion all but disappeared from Hungarian urban culture and society.

Unofficially, though, another religious movement was taking place within Hungarian society but outside the authority of the institution itself. Within the Reformed church a movement which called itself the Confessing Church came into existence in the 1950s. Composed of both clergy and laity, it was severely critical of what it called "the dictatorial attitudes of church leaders who allegedly intimidated pastors, forced changes upon local congregations, accused their opponents of heresy, and generally acted in violation of the Reformation heritage" (Beeson 1982, p. 281). Similarly, from within the Catholic church many priests, monks and nuns, whose orders had been legally dissolved by the regime, continued to gather in informal community groups to continue religious

education and a semi-underground Christian fellowship (Bailey 1991). These groups, as well as other groups of primarily lay Catholic intellectuals and young people, known as "basic" or "base" communities, took it upon themselves to substitute for the church's neglect of such areas as religious education, cultivating religious communities, and promoting spirituality, despite lack of official support or authorization from the institution itself. By the early 1970s these groups were so strong that Cardinal Lékai was called on by the state to control them. These groups, in contrast to the official institution which had maneuvered to a position of public isolation with regard to the state, were politically conscious and were often critical of both the state and the ecclesiastic hierarchy.

The base communities were particularly critical of Cardinal Lékai, accusing him of failing to take a firm line with the state, as Mindszenty had. Cardinal Lékai insisted on a cautious policy of full cooperation with the regime in exchange for small improvements for the institution. He believed that this limited partnership between church and state provided the best chance for gradual improvement of conditions in Hungary.

In contrast to Cardinal Lékai, the most threatening of the base communities, known as "the Bush," was led by Father Gyorgy Bulányi. This movement, comprised of some 200 groups of eight to fifteen members each, was strongly pacifist in character and sought to live out "the quintessential Catholic resistance to atheism. The bush members' insistence that the spiritual values of Christianity transcend political and temporal expediencies marks them as true heirs of Mindszenty" (Broun 1988, p.150). This movement, and Father Bulányi in particular, were seen as a threat by both the government

and the Hungarian religious hierarchy, although the Vatican refused to excommunicate him.

The contrast between the two religious leaders, Lékai and Bulányi, illustrates the impossible situation of the church in Hungarian civil society under the Soviet regime. The official institution, characterized by Lékai, was paralyzed into inactivity by its history of cooperation between throne and altar. Every step that was made, every gain or concession accomplished from the state, was criticized by the people as too little and too late. Committed Christians, such as those who were attracted to Bulányi, were repelled from involvement with the institution because they felt that Lékai had sold out to the regime. Therefore, they did little to push the church to reform. Instead, they gave up on the institution and sought religiosity in the base communities. The base communities were also the source of their political consciousness, as social justice was an important component of the Christian commitment shared in the base communities.

By the late 1980s, though the churches were in no way united in their commitment to or relationship with the regime, they did unite on one particular political issue with far-reaching ramifications. Large groups of ethnic Hungarians living in Romania had increasingly sought refuge in Hungary as their plight worsened under the Ceausescu regime. At the same time, increasingly greater numbers of East German tourists arrived in Hungary and sought safe passage there to the West. Because of their express commitment to human rights, the churches united to form an ecumenical ministry to Romanian and East German refugees.

> And then, in a remarkable appeal, Bishop Tóth, the Roman Catholic Primate László Cardinal Paskai and Dr. László Lehel, general secretary of the Ecumenical Council, urged the government to open the border to Austria and guarantee the East Germans safe passage. The government, still led by members of the former Communist Party, agreed. Soldiers with wire cutters opened the fences. Land mines were carefully removed. The frontier was opened so that East Germans and later Czechs and Romanian refugees walked safely and easily into Austria. There they were welcomed and provided with transportation to West Germany. The first chink in the Berlin Wall had been chipped away (Bailey 1991, p. 71).

In sum, the church in Hungary had relatively little to do with the democratic transition there. Hungary is a confessionally mixed country with a long tradition of close cooperation between church and state. Although this relationship had been reinterpreted with the imposition of communism, it had not disappeared. The churches continued to operate at the service of the state, supporting government policies almost without exception. The churches' self-imposed withdrawal from the public sphere accelerated secularization there, as religion became a strictly private matter. The revolutionary changes of 1989 were most of all the work of reform communists, and religion benefitted from them. Religious freedom and tolerance came with the democratic transition, but collaboration with the communist regime had invaded the church in a way that it had not in Poland and East Germany.

The differences between the Hungarian experience and that of the churches of Poland and East Germany are clear. In Hungary there was a communist ordered hierarchy of control, with the state at the top. Bishops were state appointed. Persons designated by the state as leaders of religious congregations were held accountable for what went on in their respective communities. In exchange, they received a certain

amount of political power, which came from the state, not from their communities. They were expected to control those communities, and if they proved to be unable to provide control, they were removed by the state. Consequently, church members came to understand that their religious leaders were compromised by the state and corrupted. In response, church attendance dropped dramatically in the 1960s and 1970s, as church members experienced negative sanctions for affiliation and saw that church leaders would not interfere with state policies. The net result was alienation from the churches, especially among the younger, better educated, and more urban Hungarians, who stood to gain the most from turning away from the church. Therefore, I expect that Hungarian church attenders will show less support for democratic values than church attenders in either Poland or East Germany, where the churches took more of an opposition stance to the regime and were more involved in the democratic transitions.

HYPOTHESES

From the review of the literature in Chapter I, as well as the comparative historical framework of the evolution of church-state relations in East Germany, Poland and Hungary reported above, I now formulate the following hypotheses concerning church support for democratic values in post-transition societies. The hypotheses are arranged according to how well the democratic values express either the priestly tradition or the prophetic tradition.

Democratic Values Reflecting the Priestly Tradition -- Power from Above

The priestly tradition is a strong force in the political culture of church members. The institutional church will always recognize the authority of the regime that is in

power, regardless of its attitude toward the church. This is because the priestly tradition emphasizes the need for order over the need for justice. This tradition recognizes that earthly power comes from God, and is externally imposed from above in a hierarchically arranged system. That is, those who are in power in society, according to the priestly tradition, have authority which comes from God and which must be obeyed, regardless of the political orientation or morality of the rulers, in order to ensure an orderly society. As long at the church is allowed room to operate in society relatively free from constraint by the state so that it can promote traditional moral values, preserve ritual and provide for the salvation of souls, the church will be inclined to accommodate to the *status quo*. That, in turn, has implications for individuals within the church. For individuals, the priestly tradition will influence them to express obedient political values. I expect the priestly tradition to affect political values among individuals in the following ways:

Hypothesis 1: Church attenders in these post-transition societies will be more supportive of the present regime, its political leaders and its institutions than persons who do not attend church. The priestly tradition of obedience to authority is a strong tenet of faith, especially in these relatively pre-modern churches who have been insulated from change by their isolation of the past 50 years. I expect that more frequent church attenders, who show their support (by their attendance) for the institutional church and the priestly tradition for which it stands, will more strongly express trust and confidence in the institutions of the state and support for the current administration than those who do not attend church.

Hypothesis 2: Church attenders in recently democratized eastern Germany will express similar levels of support for a democratic state as their coreligionists in western Germany. Although they do not yet have as much experience with a democratic form of state, they do have the example of western Germany as a successful democratic model, and the religious tolerance promised by a democratic state is a right cherished by religious people. Church attenders will express greater support for a democratic state and non-attenders, in both parts of Germany.

Democratic Values Which Lie Between the Priestly and the Prophetic Tradition

There are a number of democratic political values which are not clearly influenced by either the priestly or the prophetic tradition. Such democratic ideals as political tolerance, civil liberties, conflict and protest are difficult to classify into either tradition, as they lie generally outside of the scope of religion. Similarly, questions that deal with preference for a particular economic form have less in common with religious attitudes than do the other political and moral values examined here. Religious belief does influence these values, but the effect of religion is sometimes ambiguous. I have placed these relationships between the effects of the priestly and the prophetic traditions, because I believe that these values are influenced sometimes by both traditions, and sometimes by neither.

Hypothesis 3: Church attenders in post-transition societies will express similar attitudes toward individual freedoms and civil liberties as do church attenders in western European societies. These liberal democratic values do not correspond well with the strong priestly tradition of obedience to authority found in these mostly premodern

churches. Therefore, these are not democratic values which are actively promoted in the church and church members are less likely to have strong feelings about these more liberal democratic values. I expect church attenders to express only weak to moderate support for individual freedoms and civil liberties.

Hypothesis 4: Church attenders in post-transition societies are also likely to be ambiguous about support for protest. Normally, protest behaviors are not supported by church attenders, even in democratic societies, as these behaviors contradict the priestly tradition of obedience. However, protest behavior is supported by the prophetic tradition and public protests were successfully used by several of the churches to promote the transition to democracy, particularly in East Germany and Poland. Therefore, I expect that church attenders in these societies should be somewhat less likely to oppose protest than church attenders in western Germany.

Hypothesis 5: Churches generally uphold communitarian values and tend to favor some government redistribution of wealth. The Catholic church, in particular, has a long tradition of opposing capitalism for its pro-individual/anti-community values. However, church attenders in western democracies have tended to ignore church teaching on the role of government in the economy, interpreting this as the church going beyond its mandate. I expect that church attenders in post-transition societies will be similar to church attenders in western democracies in their attitudes about government responsibility in the economy. That is, church attenders will not support government intervention in the economy any more than non-attenders, either in providing jobs or in equalizing incomes.

Democratic Traditions Reflecting the Prophetic Tradition -- Power from Below

The effect of the prophetic tradition on the institutional church is more difficult to assess. The prophetic tradition recognizes that power is called out from within a community, and moves upward and outward into society from below. The prophetic tradition from within the institutional church is most often manifested in a call for justice on a global or transnational scale. But this call for justice from within can be seen by the existing power structure as a direct or implicit threat to the existing social order. That is why a transnational church, such as the Catholic church, can call for justice and democratic reform among its churches locked behind the Iron Curtain. But a state church, such as the organization of the Protestant churches in Germany, threatens its own order if it speaks loudly for reform from within the totalitarian order. Therefore, the prophetic call for justice among the Protestant churches was heard first as a call for demilitarization, world peace and social justice. It was not until near the end that the churches joined in support of the prodemocracy movement. The effect of the prophetic tradition within each of the churches can best be assessed here by evaluating the emergence of leaders from within the oppressed churches and how they spoke out to help bring about needed social change, as described above.

The effect of the prophetic tradition on individual church members may also be hypothesized. Because individual church members placed themselves in a position of opposition to the ruling communist regime by their decision to affiliate (or remain affiliated) with a church, whether or not they actually took an active part in the prodemocracy movement they did make a public statement of opposition by their

affiliation. Church members who responded to the prophetic tradition were expressing a call for justice. They were demanding social change from below the existing power structure. Immediately post-transition these individuals are expressing democratic values on a very personal level. They feel that in some way they had a part in winning a deciding victory. They now feel and express trust, optimism and efficacy. They are ready and willing to invest themselves in the democratic society that they supported and in some measure helped bring about. I expect the prophetic tradition to affect political values among individuals in the following ways:

Hypothesis 6: Church attenders will express greater levels of interpersonal trust than those who do not attend church, similar to their western coreligionists. Trust is a religious value reflecting the communitarian aspect of the prophetic tradition, as well as a democratic value. Even though interpersonal trust was very low in communist societies, church attenders have faithfully preserved that value and will express higher levels of trust in general, as well as trust in family members.

Hypothesis 7: Church attenders in post-transition societies will be more optimistic than those who do not attend church, and will likely be more optimistic than even their coreligionists in western Germany. They have much to be optimistic about. The situation for religious believers in post-transition societies is vastly improved over their previous situation. Church attenders will likely identify with those church leaders who spoke the prophetic call to justice which encouraged others to get involved and to help bring about this social change.

Hypothesis 8: Church attenders in eastern and western Germany will share similar feelings of political efficacy. Though they do not yet have the practical experience in democracy of western Germans, eastern German church attenders are firmly committed to the democratic system, and believe themselves to be competent democrats. The influence of the prophetic tradition and their recent experience in participatory democracy should help eastern Germans to feel confident that the democratic steps they are taking are the right ones for them. As for personal efficacy, this is not a trait that is normally associated with church attenders. In fact, church attendance is most often negatively associated with personal efficacy (Hougland and Christenson 1983) and church attenders tend to be skeptical or resistant to social change. I expect church attenders in post-transition societies to be similar to church attenders in western Germany in their level of personal efficacy.

CHAPTER III

DATA FOR THIS ANALYSIS

Data from five separate surveys conducted in the years immediately following the transitions are used in this analysis. Most of the data were collected during 1990-91; all were collected before early 1993. I will describe each of the data sets here in detail, then describe how each of the variables used in this analysis were constructed.

The International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) coordinates an annual survey in at least fifteen European countries (as well as the United States). These data were produced by the *Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung, Köln* and distributed through the ICPSR survey data archive at the University of Michigan. The 1990 survey concentrated on the role of government, and included Hungary (977 cases) and eastern Germany (1028 cases) as the first of the formerly communist countries to be surveyed, as well as western Germany (2812 cases) and eight other western democracies. The 1991 survey concentrated on the role of religion; this survey was fielded in both eastern and western Germany (1486 cases, 1346 cases), as well as the former Soviet satellite countries of Poland (1063 cases), Hungary (1000 cases), and Russia. This survey was made available to me by Dr. Andrew Greeley, a member of the ISSP Study Team.

Similarly, the European Values Systems Study Group carried out a cross-national survey of individuals in 42 nations throughout the world in 1990-93. These data were documented and distributed through the ICPSR survey data archive at the University of Michigan. The World Values Survey (WVS) includes modules on political values,

religious values, family values, environmental values, and so on. It was also conducted in eastern and western Germany (1336 cases, 2101 cases), Poland (938 cases), Hungary (999 cases), and several other former Soviet satellite countries. This survey was made available to me by Dr. Renata Köcher and Mr. Werner Süßlin, of the *Institut für Demoskopie*, Allensbach, Germany.

Finally, two surveys were conducted in eastern and western Germany in September 1991 and December 1992 by the *Institut für Demoskopie*, Allensbach, Germany. Commissioned by Dr. Frederick Weil and Dr. Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, the surveys ask a barrage of questions about political values. The 1991 survey (IfD 5055) includes 1039 western Germans and 1080 eastern Germans. The 1992 survey (IfD 5074) includes 1081 western Germans and 1131 eastern Germans. These five surveys allow me to empirically examine the political and religious values of church members in post-totalitarian societies and compare them to non-affiliates there and to church members in western Germany.

VARIABLES USED IN THIS ANALYSIS

The relationship that I wish to examine in this analysis is that between religious behavior and moral and political values. I want to show that church attendance has an effect on moral and political values. To do this, I must first control for other factors which also affect religious behavior and attitudes. Previous research has consistently shown that church attendance is not the same for all groups of people. Older people, women, less educated people, married people, and people from small communities are more likely to attend church (Sigelman 1977; Roof and McKinney 1989). To control for

these contributing factors, I include age, sex, education, marital status, and community size as controls in the models examining the relationship between religious behavior and moral and political attitudes.

Similarly, people from lower socioeconomic statuses are more likely to attend church, as are people who identify themselves as political conservatives. To address this relationship, I include dummy variables for employment status, occupation, and political party identification. I also include a scale of left/right political self-placement in the models to further specify political orientation.

Finally, there are several attitudinal variables that have been shown to affect political values. Those persons who express attitudes of national pride are more likely to express positive political attitudes. Those persons who are satisfied with their own economic condition are more likely to express positive political attitudes. And those persons who are politically engaged -- who express an interest in politics -- are more likely to express positive political attitudes. These variables must also be included in the models, to assess the contribution of religious behavior net of these factors on political attitudes. Table 3.1 illustrates the availability of each variable by country, across all data sets. One may wish to refer to this table while reading the following details of variable construction.

Independent Variables

These data were gathered by several different groups who employed a variety of coding schemes on the variables. In order to make the surveys comparable, I recoded the variables to the same scale wherever possible. Where that was not possible, I made sure

Table 3.1 Distribution of Variables Across Datasets and Countries

	World Values 1990				ISSP 1990			ISSP 1991				IfD 1991		IfD 1992	
	WG	EG	H	P	WG	EG	H	WG	EG	H	P	WG	EG	WG	EG
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES															
Age Category	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Attend Church	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Secondary Education	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Higher Income	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Left-Right Placement	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X		X	X	X	X	X
Married or Living as	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Female	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Community Size	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Union Member	X	X	X		X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Left Radical Vote		X	X	X		X	X		X	X			X		X
Center-Left Vote	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Center-Right Vote	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Right Radical Vote	X				X	X		X	X		X	X	X	X	X
Unemployed	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
White Collar Occupation	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Blue Collar Occupation	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Self Employed	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
National Pride	X	X	X	X								X	X	X	X
Economically Satisfied	X	X	X	X								X	X	X	X
Interest in Politics	X	X	X	X	X	X	X					X	X	X	X

(table con'd.)

	World Values 1990				ISSP 1990			ISSP 1991				IfD 1991		IfD 1992	
	WG	EG	H	P	WG	EG	H	WG	EG	H	P	WG	EG	WG	EG
CHAPTER IV VARIABLES															
Religious Beliefs Factor								X	X	X	X				
Follow Conscience/Obey					X	X	X								
Right/Wrong by God's Law								X	X	X	X				
Right/Wrong by Society								X	X	X	X				
Traditional Role for Women	X	X	X												
Husband Job/Wife Home								X	X	X	X				
Family Life Suffers								X	X	X	X				
Believers Hold Public Office								X	X	X	X				
Unbelievers Unfit for Office								X	X	X	X				
Religion Influence Govt.								X	X	X	X				
Religion Influence the Vote								X	X	X	X				
Churches Too Much Power								X	X	X	X				

(table con'd.)

	World Values 1990				ISSP 1990			ISSP 1991				IfD 1991		IfD 1992	
	WG	EG	H	P	WG	EG	H	WG	EG	H	P	WG	EG	WG	EG
CHAPTER V VARIABLES															
Confidence in State Inst.	X	X	X	X				X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Trust Government												X	X	X	X
Support Democratic Form												X	X	X	X
Freedom and Law												X	X	X	X
Tolerate Free Speech												X	X	X	X
Citizens Have Free Speech												X	X	X	X
Free Speech Factor												X	X	X	X
Support Protest Behaviors	X	X	X												
Tolerate Protest Behaviors					X	X	X								
Government Repression												X	X		
Government Provide Jobs					X	X	X	X	X	X	X				
Government Equalize Income					X	X	X	X	X	X	X				
Family Can be Trusted	X	X	X	X											
People Can be Trusted	X	X	X	X								X	X	X	X
Life is Happy								X	X	X	X				
Reunification Joy												X	X	X	X
Now Better Than Past												X	X	X	X
Future Better Than Past												X	X	X	X
Political Efficacy Factor												X	X	X	X
People Can't Change Lives								X	X	X	X				
Favor Change	X	X	X												

that the variables that I used measured the same thing across data sets and that they were coded in the same direction across data sets. For example, "income" means "total household income" whether it is measured in zlotys or Deutsche marks, and greater income is given a greater value. All opinion questions are recoded so that missing values are included in a middle category.

Age. Most of the surveys restricted their samples to adults aged 18 and over in the population. However, in the ISSP 1991 Poland restricted its sample to adults between the ages of 16 and 65 in the population. Some of the surveys reported respondents' actual ages. Other surveys reported age by categories. I recoded age into six categories, so that the scale would be the same for each data set. Age ranges from a value of one for those who are 24 years old or less to a value of six for those who are 65 years old or greater.

Church Attendance. The primary independent variable, used to measure strength of affiliation with a religious denomination, is a five-point scale of frequency of church attendance. Each of the data sets used a variety of coding schemes to code church attendance. In order to standardize across the data I recoded the variable where necessary into five comparable categories. The categories range from zero for those who say they never attend church to five for those who say they attend at least weekly.

Education. Education was measured using country-specific coding for level of education attained by the respondent. Sometimes this was reported as years of education, sometimes it was reported as school level completed by respondent. For comparability, I

have recoded education into a dummy variable. Education has a value of one for respondents who completed at least secondary education and zero for those who did not.[6]

Income. This variable measures respondents' total household income for all data sets, but proved to be unwieldy to recode into the same metric. Each survey uses country-specific income categories to report income, and furthermore, the number of income categories range from a low of five categories to a high of 22 categories. Rather than try to convert country-specific amounts to some standard (such as exchange value in $US at the time of the survey) and then restrict the converted values to comparable categories across data sets, I elected to retain the integrity of the original reported incomes. Therefore, across all countries in all surveys greater values for income represent greater levels of household income, with no further comparability implied.

Left/Right Self-Placement. Respondents were asked to place themselves on a scale of political ideology. In most cases this was a ten-point scale; one represents the political left and 10 represents the political right. The IfD surveys employed a 100-point scale; zero represents the political left and 100 represents the political right. Rather than trying to impose some sort of reducing metric on this scale to force it to conform to the ten-point scale, I left the scales as they are reported. Therefore, increased values in

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[6]I also tested education as it was originally coded, with several categories of education -- higher values indicating more education completed. There was very little difference in effect between either coding scheme, and the value for church attendance did not change significantly in any model. Therefore, I chose to display the results for education coded as a dummy variable, since completion of secondary education is a more meaningful threshold concept.

left/right self-placement indicate increased identification with the political right; no further comparability is implied.

Marital Status. Again, a variety of coding schemes measured current marital status of respondent. The ISSP surveys reported married or living together as one category. In all the other surveys I recoded those who reported they are married as well as those who reported they are single but living with a partner into one category. I then created a dummy variable for marital status. This variable has a value of one for those who are married or living with a partner and zero for those who are not.

Sex. This variable was coded identically across all surveys. I recoded the variable into a dummy variable, with a value of one for females and zero for males.

Community Size. Respondents were asked to report the size of their community of residence. Although these data sets used a variety of coding schemes to report size of community, it was possible to recode each of them into a comparable scale. Community size is reported here in a five-point scale, with a value of one for communities with less than 5,000 residents and a value of five for communities with more than 100,000 residents.

Union Membership. This variable was not available in all surveys, but was included in the analysis wherever it could be incorporated. Union membership is a dummy variable with a value of one for those who report they belong to a union and zero for all others.

Political Party Identification. All surveys asked respondents some form of question about identification with a particular political party. Since Europeans do not

usually formally affiliate with a political party, the most common way to ask about party identification is to ask respondents to identify which political party they would vote for if a federal election were held on the following day . Using this question, and the objective political orientations of the various country-specific parties, I created four dummy variables for political party identification.

Left-radical vote intention is coded one for those who would vote for the party most strongly identified with the former communists in that particular country (PDS or DKP in eastern Germany, MSZMP in Hungary, PZPR in Poland, doesn't exist for western Germany), zero otherwise.

Center-left vote intention is coded one for those who would vote for the major center-left party (SPD in Germany, the center-left opposition alliance of MSZP, SZDSZ and FIDESZ in Hungary, and the Social Democrats in Poland), zero otherwise. Center-right vote intention is coded one for those who would vote for the major center-right party (CDU/CSU/DSU in Germany, the center-right ruling coalition of MDF, FKgP and KDNP in Hungary, and the Christian Democrats and Solidarity in Poland), zero otherwise.

Right-radical vote intention is coded one for those who would vote for an ultra-nationalist party (NPD and Republikaner in Germany, Real Politic Union or National Party for Poland), zero otherwise (see Racz 1993 for Hungarian parties' ideologies and Jasiewicz 1993 for Polish parties' ideologies).

In this way I have captured both extremes of political party identification for each of the countries, as well as the two main center parties (or party coalitions). The omitted

reference category for political party identification includes all those who would not express a political preference, as well as those who named a party not identified with either extreme or with the center. For example, Germans who said they would vote for the Greens/Bundnis '90 Party would be included in the omitted reference category, as that party is neither centrist nor extreme.

Unemployment. Experience of unemployment is measured in different ways in several of the surveys. The World Values Survey reports whether the respondent (or the chief wage earner, if that is not the respondent) is currently unemployed. The ISSP surveys report current unemployment status only for the respondent. I constructed a dummy variable for unemployment for each of these surveys, with current unemployment coded one and employment coded zero.

The IfD surveys ask several questions about whether the respondent or anyone else in the household is unemployed, has been unemployed in the last two years, or fears becoming unemployed in the next six months. From a count of positive responses to these questions I constructed a variable that ranges from zero to six. The lowest values represent those who have not experienced unemployment and do not fear becoming unemployed, and increasing values represent increased experience or fear of unemployment.

Occupation. Country-specific occupation codes are subsequently recoded into more general, derived categories of occupation in the WVS and the ISSP surveys. From these categories I created dummy variables for white collar occupation, blue collar occupation, and self-employed. For the WVS those respondents (or the chief wage

earner, if that is not the respondent) who reported that they were either employer/managers, professional workers, or middle or junior level non-manual workers were coded one for white collar occupation, zero otherwise. Those who reported occupation as either foreman/supervisor, or skilled, semiskilled or unskilled manual workers were coded one for blue collar occupation, zero otherwise. Those respondents (or the chief wage earner, if that is not the respondent) who reported that they were self employed were coded one for self employment, zero otherwise.

The ISSP is handled similarly, except that there is no question to identify whether or not the respondent is also the chief wage earner. Therefore, respondents whose occupation is scientific/technical professional, manager/administrative professional, clerical or service are coded one for white collar occupation, zero otherwise. Those respondents whose occupation is trade professions, professions in agriculture, forestry, fishing, and commercial animal husbandry, or those who are in industrial production, manufacture, transportation services, or unskilled laborers are coded one for blue collar occupation, zero otherwise. Data restrictions prevented me from excluding farm-related occupations from this category, as is routinely done. Another question asking whether the respondent is self employed is coded one for self employed, zero otherwise.

The IfD surveys, like the WVS, ask the occupation of respondent or chief wage earner. Those who respond that their occupation is managing or non-managing employee, or high, middle or lower-level services are coded one for white collar occupation, zero otherwise. Those who report that their occupation is technical/trade worker or other worker are coded one for blue collar occupation, zero otherwise. Those

who report that they own a large firm, are self employed business people or self employed hand workers are coded one for self employed, zero otherwise.

National Pride. This variable asks respondents to report how proud they are to be their particular nationality. Since pride measures a continuum of attitude, with a strong negative attitude having the lowest value, and a strong positive attitude having the highest value, I recoded missing values to the middle category. Therefore, a value of one corresponds to those who say they are not at all proud to be their nationality, and a value of five corresponds to those who say they are very proud to be their nationality.

Economic satisfaction. This variable measures respondents' subjective level of economic satisfaction. The World Values Survey asks respondents to rank themselves on a ten point scale, according to their level of financial satisfaction. Values range from one for dissatisfied to ten for satisfied. The IfD surveys ask respondents two questions about economic satisfaction. The first asks them to rank general economic conditions in Germany today. The second asks them to rank their own economic situation. Each question is measured on a five-point scale, from very bad to very good. The questions were summed to form a Likert-type scale of economic satisfaction, ranging from two for very dissatisfied to ten for very satisfied.

Interest in Politics. This variable asks respondents to report how interested they are in politics. Responses range from one for not at all interested to five for very interested (WVS 1990 and ISSP 1990 surveys). Response categories for the IfD surveys range from one for not at all interested to three for very interested.

Dependent Variables

The dependent variables here are grouped according to the chapter in which they are examined, as described in the hypothesis section in Chapter Two. That is, dependent variables that address particular moral values to be discussed in chapter four are grouped here under the heading "Chapter Four Variables" and the dependent variables that address particular political values to be discussed in chapter five are grouped under the heading "Chapter Five Variables" for purposes of discussion. Each of these dependent variables is not always available in each of the different surveys; refer to Table 3.1 for clarification.

Chapter Four Variables

Religious Beliefs

Religious Beliefs Factor. Respondents were asked about their level of belief in God, as well as five other articles of belief. Belief in God is measured on a six-point scale, ranging from one for no belief in God to six for no doubt in the existence of God. The other five articles of belief -- belief in an afterlife, the devil, heaven, hell, and miracles -- were each measured on a five-point scale, ranging from one for definitely do not believe to five for definitely do believe. Factor analysis revealed a one-factor solution, for each country separately as well as for all four countries pooled, so the factor score is used as the dependent variable of religious beliefs (Table 3.2).

Authority vs. Autonomy

Follow Conscience Rather Than Obey. The question text reads, "In general, would you say that people should obey the law without exception, or are there exceptional occasions on which people should follow their consciences even if it means

Table 3.2 Factor Loadings for Items Included in Principal Components Analysis of Religious Beliefs[a]

Factor and Items	Western Germany Factor Loading	Eastern Germany Factor Loading	Hungary Factor Loading	Poland Factor Loading
Religious Beliefs				
Hell	.87	.88	.85	.83
Devil	.86	.87	.76	.73
Heaven	.85	.82	.88	.83
Afterlife	.76	.82	.82	.79
Miracles	.65	.60	.76	.72
God	.64	.70	.68	.62
Eigenvalue	3.63	3.71	3.8	3.45
Percent of Variance Explained	60.5%	61.8%	63.3%	57.5%

Source: ISSP 1991

[a]Eigenvalues for the other factors were as follows:
Western Germany .74, .68, .46, .33, .15
Eastern Germany .78, .61, .42, .35, .13
Hungary .75, .50, .42, .31, .22
Poland .82, .58, .52, .37, .26

breaking the law?" Response categories range from one for those who say obey the law without exception to three for those who say follow conscience on occasion.

Right/Wrong Should be Based on God's Law. This variable asks respondents how much they agree with the statement "Right and wrong should be based on God's laws." Response categories range from one for those who strongly disagree to five for those who strongly agree.

Right/Wrong Should be Determined by Society. Similarly to the previous question, respondents here are asked how much they agree with the statement "Right and wrong should be determined by society." Response categories range from one for those who strongly disagree to five for those who strongly agree.

Family Values

Traditional Role for Women. The variable is a factor scale, composed of a factor analysis of respondent's responses to the following questions, each recoded so that the more conservative answer is high:

- A pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works (strongly agree is high)
- A job is alright but what most women really want is a home and children (strongly agree is high)
- Being a housewife is just as fulfilling as working for pay (strongly agree is high)

These were the variables which loaded most consistently on the same factor in each of the three countries (Table 3.3), as well as in the pooled model including all three countries.

Traditional Family Roles. This variable asks respondents how much they agree with the statement "A husband's job is to earn the money; a wife's job is to look after the

Table 3.3 Factor Loadings for Items Included in Principal Components Analysis of Traditional Role for Women[a]

Factor and Items	Western Germany Factor Loading	Eastern Germany Factor Loading	Hungary Factor Loading
Traditional Role for Women			
Pre-school Children Suffer	.63	.63	.64
Women Want Home and Childre	.80	.81	.84
Housewife as Fulfilling as Work	.77	.81	.77
Eigenvalue	1.62	1.71	1.72
Percent of Variance Explained	54.1%	57.1%	57.2%

Source: WVS 1990

[a]Eigenvalues for the other factors were as follows:
Western Germany .80, .57
Eastern Germany .78, .51
Hungary .80, .48

home and the family." Response categories range from one for those who strongly disagree to five for those who strongly agree.

Working Women. Respondents are asked how much they agree with the statement "Family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job." Response categories range from one for those who strongly disagree to five for those who strongly agree.

Attitudes about religion and politics

It is Better if Religious Believers Hold Public Office. This variable asks respondents how much they agree with the statement "It would be better for [respondent's country] if more people with strong religious beliefs held public office." Response categories range from one for those who strongly disagree to five for those who strongly agree.

Those Who Do Not Believe in God are Unfit for Public Office. For this variable respondents report how much they agree with the statement "Politicians who do not believe in God are unfit for public office." Response categories range from one for those who strongly disagree to five for those who strongly agree.

Religious Leaders Should Not Influence the Government. Respondents are asked how much they agree with the statement "Religious leaders should not try to influence government decisions." Response categories range from one for those who strongly disagree to five for those who strongly agree.

Religious Leaders Should Not Influence the Vote. This variable asks respondents how much they agree with the statement "Religious leaders should not try to

influence how people vote in elections." Response categories range from one for those who strongly disagree to five for those who strongly agree.

Churches and Religious Organizations Have Too Much Power. This variable asks respondents how much they agree with the statement "Do you think that churches and religious organizations in this country have too much power or too little power." Response categories range from one for those who say "far too little power" to five for those who say "far too much power".

Chapter Five Variables

Confidence and Trust in the Institutions of Government

Confidence in State Institutions. Respondents were asked to measure their level of confidence in each of up to thirteen various institutions; response categories range from one (no confidence) to four (a great deal of confidence) or five (for ISSP 1991). Factor analysis for each of the countries, as well as for pooled models including all of the countries together, most often produced a two-factor solution in each country, with minor variations among the variables included in each factor. When the variables loading most strongly on the same factor in each country were included together in a second factor analysis, a one factor solution was produced for each country, as well as for the pooled models. The institutions included in this factor include schools, courts, Parliament, and civil service. These variables were the ones which most often loaded on the same factor in each of the countries. See Tables 3.4 - 3.6 for results of the factor analysis of these variables.

Table 3.4 Factor Loadings for Items Included in Principal Components Analysis of Confidence in State Institutions (World Values Survey)[a]

	Western Germany	**Eastern Germany**	**Hungary**	**Poland**
Factor and Items	Factor Loading	Factor Loading	Factor Loading	Factor Loading
Confidence in State Institutions				
Parliament	.79	.66	.76	.81
Courts	.77	.74	.76	.57
Civil Service	.75	.74	.76	.80
Schools	.66	.68	.69	.58
Eigenvalue	2.21	2	2.2	1.97
Percent of Variance Explained	55.2%	50.0%	55.1%	49.2%

Source: WVS 1990

[a]Eigenvalues for the other factors were as follows:
Western Germany .75, .57, .48
Eastern Germany .91, .56, .53
Hungary .86, .54, .40
Poland 1.26, .51, .27

Table 3.5 Factor Loadings for Items Included in Principal Components Analysis of Confidence in State Institutions (International Social Survey Program)[a]

Factor and Items	**Western Germany** Factor Loading	**Eastern Germany** Factor Loading	**Hungary** Factor Loading	**Poland** Factor Loading
Confidence in State Institutions				
Parliament	.70	.68	.79	.67
Courts	.78	.76	.75	.73
Civil Service	.78	.78	.82	.72
Schools	.65	.65	.66	.66
Eigenvalue	2.12	2.07	2.3	1.95
Percent of Variance Explained	53.0%	51.7%	57.4%	53.0%

Source: ISSP 1991

[a]Eigenvalues for the other factors were as follows:
Western Germany .80, .54, .54
Eastern Germany .80, .60, .53
Hungary .89, .49, .32
Poland .81, .64, .60

Table 3.6 Factor Loadings for Items Included in Principal Components Analysis of Confidence in State Institutions (Institut fuer Demoskopie Surveys)[a]

Factor and Items	Western Germany (91) Factor Loading	Eastern Germany (91) Factor Loading	Western Germany (92) Factor Loading	Eastern Germany (92) Factor Loading
Confidence in State Institutions				
Parliament	.76	.77	.81	.77
Courts	.73	.73	.79	.71
Civil Service	.73	.71	.72	.68
Schools	.61	.58	.69	.62
Eigenvalue	2.00	1.97	2.27	1.95
Percent of Variance Explained	50.0%	49.2%	56.8%	48.8%

Sources: IfD 5055 (1991), IfD 5074 (1992)

[a]Eigenvalues for the other factors were as follows:
Western Germany (91) .80, .68, .52
Eastern Germany (91) .84, .70, .50
Western Germany (92) .73, .60, .40
Eastern Germany (92) .79, .72, .54

Trust in Government. This variable is comprised of a factor scale of three questions:

- How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Bonn to do what is right -- just about always, most of the time, only some of the time, or none of the time? (never, sometimes, don't know, usually, always)
- Would you say the government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all people? (special interests, don't know, all people)
- Do you believe that the representatives in Bonn first and foremost represent the interests of the populace or do they have other interests which are more important to them? (other interests, don't know, all people)

The questions are coded so that positive responses indicate greater trust in government. Factor analysis indicates an underlying dimension of confidence in government, so the factor score is used as the dependent variable here (Table 3.7).

Support for Democracy as a Form of State

Support for Democracy. This variable is comprised of a factor scale of opinions on the following three questions:

- Do you believe that the democracy that we have in Germany is the best form of state or is there another form of state which is better? (another better, don't know, best form of state)
- If someone says, "We can solve the problems we have in the Federal Republic with democracy," would you agree or not? (disagree, don't know, agree)
- Two men are discussing how a country should be governed . The one says: "I like it best when the people place the best politician at the top and give him complete governing power. He can then clearly and quickly decide with a few chosen experts. Not much talking is done and something really happens!" The other says: "I prefer that a number of people have to determine something in the country. They do sometimes go round and round until something is done, but it is not so easy for abuse of power to occur." Which of these two opinions is closest to your own view -- the first or the second? (one person, don't know, several politicians)

Table 3.7 Factor Loadings for Items Included in Principal Components Analysis of Trust in Government[a]

Factor and Items	Western Germany (91) Factor Loading	Eastern Germany (91) Factor Loading	Western Germany (92) Factor Loading	Eastern Germany (92) Factor Loading
Trust in Government				
Government Run for All	.83	.81	.79	.80
Trust Bonn to do Right	.78	.80	.80	.82
MPs Represent the People	.75	.79	.74	.78
Eigenvalue	1.87	1.93	1.82	1.93
Percent of Variance Explained	62.3%	64.4%	60.5%	64.3%

Sources: IfD 5055 (1991), IfD 5074 (1992)

[a]Eigenvalues for the other factors were as follows:
Western Germany (91) .64, .49
Eastern Germany (91) .55, .52
Western Germany (92) .65, .53
Eastern Germany (92) .58, .49

The questions are coded so that positive responses indicate greater support for democracy. Again, factor analysis indicates an underlying dimension of support for democracy, so the factor score is used as the dependent variable (Table 3.8).

Political Freedoms and Political Rights

Freedom vs. Living Standard. This question asks respondents to decide which is better, to have freedom and law or to have a higher standard of living. The responses are coded so that one is higher living standard, two is don't know, three is freedom and law.

Tolerate Freedom of Speech. A set of questions from the IfD surveys asks respondents whether one should tolerate a speech made by a racist or a revolutionary. These questions come originally from the General Social Survey, and are adaptations of Stouffer's (1955) tolerance questions. The questions are worded:

- There are some people whose views are considered extreme by the majority. First consider people who want to overthrow the government by revolution. Do you think that such people should be allowed to hold public meetings to express their views? (don't allow, don't know, allow)
- Now consider people who believe that whites are racially superior to all other races. Do you think that such people should be allowed to hold public meetings to express their views? (don't allow, don't know, allow)

The questions are coded so that positive responses indicate greater tolerance. Both questions loaded on the same factor in each country, as well as in the pooled data, so the factor scale is used as the dependent variable as it captures an underlying dimension of political tolerance (Table 3.9).

Believe Citizens Have Free Speech. The question asks "Do you feel that one can express his political opinions freely in Germany today, or is it better to be careful?"

Table 3.8 Factor Loadings for Items Included in Principal Components Analysis of Support for Democracy[a]

Factor and Items	Western Germany (91) Factor Loading	Eastern Germany (91) Factor Loading	Western Germany (92) Factor Loading	Eastern Germany (92) Factor Loading
Support for Democracy				
Solve Problems with Dem	.74	.81	.72	.78
German Democracy Best	.73	.82	.70	.79
Deliberative Body is Best	.52	-.06	.56	.25
Eigenvalue	1.34	1.33	1.32	1.29
Percent of Variance Explained	44.7%	44.2%	44.0%	43.1%

Sources: IfD 5055 (1991), IfD 5074 (1992)

[a]Eigenvalues for the other factors were as follows:
Western Germany (91) .92, .74
Eastern Germany (91) .99, .67
Western Germany (92) .90, .78
Eastern Germany (92) .99, .72

Table 3.9 Factor Loadings for Items Included in Principal Components Analysis of Tolerance for Freedom of Speech[a]

Factor and Items	Western Germany (91) Factor Loading	Eastern Germany (91) Factor Loading	Western Germany (92) Factor Loading	Eastern Germany (92) Factor Loading
Tolerate Freedom of Speech				
Revolutionary Speech OK	.85	.81	.85	.82
Racialist Speech Allowed	.85	.81	.85	.82
Eigenvalue	1.44	1.3	1.45	1.35
Percent of Variance Explaine	71.9%	65.2%	72.7%	67.3%

Sources: IfD 5055 (1991), IfD 5074 (1992)

[a]Eigenvalues for the other factors were as follows:
Western Germany (91) .56
Eastern Germany (91) .70
Western Germany (92) .55
Eastern Germany (92) .65

The question is coded so that higher values represent agreement that people can speak freely.

Right to Free Expression. This question is a factor score from two items developed in 1968 by Rudolf Wildenmann and Max Kaase (Kaase 1971). Response categories range from one for full disagreement to six for full agreement. The questions read: "On these cards, we have put together a series of commonly-heard opinions about peoples' behavior. We would like to find out what people really think. Please sort out the cards on this scale according to how much you agree or disagree with each statement:

- Every citizen has the right to go to the streets for his convictions if necessary
- Everyone should have the right to stand up for his opinion, even if the majority disagrees

Factor analysis of these two items yielded one underlying factor of support for the right of free expression, which was used as the dependent variable (Table 3.10).

Protests

Support Protest Behaviors. This variable is a Guttman scale, made up of five variables which measure whether or not the respondents had ever engaged in various forms of protest behavior, or were inclined to do so. These variables were replicated from the Political Action Data Set, conducted in the mid 1970s in eight countries of western Europe and the United States.[7] These five variables are presumed to have unidimensional and cumulative properties, therefore making them suitable for Guttman

[7]See Barnes and Kaase, 1979, for additional information about the original data set, particularly the Technical Appendix for information about variable construction.

Table 3.10 Factor Loadings for Items Included in Principal Components Analysis of Right to Freedom of Expression[a]

Factor and Items	Western Germany (91) Factor Loading	Eastern Germany (91) Factor Loading	Western Germany (92) Factor Loading	Eastern Germany (92) Factor Loading
Right to Freedom of Expression				
Take Convictions to Streets	.83	.80	.83	.81
Stand Up for Own Opinion	.83	.80	.83	.81
Eigenvalue	1.39	1.28	1.37	1.31
Percent of Variance Explained	69.5%	64.2%	68.7%	65.7%

Sources: IfD 5055 (1991), IfD 5074 (1992)

[a]Eigenvalues for the other factors were as follows:
Western Germany (91) .61
Eastern Germany (91) .72
Western Germany (92) .63
Eastern Germany (92) .69

scaling. Response categories are one for have done, two for might do, and three for would never do. The original question wording is as follows:

> I'm going to read out some different forms of political action that people can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have actually done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never, under any circumstances, do it.
> a) Signing a petition
> b) Joining in boycotts
> c) Attending lawful demonstrations
> d) Joining unofficial strikes
> e) Occupying buildings or factories

In order to construct a Guttman scale from these five items I followed the same procedure detailed in the technical appendix by the creators of the Political Action Data Set. I reproduced a protest activity scale, with responses ranging from zero (never done any protest activity) to five (have done or might do all five items) for each country.

Tolerate Protest Behavior. This series of questions was also taken from the Political Action Data Set. As in the variable above, this variable is also a Guttman scale, made up of six variables which measure whether or not the respondents think these various forms of protest behavior should be allowed. Again, these six variables are presumed to have unidimensional and cumulative properties, therefore making them suitable for Guttman scaling. Response categories range from one for definitely allowed to four for definitely not allowed. The original question wording is as follows:

> There are many ways people or organizations can protest against a government action they strongly oppose. Please show which you think should be allowed and which should not be allowed by ticking a box on each line. (Please tick one box on each line).
> a) Organizing public meetings to protest against the government
> b) Publishing pamphlets to protest against the government
> c) Organizing protest marches and demonstrations

d) Occupying a government office and stopping work there for several days
e) Seriously damaging government buildings

The variable was created using the same procedure as above for creating the variable of support for protest activity.

Oppose Government Repression. A final variable measuring attitude toward public protest was also reproduced from the Political Action Data Set. This variable is a factor scale, composed of four questions which ask respondents whether they approve or disapprove of a variety of forms of government repression of protest activity. The questions are worded as follows:

> What do you think about the following behaviors? Please tell me for each one, whether you approve or disapprove of this behavior?
> a) Police attack demonstrators with clubs
> b) Judges impose severe sentences against protesters who attack police defense lines
> c) The government forbids public demonstrations in the interest of public safety and order
> d) The federal government employs the national guard or the army to end a strike

The questions are coded so that opposition to government repression has the highest value. All of the questions loaded on the same factor of opposition to government repression in each country, as well as in the pooled data, so the factor score is used as the dependent variable (Table 3.11).

Economic Issues

Not the Responsibility of Government to Provide Jobs. Not the Responsibility of Government to Equalize Incomes. These variables are the only two replicated in 1991 from a series of questions about the responsibilities of government

Table 3.11 Factor Loadings for Items Included in Principal Components Analysis of Opposition to Government Repression[a]

Factor and Items	**Western Germany (91)** Factor Loading	**Eastern Germany (91)** Factor Loading
Oppose Government Repression		
Police Attacks on Demonstrator	.74	.74
Severe Sentences for Protestors	.69	.59
Forbid Public Demonstrations	.74	.64
Troops Intervene in Strikes	.67	.82
Eigenvalue	2.02	1.97
Percent of Variance Explained	50.5%	49.3%

Source: IfD 5055 (1991)

[a]Eigenvalues for the other factors were as follows:
Western Germany .88, .58, .53
Eastern Germany .99, .69, .34

asked in 1990. The question text reads, "On the whole, do you think it should be or should not be the government's responsibility to:"

- Provide a job for everyone who wants one
- Reduce income differences between the rich and poor

Answer categories range from one for definitely should to five for definitely should not.

Interpersonal Trust

Family Members Can Be Trusted. This question asks respondents to rank how much they can trust various groups of people; the first group asked about is "your family." Response categories range from one for no trust at all to five for complete trust.

People Can Be Trusted. This question asks respondents whether, generally speaking, they would say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people. Responses were recoded so that a value of one indicates the response that most people can be trusted and zero indicates that one must be careful in dealing with people.

Optimism

Describe Life as Happy. This variable asks respondents, "If you were to consider your life in general these days, how happy or unhappy would you say you are, on the whole?" Response categories range from one for not at all happy to five for very happy.

Joyful about Reunification. This question was asked on the IfD surveys, for both parts of Germany. The question reads, "Is the German reunification more an

occasion for joy or concern for you?" Response categories are one for concern, two for don't know, and three for joy.

Evaluation of Present and Future Relative to the Past. The IfD surveys asked respondents to rate from zero to ten the general situation in their part of the country at three points in time. The question is worded:

> If you think back to the time when Germany was still divided, what do you generally think of the situation at that time? Tell me according to this ladder: Zero would mean that the situation in our part of Germany was very bad, and 10 would mean that the situation here was very good. Which number best expresses what the situation here was like back then? What is the situation like at the present time? Which number best expresses the present situation in our part of Germany?

The rating for the past situation was subtracted from the rating for the present situation to obtain the respondent's evaluation of relative improvement since reunification. The rating for the present situation was subtracted from the rating for the future situation to obtain the respondent's projection for improvement in the future. Positive values indicate optimism about the present and future situations in Germany, relative to the past.

Efficacy and Attitude toward Change

Political Efficacy. This set of four efficacy questions is replicated from the University of Michigan National Election Studies. For each item, respondents are asked whether they agree (1), don't know (2), or disagree (3). The question is worded: "On this list are opinions that one sometimes hears. Please tell me for each opinion whether you agree or disagree."

- Voting is the only way that people like me can have any say about how the government runs things
- I don't think that public officials care much about what people like me think

- Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on
- People like me don't have any say about what the government does

Factor analysis resulted in a single factor of efficacy for each country separately, as well as for the pooled data, so the factor score is used as the dependent variable of political efficacy (Table 3.12).

People Can Do Little to Change Their Lives. A measure of personal efficacy comes from a question asked on the ISSP 1991 survey. This question asks people whether they agree with the statement, "There is little that people can do to change the course of their lives." Response categories range from one for disagreeing strongly to five for agreeing strongly.

Attitude toward Change. Three questions were asked about personal attitudes toward change, which provide another measure of respondent's personal efficacy. A factor scale is created out of these three questions asking people to rank their outlook on life, according to a ten point scale. Responses indicating personal efficacy and openness to change were ranked high. The questions included:

- You will never achieve much unless you act boldly (vs. One should be cautious about making major changes in life)
- New ideas are generally better than old ones (vs. Ideas that have stood the test of time are generally best)
- When changes occur in my life, I welcome the possibility that something new is beginning (vs. When changes occur in my life, I worry about the difficulties they may cause)

Factor analysis indicated that all three questions loaded on one factor in each country, as well as in the pooled data, so the factor score was used as another measure of personal efficacy (Table 3.13).

Table 3.12 Factor Loadings for Items Included in Principal Components Analysis of Political Efficacy[a]

Factor and Items	Western Germany (91) Factor Loading	Eastern Germany (91) Factor Loading	Western Germany (92) Factor Loading	Eastern Germany (92) Factor Loading
Political Efficacy				
Vote Not Only Influence	.63	.60	.63	.50
Officials Care What I Thin	.74	.70	.59	.71
Politics Not Complicated	.72	.69	.59	.66
People Have Say in Govern	.72	.81	.72	.74
Eigenvalue	1.99	1.99	1.61	1.74
Percent of Variance Explained	49.7%	49.9%	40.3%	43.5%

Sources: IfD 5055 (1991), IfD 5074 (1992)

[a]Eigenvalues for the other factors were as follows:
Western Germany (91) .78, .66, .57
Eastern Germany (91) .82, .68, .51
Western Germany (92) .91, .79, .69
Eastern Germany (92) .91, .71, .65

Table 3.13 Factor Loadings for Items Included in Principal Components Analysis of Attitude Toward Change[a]

Factor and Items	Western Germany Factor Loading	Eastern Germany Factor Loading	Hungary Factor Loading
Attitude Toward Change			
Welcome Change in My Life	.81	.79	.75
Act Boldly to Achieve in Life	.81	.76	.74
New Ideas Better than Old Ones	.79	.74	.60
Eigenvalue	1.93	1.75	1.47
Percent of Variance Explained	64.2%	58.5%	48.9%

Source: WVS 1990

[a]Eigenvalues for the other factors were as follows:
Western Germany .56, .51
Eastern Germany .66, .58
Hungary .85, .69

Altogether, there are twelve dependent variables to be discussed in chapter four, dealing with church attenders religious beliefs and attitudes toward certain moral and social issues. These variables are important to explore the breadth and depth of the influence of religion in these postcommunist societies. Then there are twenty-one dependent variables to be discussed in chapter five, dealing with church attenders' support for the government and political values. This broad spectrum of variables is necessary to explore the terrain of church influence on political values in these postcommunist societies. As was set out in the hypotheses, certain of these democratic values reflect the priestly tradition of the church, others reflect the prophetic tradition, and still others cannot easily be identified with either tradition. By exploring the effect of church attendance on each of these variables of democratic support we can better understand just how the church is operating in civil society in each of these countries.

METHODS

To provide the most parsimonious model for each dependent variable, while at the same time provide a model that explains variance within each country, I first ran a full regression model for each dependent variable. In this full model I included church attendance as the primary independent variable. I also included other demographic variables known from the literature to be associated with church attendance (age, sex, marital status, education, income, political ideology, and community size). I included union membership as a control variable to capture the influence of this other aspect of civil society.

Finally, I included several variables often associated with support for democratic values, such as political party identification, occupation, national pride, economic satisfaction, and interest in politics. Any variable that achieved a minimum level of significance ($p<.10$) for any of the four countries was retained for inclusion in the final models for all countries. Therefore, for each dependent variable, the model reported in the tables is the most parsimonious model that includes variables important for explaining variation in at least one of the four countries. Any variable that was included in the full model but was dropped from the final models because it failed to achieve significance in any of the countries is indicated in the tables by a dash. And any variable that was not included in the final model for a particular country because it was not asked of that country in that data set is indicated in the tables by "n/a".

Each table reports standardized regression coefficients, along with their significance levels. Since these are standardized regression coefficients their size or significance cannot be compared across models. The conclusions that I draw from these models are based on the relative strength of each of the independent variables in the equations, not on their absolute values.

CHAPTER IV

DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF THE CHURCHES IN EASTERN EUROPE

The churches in central and eastern Europe are once again free to operate, after nearly 50 years of government repression. Before we can speak meaningfully of the political values of church attenders in post-transition societies we need first to evaluate the present condition of these churches. In this chapter I examine church membership characteristics of East Germany, Poland and Hungary to see who still belongs after two generations of communism. Then I explore the sociodemographic characteristics of church members, to search for patterns of disaffiliation. Next I analyze religious beliefs, to determine whether church attenders differ from non-attenders in their religious beliefs. Finally, I examine a variety of moral and social values to see whether church attendance has an effect on these values.

Church Membership

For purposes of this analysis I have recoded church membership into a dummy variable, coded zero if the respondent claimed no religious affiliation and one if the respondent claimed a religious affiliation. I have done the same for Catholic and Protestant affiliation (one if the respondent reported self as Catholic or Protestant, zero if not). Poland and Hungary report the highest rates of religious affiliation (see Table 4.1), with non-affiliation rates of only 4.8% and 6.1%, respectively. 95% of Poles are Catholics; there are no Polish Protestants in this sample (ISSP 1991). In Hungary, 72.4% are Catholics, 21.4% are Protestants. Each of these countries has retained very

Table 4.1 Church Affiliation Rates and Characteristics of Church Members (proportion of church members in each category, by country)

	Western Germany	Eastern Germany	Hungary	Poland
Church Affiliates	.89	.35	.93	.95
Catholics	.43	.06	.73	.95
Protestants	.45	.29	.21	.00
Age Category				
Under 25	.13	.06	.08	.16
65 and Older	.18	.25	.16	.06
Secondary Education Complet	.26	.17	.32	.36
Higher than Average Income	.59	.69	.72	.52
Right of Center Self Placement	.52	.44	n/a	.58
Married or Living as Married	.60	.63	.72	.69
Female	.53	.66	.57	.53
Community Size				
<5000 people	.12	.46	.31	.43
>100,000 people	.63	.20	.30	.28
Union Member	.16	.24	.40	.18
Left Radical Vote Intention	n/a	.01	.01	n/a
Center-Left Vote Intention	.33	.26	.27	.00
Center-Right Vote Intention	.27	.25	.22	.04
Right Radical Vote Intention	.01	.00	n/a	.00
Unemployed	.02	.06	.01	.09
White Collar Occupation	.50	.47	.23	.19
Blue Collar Occupation	.35	.47	.34	.34
Self Employed	.08	.13	.04	.13

Source: ISSP 1991

high levels of religious affiliation. In contrast, western Germany, which did not have a policy of official repression of religion, reports a non-affiliation rate of 10.7%. 42.6% of the western German sample are Catholics, and 44.7% are Protestants. Eastern Germany has the lowest rate of affiliation; greater than 64% of the sample claim no affiliation with any organized religion. 29% of the eastern German sample are Protestants; only 5.7% are Catholics.

When Germany was divided into two countries after World War II, religious affiliation was very similar between East and West. The main religious difference between them was that East Germany was almost entirely Protestant while West Germany was about evenly divided between Protestants and Catholics. To compare overall affiliation rates, in 1950 the proportion of religious adherents was nearly identical in eastern and western Germany, approximately 90% of the population. But by 1989 the proportion of adherents in the East had dropped dramatically, to approximately 36% of the population (Lemke 1989).

The significant drop in religious affiliation in eastern Germany could be due to at least two possible contributing factors. First, the drop could be due to a rapid secularization of East German society. Secularization theory proposes that as society modernizes more material values tend to replace traditional values and the place of religion in society is displaced by modern science and technology (see Greeley 1982; Wilson 1982; Luckmann 1983). For many years East Germany was the model of advanced Soviet society, exemplifying the very latest in Soviet technology and development. Perhaps this modernizing pressure on East German society led to a more

rapid secularization of this society. If so, then younger East Germans should have disaffiliated at a more rapid rate than their elders, as they have been more subjected to these modernizing pressures through their education. If the secularization process is the primary cause of disaffiliation in eastern Germany then we would expect to see younger eastern Germans disaffiliating in greater numbers than older eastern Germans.

However, another possible cause of disaffiliation could be the severe repression of the churches by the Soviet authorities. Repression of religious expression, particularly religious affiliation, may have been especially harsh in East Germany, the showcase of Soviet society to the West. We know from historical accounts that religious clergy were harshly sanctioned in East Germany. Accounts of the repression of citizens who continued to express their religious faith have also been documented (see Chapter Two). Repression, though, affects all age levels of society. As churches are closed and public worship is negatively sanctioned, persons of all age groups are equally affected. If repression were the primary cause of disaffiliation, then church membership rates should be lower across all age groups in eastern Germany, especially when compared to membership rates in western Germany. Figure 4.1 illustrates percentage of church members (of any denomination) for each age group, by country. One sees immediately that church membership is dramatically lower for eastern Germans across all age categories.

Sanctions against church membership were particularly detrimental for younger people in East Germany; for example, young Christians faced severe discrimination in educational and occupational opportunities (Childs 1983; Dennis 1988; Cordell 1990).



Figure 4.1 Church Membership by Age by Country

Source: ISSP 1991

But Figure 4.1 shows that disaffiliation was successfully promoted across all age groups. This is the effect one would expect if repression of church membership is the primary cause of the decrease in church membership rates. No similar effect is seen in any of the other countries.

Since eastern Germany has a predominantly Protestant tradition (Lutheranism originated in eastern Germany) and Catholics are associated with higher rates of affiliation, I next restricted the sample to non-Catholics and again looked at percentage of church members by age group. Again, church membership is much lower for eastern Germans, across all age groups (Figure 4.2). The line for Polish non-Catholics is misleading; there are so few Polish non-Catholics in the sample that they are not even represented in all age categories. Therefore, that line was omitted from the figure.

The line representing Hungarian non-Catholics is interesting here, because it shows more of the effect expected from secularization theory. Younger Hungarian non-Catholics (those below age 45) are much less likely to be church members than are older Hungarians, an effect associated with secularization. Note that for eastern Germans there is a similar effect, though not as pronounced as for Hungarian Protestants. However, when one takes into account the fact that church membership in East Germany was about 90% of the population prior to World War II, the differences in membership rates for all ages between Hungarian Protestants and eastern German Protestants suggest that the decline in membership among eastern Germans is not attributable primarily to secularization, but is more likely to have been caused by state repression of the churches there. In contrast, Hungarian non-Catholics show more of a secularization pattern in



Figure 4.2 Church Membership by Age by Country (Non-Catholics)

Source: ISSP 1991

their church membership, since the older cohorts have not disaffiliated to any significant degree. This is not to say that Hungarian society is secularized. Church membership rates in Hungary overall are still nearly 95% of the population, as reported above. This membership pattern does allow for speculation, though, that membership rates in Hungary's Protestant churches may continue to decline as younger, less affiliated cohorts replace the older, more affiliated cohorts.

Characteristics of Church Members

Table 4.1 also presents some demographic characteristics of church members for eastern Germany, Hungary and Poland. Again, figures for western Germany are included as a benchmark reference point for comparison. Eastern German and Hungarian church members are slightly more likely to be female than western German church members, but Polish church members are equally likely to be female. The age distribution also shows similarities between Poles and western Germans, and between eastern Germans and Hungarians. The Polish sample was restricted to persons between the ages of 16 and 65, so the distribution of church members at the upper end of the age spectrum is probably not representative for Poland.

In terms of education, just over one quarter of western German church members have completed a secondary school education (secondary technical or trade school). In contrast, more than a third of Polish church members have completed secondary school education. Hungarian church members are similar to Poles in education completed, and eastern German church members have the lowest rates of completed secondary education.

Church members in all four places are most likely to be married or living with a partner. Eastern German church members are the more likely to be widowed than members in the other four countries, and church members in Poland and western Germany are more likely to be single. Polish and eastern German church members are more likely to live in a small community of less than 5,000 persons, while western German church members are more likely to be urban dwellers. In Hungary, church members are rather more equally distributed between rural and urban communities.

Political orientation of church members reflects a somewhat right of center ideology in all countries but eastern Germany. In that country only forty-four percent of church members placed themselves to the right of the mean ideology score for their country. Political ideology was not reported for Hungary. As for vote intention, church members show little support for radical political parties on either end of the ideological spectrum. Between a quarter and a third of church members report they would vote for either a center-left or a center-right party, in all countries except Poland. However, there were so few Poles who were willing to identify with a political party in the survey (somewhat under 15%) that meaningful comparisons here are not possible.

Finally, Hungarian church members are most likely to be members of a union, followed by eastern Germans, Poles and western Germans. Poland has the highest percentage of church members who are unemployed, but even there less than ten percent of church members are unemployed. Nearly half the church members in both parts of Germany report white-collar employment; about one-fourth of Hungarian church members and about one-fifth of Polish church members are white collar workers. About

one-third of church members in western Germany, Hungary and Poland are blue collar workers; forty-seven percent of eastern German church members are blue collar. And although church members are unlikely to be self-employed, fully thirteen percent of church members in both eastern Germany and Poland are self-employed.

Church Attendance

While church membership rates can tell us something about the extent of Soviet repression in Eastern Europe, church attendance is a better measure of religious attachment. In other words, church membership rates are only a crude measure of religious attachment; better measurement of the extent of religious socialization is more accurately captured by examining church attendance. For example, although about 89% of western Germans claim to be members of a church, more than 21% admit they never attend services. Mean rates of church attendance by age for each country are illustrated by Figure 4.3. The figure shows similar country-specific patterns of church attendance as was seen in Figure 4.1 for church membership. Poles show the highest rates of church attendance, eastern Germans show the lowest rates of church attendance, and church attendance rates for Hungarians and western Germans are nearly identical.

American research on religious participation suggests that participation increases with age (Hout and Greeley 1987). Since we already know that Catholic participation rates are higher than Protestant rates, restricting the sample to Protestants only (Figure 4.4) shows more clearly the age effect on participation, particularly in Hungary. Note, however, that the expected age effect does not hold for eastern Germany. Participation rates for eastern Germany are at their lowest among 45- to 54-year-olds: the cohort



Figure 4.3 Mean Church Attendance by Age by Country

Source: ISSP 1991



Figure 4.4 Mean Church Attendance by Age by Country (Protestants Only)

Source: ISSP 1991

which came of age during the imposition of the communist regime in East Germany. This group was most heavily influenced by the antireligious message of the Soviet regime, but later cohorts do not appear to be as influenced; their participation rates are similar to those of older eastern Germans.

Religious Beliefs

Perhaps more illuminating to an understanding of the persistence of religion in post-transition societies than who continues to affiliate formally with a church is the question of what religious beliefs have endured. The data here show some very interesting comparisons. Respondents were asked to evaluate their level of belief in six different items of religious faith: God, the devil, heaven, hell, an afterlife, and miracles. Consistently, Poles show higher mean levels of belief across all age categories (with the anomalous exception that younger western Germans report slightly higher levels of belief in miracles). This finding reflects the strong position of the Polish Catholic church in Polish society, even during the years of Soviet domination (see Chapter Two).

Another consistency is the finding that eastern Germans report lower mean levels of belief across all age categories (again, with the interesting exception that younger Hungarians are less likely than eastern Germans of the same age to believe in miracles). With church membership rates at only about 35% one would expect average levels of belief to be low in eastern Germany. The mean levels of belief for Hungarians and western Germans show the life cycle effect we would expect to find in a modern western society (Hout and Greeley 1987). That is, levels of belief tend to decline among individuals as they leave home to form their own families and establish careers. Mean

levels of belief reach their lowest levels with the 35-44 age group and then rise again in the older age groups. This pattern suggests a curvilinear relationship between age and belief, at least for Hungary and western Germany.

To explore a model that could explain religious belief for each country, I first created an indicator of religious beliefs from a factor analysis of those six variables, which taps an underlying dimension of religious belief for each country. The dependent variable of religious beliefs is the factor score, comprised of respondents' relative levels of belief in God, life after death, heaven, hell, the devil, and miracles. Each of these variables loaded on a single dimension of religious belief in each country. Figure 4.5 illustrates the mean of this factor score of religious beliefs for each age category, within each country. The curvilinear relationship between age and beliefs is seen most clearly in the lines representing Hungary and eastern Germany.

There are a number of sociodemographic variables that are known in the literature to affect religious belief. The literature suggests that church attendance is the most important predictor of religious beliefs, but other variables are also important in predicting religious belief. Gender has been shown to be an important predictor of religious beliefs (women express higher levels of religious beliefs), as has age (older persons express higher levels of religious beliefs), education (more educated persons tend to express lower levels of religious beliefs), marital status (married persons express higher levels of religious beliefs), and community size (rural residents express higher levels of religious belief). Conservative political attachments are also associated with higher levels of religious belief.



Figure 4.5 Mean Beliefs Factor by Age by Country

Source: ISSP 1991

To understand which characteristics best explain religious beliefs in each of the countries I next ran a set of regressions of the religious beliefs factor score on these sociodemographic characteristics, as well as church attendance, separately for each country (see Table 4.2). I found, as expected, that church attendance was the most important independent variable explaining religious beliefs for each of the countries. Several of the other sociodemographic variables also predicted religious beliefs. Older people in both East Germany and Hungary expressed higher levels of belief, but in West Germany it was younger people who expressed higher levels of belief. Those who place themselves on the right politically expressed higher levels of belief, in all countries except Hungary. This variable was not reported for Hungary, so had to be omitted from that model. However, I expect that the same relationship would hold in the Hungarian model, had that variable been available. Extremist vote intention predicted lower levels of belief in both regions of Germany, as did white collar employment in eastern Germany. Finally, unemployed persons in West Germany and Hungary expressed higher levels of belief. Altogether, the models fit the data well, with nearly a third of the variation in religious beliefs explained in western Germany and Poland, and nearly forty percent of the variation explained in eastern Germany and Hungary.

Besides religious beliefs, church attenders in these post-transition societies also have definite attitudes about the distribution of moral values in society. Other questions are available in the survey which allow me to compare church attenders with non-attenders on a variety of attitudes about moral authority, family values, and the role of

Table 4.2 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Religious Beliefs Factor on Selected Independent Variables

	Western Germany	**Eastern Germany**	**Hungary**	**Poland**
Age Category(Older)	-.06 *	.07 **	.10 **	-.03
Attend Church	**.51 ** **	**.56 ** **	**.55 ** **	**.50 ** **
Secondary Education Complet	-.04 +	.00	-.01	.04
Higher Income	-	-	-	-
Left-Right Placement (Right)	.06 *	.08 **	n/a	.07 *
Married or Living as Married	-	-	-	-
Female	.06 *	.06 *	.08 **	.02
Larger Community Size	-	-	-	-
Union Member	-	-	-	-
Left Radical Vote Intention	-	-.04 +	-.03	-
Center-Left Vote Intention	-.06 *	-.02	-.04	-.04
Center-Right Vote Intention	-	-	-	-
Right Radical Vote Intention	-.06 *	-.04 +	-	-.04
Unemployed	.07 *	.00	.07 *	.00
White Collar Occupation	-.02	-.06 *	.00	-.03
Blue Collar Occupation	-	-	-	-
Self Employed	-	-	-	-
Adjusted R^2	.29	.38	.37	.27
N	1323	1458	987	978

** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country, n/a not asked in survey
Source: ISSP (1991)

religion in politics. Using the same models which were employed above to predict religious beliefs, I next tested these attitudes about the role of religion in public life.

Authority vs. Autonomy

Another set of variables measures various aspects of respondents' attitudes toward authority, as well as the relative merit of autonomy versus obedience. A question was asked of Germans and Hungarians whether it is better to obey the law without question or whether one should follow their conscience (Table 4.3). Western German church attenders were more likely to favor obedience, but it was not one of the strongest predictors in this model of support for autonomy over obedience. Older persons, less educated persons, lower income persons and those on the political right were associated with obedience for western Germany. The same relationship holds in Hungary for older persons and the less educated. In eastern Germany it is females and those on the political right who advocate obedience. And in both parts of Germany persons who say they are interested in politics are more likely to advocate following one's conscience, rather than obedience. Church attendance does not affect opinion on this variable in either eastern Germany or Hungary. Could this lack of association be due to a movement toward individual autonomy among church members in these post-transition societies? Two other variables are available which allow us to test this speculation.

The ISSP 1991 asks respondents in all four countries what should be the basis for moral decision making. The questions ask whether right and wrong should be based on God's law, or whether right and wrong should be a matter determined by society. These questions provide further illumination to the autonomy/obedience question posed above.

Table 4.3 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Those Who Would Follow Conscience Rather Than Obey on Selected Independent Variables

	Western Germany	Eastern Germany	Hungary
Age Category(Older)	-.20 **	-.05	-.23 **
Attend Church	**-.04 +**	**.06**	**.03**
Secondary Education Complete	.09 **	.01	.16 **
Higher Income	.05 *	.03	.02
Left-Right Placement (Right)	-.08 **	-.07 +	-
Married or Living as Married	-	-	-
Female	-.01	-.08 *	-.03
Larger Community Size	-	-	-
Union Member	-	n/a	n/a
Left Radical Vote Intention	-	-	-
Center-Left Vote Intention	-	-	-
Center-Right Vote Intention	-	-	-
Right Radical Vote Intention	-	-	-
Unemployed	-	-	-
White Collar Occupation	-	-	-
Blue Collar Occupation	-	-	-
Self Employed	-	-	-
National Pride	-	-	-
Economically Satisfied	-	-	-
Interest in Politics	.10 **	.11 **	.05
Adjusted R^2	.10	.03	.10
N	2060	740	763

** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country

Source: ISSP 1990

In all four models it is very clear that church attenders firmly believe that right and wrong are not matters to be left up to the individual conscience, but rather that moral decisions should be based on God's law (Table 4.4). Again, older people, lower incomes, those on the political right, and people from smaller communities are also associated with this attitude in all four countries. Roughly a quarter to a third of the variation in attitude is explained by these models. Thus, it does not appear that church members in post-transition societies question obedience to the law. Rather, it seems more likely that they question the validity of political authority. Perhaps, as they reflect on the arbitrary laws and practices of the previous regime, church members in post-transition societies are less willing to blindly obey.

We see this questioning of popular authority again in another question (Table 4.5). This one asks respondents whether right and wrong should be a matter that is determined by society. Once again, church attenders in all four countries reject this attitude. Women, too, disapprove of socially relative morality. Although the model does not explain as much of the variation here, nevertheless it helps illustrate the point that church attenders are neither moral relativists nor blindly obedient.

Family Values

Further information about the distribution of moral values in post-transition societies can be found when we look at a set of questions about family values in society. One indicator -- a factor score composed of respondents' answers to four items about working women and their families (see question texts in Chapter Three) -- shows a strong association between church attendance and preference for a traditional role for women for

Table 4.4 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Attitude That Right and Wrong Should be Based on God's Law on Selected Independent Variables

	Western Germany	**Eastern Germany**	**Hungary**	**Poland**
Age Category(Older)	.17 **	.16 **	.26 **	.10 **
Attend Church	**.40 ** **	**.47 ** **	**.40 ** **	**.40 ** **
Secondary Education Complet	-	-	-	-
Higher Income	-.06 *	-.06 *	-.08 **	-.05
Left-Right Placement (Right)	.08 *	.08 **	n/a	.08 *
Married or Living as Married	-	-	-	-
Female	-	-	-	-
Larger Community Size	-.06 *	-.08 **	-.05 +	-.06 *
Union Member	-.02	-.05 *	-.05 +	-.07 *
Left Radical Vote Intention	-	-.06 *	-.02	-
Center-Left Vote Intention	-	-	-	-
Center-Right Vote Intention	-.03	.02	.05 +	.06 +
Right Radical Vote Intention	-	-	-	-
Unemployed	-	-	-	-
White Collar Occupation	-	-	-	-
Blue Collar Occupation	-	-	-	-
Self Employed	-	-	-	-
Adjusted R^2	.25	.34	.37	.22
N	1150	1334	924	954

** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country, n/a not asked in survey
Source: ISSP (1991)

Table 4.5 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Attitude That Right and Wrong Should be Determined by Society on Selected Independent Variables

	Western Germany	**Eastern Germany**	**Hungary**	**Poland**
Age Category(Older)	.06 *	.06 *	.04	.09 **
Attend Church	**-.10 ** **	**-.07 * **	**-.10 ** **	**-.08 * **
Secondary Education Complet	-	-	-	-
Higher Income	-	-	-	-
Left-Right Placement (Right)	-	-	n/a	-
Married or Living as Married	-	-	-	-
Female	-.11 **	-.13 **	-.07 *	-.11 **
Larger Community Size	-	-	-	-
Union Member	-	-	-	-
Left Radical Vote Intention	-	-	-	-
Center-Left Vote Intention	-.03	.05 *	.00	.00
Center-Right Vote Intention	-	-	-	-
Right Radical Vote Intention	-	-	-	-
Unemployed	-	-	-	-
White Collar Occupation	-	-	-	-
Blue Collar Occupation	-	-	-	-
Self Employed	-	-	-	-
Adjusted R^2	.02	.03	.01	.02
N	1339	1474	987	1056

** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country, n/a not asked in survey
Source: ISSP (1991)

eastern Germany and Hungary, as well as for western Germany (Table 4.6). In fact, church attendance is one of the strongest predictors in each model, along with age and national pride. These models would indicate a clear preference for traditional family values among church attenders in post-transition societies. But the evidence for this relationship becomes less compelling when we look further. Two other questions are available to us which also measure church attenders' attitudes toward traditional family values.

The first question asks respondents to rank their agreement with the statement , "A husband's job is to earn the money; a wife's job is to look after the home and the family" (Table 4.7). Church attenders are more likely to agree with this statement in eastern Germany and Poland, as they do in western Germany. But no such relationship holds for Hungary. The strongest predictors in each model are older people, less educated, lower incomes, and males. The model fits best in western Germany (R^2 is .30), but explains variation relatively well in the post-transition societies, too. Explained variation is .19 for both eastern Germany and Hungary, and .11 for Poland.

A second question again asks respondents to rank their agreement with the statement, "All in all, family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job" (Table 4.8). Once again, church attenders are more likely to agree with the statement in both parts of Germany, but there is no relationship between church attendance and agreement with this statement for either Hungary or Poland. Church attenders do not seem to be as conservative on these family values in post-transition societies as they are in western Germany. The strongest relationship in each model is age; older people tend to agree that

Table 4.6 .Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Those Who Favor a Traditional Role for Women on Selected Independent Variables

	Western Germany	**Eastern Germany**	**Hungary**
Age Category(Older)	.20 *	.13 *	.12 *
Attend Church	**.12** *	**.17** *	**.15** **
Secondary Education Complete	-.08 *	-.09 *	-.09 *
Higher Income	-.06 *	-.09 *	-.05
Left-Right Placement (Right)	.09 *	.06 +	.01
Married or Living as Married	.01	.06 *	.06
Female	-.10 *	-.09 *	-.06
Larger Community Size	-	-	-
Union Member	-	-	-
Left Radical Vote Intention	-	-.08 *	-.03
Center-Left Vote Intention	.04 +	.04	.00
Center-Right Vote Intention	.07 *	.12 *	.03
Right Radical Vote Intention	-	-	-
Unemployed	.04 +	.02	-.01
White Collar Occupation	-.07 *	-.04	-.08 *
Blue Collar Occupation	-	-	-
Self Employed	-	-	-
National Pride	.15 *	.07 *	.12 **
Economically Satisfied	-	-	-
Interest in Politics	-.08 *	-.11 *	-.01
Adjusted R^2	.23	.22	.11
N	1715	1216	696

** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country, n/a not asked in survey
Source: WVS (1990)

Table 4.7 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Attitude That Husband's Job is to Earn Money; Wife's Job is Home and Family on Selected Independent Variables

	Western Germany	**Eastern Germany**	**Hungary**	**Poland**
Age Category(Older)	.30 **	.16 **	.19 **	.16 **
Attend Church	**.13 ** **	**.08 ** **	**.04**	**.10 ** **
Secondary Education Complet	-.18 **	-.12 **	-.22 **	-.17 **
Higher Income	-.19 **	-.12 **	-.10 **	-.06 +
Left-Right Placement (Right)	.10 **	.16 **	n/a	-.01
Married or Living as Married	.09 **	-.01	.01	.06 +
Female	-.09 **	-.11 **	-.13 **	-.14 **
Larger Community Size	-.05 *	-.09 **	-.07 *	-.03
Union Member	-.04	-.06 *	-.02	-.01
Left Radical Vote Intention	-	-.07 *	.02	-
Center-Left Vote Intention	-	-	-	-
Center-Right Vote Intention	-	-	-	-
Right Radical Vote Intention	.03	-.05 +		.01
Unemployed	-	-	-	-
White Collar Occupation	-	-	-	-
Blue Collar Occupation	.09 **	.08 *	.02	.02
Self Employed	-	-	-	-
Adjusted R^2	.30	.19	.19	.11
N	1150	1334	924	954

** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country, n/a not asked in survey
Source: ISSP (1991)

Table 4.8 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Attitude That Family Life Suffers if Women Work Outside the Home on Selected Independent Variables

	Western Germany	**Eastern Germany**	**Hungary**	**Poland**
Age Category(Older)	.19 **	.11 **	.16 **	.21 **
Attend Church	**.11 ** **	**.13 ** **	**.03**	**.05**
Secondary Education Complet	-.16 **	-.04	-.09 *	-.06 +
Higher Income	-.17 **	-.03	-.07 +	-.06 +
Left-Right Placement (Right)	.11 **	.11 **	n/a	.02
Married or Living as Married	.08 *	.02	.02	.08 *
Female	-.08 *	-.04	.00	-.14 **
Larger Community Size	-.06 *	-.05 +	-.08 *	.01
Union Member	-.02	-.05 +	.04	.05
Left Radical Vote Intention	-	-.08 **	-.11 **	-
Center-Left Vote Intention	-	-	-	-
Center-Right Vote Intention	-	-	-	-
Right Radical Vote Intention	-	-	-	-
Unemployed	-	-	-	-
White Collar Occupation	-	-	-	-
Blue Collar Occupation	-.01	.05	.04	.05
Self Employed	-	-	-	-
Adjusted R^2	.17	.09	.07	.10
N	1150	1334	924	954

** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country, n/a not asked in survey
Source: ISSP (1991)

family life suffers if women work outside the home. This relationship holds in each of the four models.

Attitudes about Religion and Politics

A final set of variables allow us to examine church members' attitudes about the proper relationship between religion and politics. These questions ask respondents about how much influence the church should have in political life. They address the issue of morality in public service, and they show that church attenders in post-transition societies feel quite strongly about this issue, as do western German church attenders.

The first question (Table 4.9) asks respondents whether it is better if religious believers hold public office. Church attendance is the strongest predictor of assent on this issue, in each country. Older people also agree with this statement, as do those on the political right. The less educated tend to disagree (though the relationship is only significant for eastern Germany and Poland), as do those who would vote for a radical right party (but only in Germany). The model fits best for western Germany, with nearly 30% explained variation, but it fits reasonably well in the post-transition societies as well.

A similar question (Table 4.10) asks respondents whether those who do not believe in God are unfit for public office. Again, church attendance is the strongest predictor in the model in each country, though not completing secondary education is equally strong in the Polish model. Older people agree with the statement, as do those who have not completed secondary education, people with lower incomes (not in Poland), those on the political right, and those from smaller communities.

Table 4.9 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Attitude That It is Better if Religious Believers Hold Public Office on Selected Independent Variables

	Western Germany	Eastern Germany	Hungary	Poland
Age Category(Older)	.13 **	.06 *	.12 **	.06 +
Attend Church	**.45 ** **	**.36 ** **	**.31 ** **	**.30 ** **
Secondary Education Complet	-.02	-.06 *	-.04	-.07 *
Higher Income	-	-	-	-
Left-Right Placement (Right)	.09 **	.11 **	n/a	.11 **
Married or Living as Married	-	-	-	-
Female	-	-	-	-
Larger Community Size	-	-	-	-
Union Member	-	-	-	-
Left Radical Vote Intention	-	-.05 +	-.05	-
Center-Left Vote Intention	-	-	-	-
Center-Right Vote Intention	-	-	-	-
Right Radical Vote Intention	-.04 +	-.05 *	-	.01
Unemployed	.01	-.04 +	.00	.03
White Collar Occupation	-	-	-	-
Blue Collar Occupation	-	-	-	-
Self Employed	-	-	-	-
Adjusted R^2	.28	.18	.14	.12
N	1323	1458	987	978

** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country, n/a not asked in survey
Source: ISSP (1991)

Table 4.10 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Attitude That Those Who Do Not Believe in God are Unfit for Public Office on Selected Independent Variables

	Western Germany	**Eastern Germany**	**Hungary**	**Poland**
Age Category(Older)	.14 **	.11 **	.12 **	.09 *
Attend Church	**.32 ** **	**.23 ** **	**.25 ** **	**.19 ** **
Secondary Education Complet	-.08 **	-.10 **	-.14 **	-.19 **
Higher Income	-.07 *	-.06 *	-.09 *	-.04
Left-Right Placement (Right)	.07 *	.16 **	n/a	.09 **
Married or Living as Married	-	-	-	-
Female	-.01	.06 *	.02	.07 *
Larger Community Size	-.05 +	-.08 **	-.08 *	-.06 +
Union Member	-.03	-.05 *	-.03	-.01
Left Radical Vote Intention	-	-	-	-
Center-Left Vote Intention	-	-	-	-
Center-Right Vote Intention	-	-	-	-
Right Radical Vote Intention	-.04	-.06 *	-	.01
Unemployed	-	-	-	-
White Collar Occupation	-	-	-	-
Blue Collar Occupation	-	-	-	-
Self Employed	.02	-.02	-.02	.04
Adjusted R^2	.19	.17	.19	.13
N	1150	1334	924	954

** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country, n/a not asked in survey
Source: ISSP (1991)

Two further questions ask about how much influence religious leaders should have in political life. Church attenders are less consistent in their attitudes about the proper role of religious **leaders** in political life than they were about the proper role of religious **believers** in political life in the two questions above. The models do not predict these two questions nearly as well, for any of the countries. Church attendance is still the strongest predictor of disagreement with the statement that religious leaders should not influence the government (Table 4.11). Church attenders agree that there should be a moral influence in political life, but they appear hesitant to turn over that responsibility to religious leaders. Church attenders also tend to disagree with the statement that religious leaders should not influence the vote (Table 4.12), though the relationship is not significant in eastern Germany and the model is not significant for Hungary.

Finally, when respondents were asked whether churches and religious organizations have too much power (Table 4.13), church attenders voiced strong disagreement with this statement, in all four countries. Church members agree that religion has a role in political life. They agree that it is better when religious believers hold public office. But they hesitate to endow religious leaders with the authority to speak for all believers. Church attenders are less in agreement that religious leaders should influence the government or the vote.

The results of this preliminary look at religious values in the postcommunist societies of Eastern Germany, Hungary and Poland point to some interesting similarities and differences. The figures on church membership by age category illustrate

Table 4.11 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Attitude That Religious Leaders Should Not Influence the Government on Selected Independent Variables

	Western Germany	**Eastern Germany**	**Hungary**	**Poland**
Age Category(Older)	.07 *	.08 **	.11 *	-.03
Attend Church	**-.23 ** **	**-.09 ** **	**-.12 ** **	**-.12 ** **
Secondary Education Complet	.00	.02	.07 +	.09 **
Higher Income	-	-	-	-
Left-Right Placement (Right)	-	-	n/a	-
Married or Living as Married	.02	-.06 *	.01	.03
Female	-.06 *	-.03	.01	.08 *
Larger Community Size	-	-	-	-
Union Member	.04	.07 *	.01	.00
Left Radical Vote Intention	-	.08 **	.02	-
Center-Left Vote Intention	-	-	-	-
Center-Right Vote Intention	-.06 +	-.03	.00	.02
Right Radical Vote Intention	-	-	-	-
Unemployed	-	-	-	-
White Collar Occupation	-	-	-	-
Blue Collar Occupation	-.01	.06 +	.04	-.01
Self Employed	.05 +	.02	-.10 **	.05
Adjusted R^2	.06	.03	.02	.03
N	1339	1474	984	1056

** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country, n/a not asked in survey
Source: ISSP (1991)

Table 4.12 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Attitude That Religious Leaders Should Not Influence the Vote on Selected Independent Variables

	Western Germany	**Eastern Germany**	**Hungary**	**Poland**
Age Category(Older)	-	-	-	-
Attend Church	**-.18 ****	**-.01**	**-.06 +**	**-.09 ***
Secondary Education Complet	.03	.05 +	-.03	.07 +
Higher Income	-	-	-	-
Left-Right Placement (Right)	-.04	-.06 *	n/a	-.08 *
Married or Living as Married	-	-	-	-
Female	-.07 *	-.05 +	.01	-.02
Larger Community Size	.01	.05 +	-.01	-.02
Union Member	.08 **	.04	.07 *	-.04
Left Radical Vote Intention	-	.05 +	.01	-
Center-Left Vote Intention	-	-	-	-
Center-Right Vote Intention	-	-	-	-
Right Radical Vote Intention	-	-	-	-
Unemployed	-	-	-	-
White Collar Occupation	.02	.05	.01	.04
Blue Collar Occupation	-	-	-	-
Self Employed	-	-	-	-
Adjusted R^2	.06	.02	.00	.02
N	1323	1458	987	978

** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country, n/a not asked in survey
Source: ISSP (1991)

Table 4.13 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Attitude That Churches and Religious Organizations Have Too Much Power on Selected Independent Variables

	Western Germany	**Eastern Germany**	**Hungary**	**Poland**
Age Category(Older)	-	-	-	-
Attend Church	**-.28 ****	**-.18 ****	**-.15 ****	**-.36 ****
Secondary Education Complet	-	-	-	-
Higher Income	-	-	-	-
Left-Right Placement (Right)	.00	-.09 **	n/a	-.10 **
Married or Living as Married	-	-	-	-
Female	-.06 *	-.03	.01	.01
Larger Community Size	-	-	-	-
Union Member	.10 **	.00	.01	-.02
Left Radical Vote Intention	-	-	-	-
Center-Left Vote Intention	-	-	-	-
Center-Right Vote Intention	-.05 +	-.03	-.06 +	-.06 *
Right Radical Vote Intention	.06 *	.02	-	-.04
Unemployed	-	-	-	-
White Collar Occupation	-	-	-	-
Blue Collar Occupation	-	-	-	-
Self Employed	-	-	-	-
Adjusted R^2	.11	.05	.03	.16
N	1323	1458	987	978

** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country, n/a not asked in survey
Source: ISSP (1991)

dramatically the effect of Soviet repression on church membership in Eastern Germany, and show how minimal that effect was among Catholics in both Hungary and Poland. When Catholics are removed from the sample the figure shows a moderate secularization effect for Hungary and eastern Germany, with the age groups born after the imposition of communism most strongly affected by the pressure to disaffiliate.

Church attenders in all three post-transition societies express strong religious beliefs, as do church attenders in western Germany. Fifty years of communism does not appear to have had as much impact on religious beliefs as it has had on religious behavior. Church attenders also have very different attitudes than non-attenders in their opinions about where the authority for moral decision-making rests. Church attenders are much more likely than non-attenders to declare that moral authority rests in God's laws, and they are likewise less likely to agree that moral authority rightly resides within society.

However, in attitude toward conventional family roles church members in these post-transition societies do not appear to be as traditional as their western German counterpart. Hungarian church attenders, in particular, are no more likely than non-attenders to support traditional family roles. This is further evidence, I would argue, of a more secular character to Hungarian society. Churches in Hungarian society have made a concerted effort to cooperate with the state and stay out of the concerns of everyday economic realities. Church members here are less likely to feel that the church takes a stand, either one way or the other, on issues such as the role of women in the home and in

the workplace. Polish church attenders, likewise, feel no more strongly about women working outside the home than to non-attenders. This is not an issue for the church there.

Church attenders in post-transition societies do feel strongly, though, that religion does have a place in public life. They agree that it is better for society if religious believers hold public office. They agree that non-believers should not hold public office. They feel that it is right for religious leaders to have an influence in the government. They disagree that religious organizations, such as churches, have too much power. But they do not necessarily agree that religious leaders should influence the vote. They appear to recognize the importance of the sanctity of the polling booth, and the necessity of a free and confidential ballot for the proper operation of democratic process. In other words, church attenders agree that religious believers have a moral obligation to be politically engaged and to exert their moral influence in the public process of democracy. But they resist the right of anyone, even religious leaders, to interfere with democratic process by influencing the vote.

These findings make it clear that religion is alive and well in these post-transition societies. Although the effects of repression of the churches will continue to be felt, probably for several generations, there is a vitality to religious belief and moral values that reflects well when compared to that of religious believers in western Germany. Similarly, it seems that democracy is also alive and well in these post-transition societies. Apparently nurtured by the churches during the years of totalitarianism, healthy attitudes about the role of religion in a democratic state have persisted in these societies. Further research on the relationship between religious behavior and other democratic values in

the next chapter will help us to better understand just what role the churches have had in preserving democratic values in these societies.

CHAPTER V

POLITICAL VALUES OF CHURCH ATTENDERS

In the previous chapter I examined patterns of church membership and church attendance for the period immediately following the transition to democracy in each of these postcommunist countries. I found that repression of the churches was most strongly experienced in East Germany, where church attendance has been more than halved across all age groups since World War II. While church repression was also experienced by Poland and Hungary during that same time period (see Chapter Two) its effect on church attendance has been very different in these two countries. Church membership in Poland remains very high across all age groups, and repression appears to have had little effect on church attendance in this country. In Hungary church membership also remains relatively high, but when examined by age group we see that younger Hungarians report lower levels of church attendance than older Hungarians, a secularization (or life cycle) effect seen also in western Germany.

As I discussed in Chapter One, I expect church attendance to have a differential effect on political values depending on the political structure of church/state organization in the country prior to its democratic transition. I expect church attendance to have a stronger effect on political values in countries where the church was heavily repressed by the communist government -- Poland and East Germany -- in countries where the church was the only institution of civil society allowed to exist alongside the government. I expect church attendance to have less of an effect on political values in Hungary, a

communist country that allowed for church participation in political life, where the church was less severely repressed than in Poland and East Germany. Though I do not empirically test this state/civil society contextual variable, I have provided details of its composition and effect in Chapter Two and have demonstrated evidence of its existence in an analysis of church membership and church attendance in Chapter Four. Therefore, I examine individual-level models separately for each country to control for this country-specific effect.

In this chapter I examine a broad variety of political values to see what effect church attendance has on political values in each of these countries. I group the variables into categories reflecting some aspect of the political culture captured by those variables, then describe how church attendance affects each of those variables in each country. Though I do not empirically verify the relationship between certain democratic values and either the priestly or the prophetic tradition of the church, I have argued in Chapter One for the face validity of this conceptual scheme. There are certain democratic values that reflect the priestly tradition of the church. Democratic values such as confidence and support in the regime reflect the priestly tradition's insistence on the legitimacy of earthly authority.

Other democratic values are not consonant with the priestly tradition of the church but they do reflect the prophetic tradition of the church. Democratic values such as interpersonal trust and political and personal efficacy are not highly valued in the priestly tradition of the church, and church members are not ordinarily associated with these particular democratic values. But in a repressive society, where the individual rights of

church members have been oppressively compromised by the regime, the call for a return to justice spoken by the prophetic tradition of the church resonates with individual church members. The more the church was repressed by the regime, the stronger became the call of the prophetic tradition and the more it allied with these democratic values of trust for others and individual efficacy. Therefore, these democratic values are likely to be found among church members in these post-transition societies, even though they are values not usually associated with church membership.

Finally, there are democratic values which do not particularly reflect either the priestly or the prophetic tradition of the church. Such democratic ideals as political tolerance, civil liberties, and attitudes toward conflict and protest are difficult to classify into either tradition, as the church generally defines these values as outside of the scope of religion. Similarly, questions that deal with preference for a particular economic form have little to do with religious attitudes, although they do inform us about democratic values. Religious belief does influence these values, but the effect of religion is sometimes ambiguous. I have placed these relationships between the effects of the priestly and the prophetic traditions, because I believe that these values are influenced sometimes by both traditions, and sometimes by neither. In this way I am able to describe the "landscape" of the political culture in each country and how it is differentially affected by the church.

Democratic Values Reflecting the Priestly Tradition -- Power from Above

Confidence and Trust in the Institutions of Government

Confidence and trust are very important aspects of the political culture, indicating some measure of legitimation of the current regime by the populace. Legitimation is a very complex concept, however, and confidence and trust reflect a somewhat superficial level of democratic support, related to government performance. People are likely to indicate confidence and trust in the regime as long as civil order is maintained, the regime is stable, and economic conditions are not fluctuating too severely. This is but one level of support for democratic values, however, and is not a particularly reliable indicator of the true depth of democratic legitimation (see Weil 1987, Weil 1989).

Confidence and trust in the regime by church attenders reflects the priestly tradition of obedience to authority. As I said before, obedience is a strong tenet of faith promoted by the priestly tradition of the church. The isolation of the past forty years of these churches from their counterparts in the West has had the result of preserving relatively pre-modern churches in the East. Because of this, church attenders in the East are likely to be even more conservative than their counterparts in the West, especially when it comes to attitudes of obedience to authority, as I stated in hypothesis one.

Aspects of this concept are captured by two separate variables -- a factor of confidence in state institutions and a factor of trust in government. Confidence in State Institutions is a commonly asked question in surveys of political attitudes. It is included in all of the surveys I analyzed here, and the factor includes the identical institutions across all countries (see Chapter Three for variable construction details). Table 5.1

Table 5.1 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Confidence in State Institutions Factor on Selected Independent Variables

	Western Germany		**Eastern Germany**		**Hungary**		**Poland**	
	1990	1991	1990	1991	1990	1991	1990	1991
Age Category(Older)	.05 +	.08 *	.05	.02	.01	.00	.13 *	.05
Attend Church	**.10** *	**.11** *	**.04**	**.18** *	**.07** +	**.12** *	**.12** *	**.11** **
Secondary Education Complet	.02	-	-.07 *	-	-.03	-	-.05	-
Higher Income	-	.06 *	-	-.02	-	-.09 *	-	.02
Left-Right Placement (Right)	.11 *	.11 *	-.07 *	.10 *	-.01	n/a	.08 *	.08 *
Married or Living as Married	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Female	.04	-.08 *	.09 *	-.02	.01	.04	-.01	.05
Larger Community Size	.00	.00	-.05 +	-.05 +	-.08 *	-.08 *	n/a	-.08 *
Union Member	-	.02	-	.06 *	-	-.04	-	-.01
Left Radical Vote Intention	-	-	-	-.06 *	-	.01	-	-
Center-Left Vote Intention	.07 *	.01	.13 *	.07 *	.08 *	.10 *	-.02	-.03
Center-Right Vote Intention	.12 *	.09 *	.05	.14 *	.10 *	.21 *	.06 +	.05
Right Radical Vote Intention	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Unemployed	.01	-	.06 *	-	-.04	-	n/a	-
White Collar Occupation	-	.02	-	-.03	-	.02	-	-.08 *
Blue Collar Occupation	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Self Employed	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
National Pride	.16 *	n/a	.16 *	n/a	.17 *	n/a	.24 *	n/a
Economically Satisfied	.15 *	n/a	.16 *	n/a	.13 *	n/a	.06	n/a
Interest in Politics	.06 *	n/a	.12 *	n/a	.00	n/a	.09 *	n/a
Adjusted R^2	.16	.07	.11	.10	.07	.08	.14	.04
N	1839	1150	1220	1334	706	924	653	954

** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country

Sources: WVS (1990), ISSP (1991)

presents standardized regression coefficients for models in all four countries for 1990 and 1991. The models are not identical, however, and care should be taken not to extend inferences across models. The variables measuring pride, satisfaction with the economy, and interest in politics were not asked on the 1991 ISSP survey, but they were asked on the 1990 World Values Survey, so the 1991 models do not include those variables.

Church attendance is one of the most significant and consistent predictors of confidence in state institutions within each model. With the exception of East Germany in 1990, church attenders express more confidence in state institutions in each of the countries. Those who indicate pride in their country are also more likely to indicate confidence in its institutions, as are those who are satisfied with their economic situation (but not in Poland), and those who are interested in politics (but not in Hungary). Older people are also usually more likely to indicate confidence in state institutions, as are people who express a preference for the political right or who would vote for a right of center party.

Table 5.2 models the same dependent variable, but focuses specifically on eastern and western Germany in 1991 and 1992. Comparison of Tables 5.1 and 5.2 shows how important questions measuring national pride and economic satisfaction are to properly specifying this model. A look at the explained variance for the models for the two Germanies on these tables illustrates the point. For western Germany adjusted R^2 nearly doubles in size when these two variables are included in the model, and model fit

Table 5.2 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Confidence in State Institutions Factor on Selected Independent Variables

	Western Germany		Eastern Germany	
	1991	1992	1991	1992
Age Category(Older)	-	-	-	-
Attend Church	**.10 ***	**.16 ****	**.11 ***	**.05 +**
Secondary Education Complete	.03	-	.04	-
Higher Income	-.03	-	-.04	-
Left-Right Placement (Right)	.07 +	.04	.11 *	.10 **
Married or Living as Married	-	-	-	-
Female	-	-	-	-
Larger Community Size	-.06 *	-.10 **	-.01	-.08 **
Union Member	-	-	-	-
Left Radical Vote Intention	-	-	-	-
Center-Left Vote Intention	-	.08 *	-	.07 *
Center-Right Vote Intention	.13 *	.24 **	.11 *	.16 **
Right Radical Vote Intention	-.12 *	-.11 **	-.10 *	-.11 **
Unemployed	-	-	-	-
White Collar Occupation	-	-	-	-
Blue Collar Occupation	-	-	-	-
Self Employed	-	-	-	-
National Pride	.13 *	.03	.15 *	.10 **
Economically Satisfied	.14 *	.26 **	.17 *	.23 **
Interest in Politics	-	-	-	-
Adjusted R^2	.13	.24	.15	.18
N	1012	1039	1039	1105

** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country

Sources: IfD 5055 (1991), IfD 5074 (1992)

increases substantially for eastern Germany, too.[8] Once again, church attenders are more likely to support state institutions, as are those who would vote for a center-right party, those who express pride in their country, and those who indicate they are satisfied with their economic situation. Those who would vote for a right-radical party (the Republikaner) indicate less confidence in state institutions.

Trust in Government (Table 5.3) is another measure of support for the current regime. Like confidence in institutions I expect church attenders to express trust in their government. This variable is a factor score, comprised of three separate items asking about trust in the government (see Chapter Three for question texts and variable construction). Church attenders in both eastern and western Germany indicate trust in their government, for both years. And these two years were particularly trying ones for both parts of the recently reunited Germany. Reunification extracted a heavy financial toll on western Germans, which they experienced most strongly in 1991 and 1992. And by 1991 and 1992 some of the transition euphoria had worn off in eastern Germany, and the realities of unemployment and a seriously inadequate infrastructure had become apparent. But church attenders in both parts of Germany reflect a basic trust in their government, again indicative of the priestly tradition of acquiescence to authority. Those

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[8]To test whether the addition of these variables significantly improves the fit of the model, I ran a hierarchical multiple regression test on each of the models for this variable in the WVS. F-test results indicate a significant improvement in each model with the addition of the variables of national pride, economic satisfaction, and interest in politics. For West Germany the value of F was -56.83, with df for K_2 12 and for K_1 9; for East Germany the value of F was -15.62, (df for K_2 12, for K_1 9); for Hungary the value of F was -4.48, (df for K_2 12, for K_1 9); and for Poland the value of F was -11.41 (df for K_2 10, for K_1 7).

Table 5.3 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Trust in Government on Selected Independent Variables

	Western Germany		Eastern Germany	
	1991	1992	1991	1992
Age Category(Older)	-	-	-	-
Attend Church	**.07 ***	**.11 ****	**.08 ***	**.09 ****
Secondary Education Complete	-.03	.00	.02	-.05 +
Higher Income	-.02	.01	-.01	-.05 +
Left-Right Placement (Right)	.13 *	.07 *	.20 *	.17 **
Married or Living as Married	-	-	-	-
Female	.08 *	.05	.03	-.01
Larger Community Size	-	-.05 +		-.05 +
Union Member	-	-	-	-
Left Radical Vote Intention	-	-	-	-
Center-Left Vote Intention	-.07 *	.05	.00	.07 *
Center-Right Vote Intention	.31 *	.29 **	.24 *	.27 **
Right Radical Vote Intention	-.08 *	-.11 **	-.02	-.11 **
Unemployed	-	-	-	-
White Collar Occupation	.02	-.02	-.07 *	-.06
Blue Collar Occupation	-	-.07 +	-	-.06
Self Employed	-	-	-	-
National Pride	.10 *	.08 *	.12 *	.13 **
Economically Satisfied	.18 *	.20 **	.25 *	.24 **
Interest in Politics	-	-.01	-	-.06 *
Adjusted R^2	.31	.25	.31	.33
N	1002	1039	1039	1104

** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country

Sources: IfD 5055 (1991), IfD 5074 (1992)

who place themselves to the political right, those who would vote for the center-right party, those who express national pride and those who indicate satisfaction with their economic situation also indicate greater trust in government.

Support for Democracy as a Form of State

This item refers to democratic support on a somewhat deeper, more philosophical level. Relative to the previous measures of democratic legitimation, this concept gets at support for democracy in principle, irrespective of government performance. While we would expect the church to express support for a democratic form of government from a purely utilitarian motive -- democracy is at most agnostic, while the Soviet regime was deliberately atheistic -- I argue that support for a democratic form of state among church members reflects a change in orientation among the churches toward democracy. The church has learned, particularly as a result of experiences since World War II, that a democratic form of state is more closely aligned with religious values. That is, a democratic state is preferred over an autocratic state because the good of the community is preserved without sacrificing the good of the individual. Therefore, as I stated in hypothesis two, I would expect church attenders to be more supportive of a democratic state than non-attenders. But surveys indicate that a reservoir of democratic legitimation tends to build up in a society, as people develop experience with a successfully functioning democratic structure (see Weil 1989). Therefore, I would also expect that church attenders in western Germany would indicate stronger levels of support for a democratic form of state than their counterparts in eastern Germany, since they have many years of experience with a successful democratic state.

Several questions were asked of respondents to find out their opinions on democracy as a form of state (see Chapter Three for question texts). The factor score of these questions provides a measure of the underlying dimension of democratic support . Table 5.4 describes the influence of church attendance on democratic support for eastern and western Germany. Church attenders are more likely to indicate support for democratic values in western Germany, both in 1991 and 1992. In eastern Germany church attenders were also more likely to indicate support for democratic values in 1991, but by 1992 church attenders were no more likely than non-attenders to express democratic support. A further look at the model for 1992 in eastern Germany helps explain why this relationship faded. Extremist vote intention, both on the right and on the left, significantly reduced support for democratic values in eastern Germany as the harsher realities of reunification gradually replaced the initial optimism. Center-right vote intention, satisfaction with the economic situation, and national pride (in eastern Germany) also affect support for democratic values.

Democratic Values Which Lie Between the Priestly and the Prophetic Tradition

Political Freedoms and Political Rights

A very important tenet of democracy is individual liberty and political tolerance. In a democracy individual liberty is protected by law, as is the right of individuals to pursue their own self interest. This particular set of democratic values is not so clearly aligned with Christian values, however. The church does support and promote individual human rights and in cases of individual liberty versus state control does tend to stand on the side of the individual. However, the transcending value for the church is the

Table 5.4 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Support for a Democratic Form of State on Selected Independent Variables

	Western Germany		Eastern Germany	
	1991	1992	1991	1992
Age Category(Older)	-	-.04	-	.07 *
Attend Church	**.08 ***	**.12 ****	**.09 ***	**.04**
Secondary Education Complete	-	.07 *	-	-.03
Higher Income	.00	-	-.08 *	-
Left-Right Placement (Right)	-.06 +	-.03	.10 *	.07 *
Married or Living as Married	.05	-	-.01	-
Female	-	-.01	-	-.07 *
Larger Community Size	-.08 *	-	.07 *	-
Union Member	-	-	-	-
Left Radical Vote Intention	-	.02	-	-.07 *
Center-Left Vote Intention	.09 *	.16 **	.01	.11 **
Center-Right Vote Intention	.13 *	.17 **	.16 *	.13 **
Right Radical Vote Intention	-.09 *	-.02	.03	-.13 **
Unemployed	-.09 *	-.04	.00	-.06 +
White Collar Occupation	.05	-	-.03	-
Blue Collar Occupation	-	-	-	-
Self Employed	-	-	-	-
National Pride	-.08 *	-.06	.06 +	.06 +
Economically Satisfied	.17 *	.10 **	.14 *	.14 **
Interest in Politics	-	.08 *	-	.05
Adjusted R^2	.10	.08	.11	.14
N	1012	1039	1039	1116

** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country

Sources: IfD 5055 (1991), IfD 5074 (1992)

promotion of the community, not the individual. The common good is valued more highly than individual liberty. Therefore, church support of this democratic value tends to be less strong. The rights of individuals are valued only insofar as they promote the common good. Individual rights which are divisive or extreme are not supported by the church. As I stated in hypothesis three, I do not expect church attenders to be any stronger than non-attenders in their support of individual freedoms and civil liberties.

Several questions from these data measure various aspects of individual freedoms and allow us to examine this relationship in more detail. One question asks respondents to decide which is better, to have freedom and law or to have a higher standard of living. Table 5.5 displays multiple regression results for this variable. Unambiguously, church attenders prefer freedom and law over a higher standard of living, for each part of Germany. However, notice how this question does not really address the idea of individual liberty, but merely asks whether freedom and law is preferable to economic security. One can answer in favor of freedom and law here without stating a preference for individual liberty over the common good. This answer is consistent with the priestly tradition of the church, which values individual autonomy only insofar as it promotes the common good. When individual liberties threaten the common good they are not supported by the priestly tradition. That is why church members tend to be somewhat less tolerant of civil liberties and individual freedoms.

The next three tables show how church support diminishes when the issue of political freedom involves choosing between individual liberty and the common good. These questions probe the respondent's understanding of and support for the right of free

Table 5.5 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Those Who Prefer Freedom and Law over Higher Living Standard on Selected Independent Variables

	Western Germany		Eastern Germany	
	1991	1992	1991	1992
Age Category(Older)	-	-	-	-
Attend Church	**.12 ***	**.06 +**	**.07 ***	**.06 ***
Secondary Education Complete	-	-	-	-
Higher Income	-	-	-	-
Left-Right Placement (Right)	-	-.11 **	-	-.09 *
Married or Living as Married	.03	-.01	.01	.04
Female	-	.06 +	-	-.01
Larger Community Size	-	-	-	-
Union Member	-	-	-	-
Left Radical Vote Intention	-	-	-	-
Center-Left Vote Intention	-	-	-	-
Center-Right Vote Intention	-	.09 *	-	.05
Right Radical Vote Intention	-	-	-	-
Unemployed	-.08 *	-	-.01	-
White Collar Occupation	-.05	-	-.02	-
Blue Collar Occupation	-.03	-	-.04	-
Self Employed	-.08 *	-	.02	-
National Pride	.07 *	-	.01	-
Economically Satisfied	.09 *	.07 *	.03	.10 **
Interest in Politics	.12 *	.15 **	.02	.11 **
Adjusted R^2	.06	.04	.00	.04
N	1019	1039	1076	1116

** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country

Sources: IfD 5055 (1991), IfD 5074 (1992)

speech. Table 5.6 reports regressions of a factor score of respondents' tolerance for extremist speech. Church attenders in western Germany are not tolerant of extremist speech. More educated persons are similarly intolerant, as are white collar workers. Those who would vote for the right extremist party are more tolerant of extremist speech, but this effect is partly an artifact of variable construction. Since the variable measures support for right radical or revolutionary speakers, right extremists are indicating support for like-minded persons.

In eastern Germany there is no apparent relationship between church attendance and tolerance for extremist speech. Older persons are less likely to endorse such speech, as are those who are satisfied with the economic situation. And just as in the west, those who would vote for a right radical party are more tolerant of extremists such as themselves.

Table 5.7 asks respondents to evaluate whether they feel that individual citizens have freedom of speech in Germany. Western German church attenders do not differ from non-attenders on this question, but eastern German church attenders in 1991 expressed strong agreement that individuals have free speech. Compared to their situation in previous years, clearly they did gain the right to express their political opinions freely. And since political opinions were being expressed from pulpits and within religious gatherings under threat of political repression prior to the transition, the freedom of speech that came about as a result of the transition was felt particularly strongly by church affiliates. However, by 1992 the political climate had changed in eastern Germany and church attenders were less euphoric about their newly found

Table 5.6 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Tolerance of the Right of Free Speech on Selected Independent Variables

	Western Germany		Eastern Germany	
	1991	1992	1991	1992
Age Category(Older)	-.05	-.03	-.11 *	-.10 **
Attend Church	**-.10 ***	**-.08 ***	**-.03**	**.00**
Secondary Education Complete	.07 *	.08 *	.03	.01
Higher Income	-	-	-	-
Left-Right Placement (Right)	-	.00	-	.11 **
Married or Living as Married	-	.03	-	-.07 *
Female	-.10 *	-	-.05 +	-
Larger Community Size	-	-	-	-
Union Member	-	-	-	-
Left Radical Vote Intention	-	-	-	-
Center-Left Vote Intention	-	-	-	-
Center-Right Vote Intention	-	-.04	-	-.01
Right Radical Vote Intention	.09 *	.15 **	.10 *	.09 **
Unemployed	-	.09 **	-	.06 +
White Collar Occupation	.11 *	.09 *	-.01	-.07
Blue Collar Occupation	.10 *	.07	-.03	-.01
Self Employed	-	-	-	-
National Pride	-.12 *	-	.01	-
Economically Satisfied	.01	-.07 *	-.06 *	-.09 *
Interest in Politics	-	.02	-	.05
Adjusted R^2	.07	.07	.03	.05
N	1019	1039	1076	1116

** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country

Sources: IfD 5055 (1991), IfD 5074 (1992)

Table 5.7 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Those Who Believe Citizens Have Free Speech on Selected Independent Variables

	Western Germany		Eastern Germany	
	1991	1992	1991	1992
Age Category(Older)	-	-	-	-
Attend Church	**-.02**	**-.01**	**.10 ***	**.03**
Secondary Education Complete	-	-	-	-
Higher Income	-	-.02	-	-.09 **
Left-Right Placement (Right)	-	-	-	-
Married or Living as Married	.06 +	-	-.05 +	-
Female	-.01	.02	-.08 *	-.10 **
Larger Community Size	-	-	-	-
Union Member	-	-	-	-
Left Radical Vote Intention	-	-	-	-
Center-Left Vote Intention	.08 *	-	.01	-
Center-Right Vote Intention	.09 *	.05	.17 *	.20 **
Right Radical Vote Intention	-.09 *	-.10 **	.02	.04
Unemployed	-	-	-	-
White Collar Occupation	-	-	-	-
Blue Collar Occupation	-	-	-	-
Self Employed	-	-	-	-
National Pride	-	-	-	-
Economically Satisfied	.18 *	.12 **	.11 *	.11 **
Interest in Politics	-	-.01	-	-.09 **
Adjusted R^2	.05	.03	.07	.08
N	1019	1055	1076	1106

** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country

Sources: IfD 5055 (1991), IfD 5074 (1992)

freedom of speech. Males in eastern Germany are more likely to agree that political opinions can freely be expressed, as are those who would vote for the prevailing center-right party and those who are satisfied with the economic situation.

Finally, Table 5.8 reflects opinions about the individuals' right to freedom of expression -- a more philosophical form of the question (see Chapter Three for question wording). Church attenders in both parts of Germany in 1991 were less likely to agree that people have the right to free expression . By 1992 this relationship no longer held, for either part of Germany. Younger people are more likely to agree with the right to freedom of expression, as are those who would place themselves on the political left (at least in 1991), those who would vote for a center-left party, and those who claim an interest in politics.

These previous four tables illustrate the ambiguity of support for certain democratic values among church members. When individual rights do not conflict with the common good, they are supported by the church. This again reflects the priestly tradition of respect for authority. For example, the right to freedom of speech was supported by church members when it promoted the transition from totalitarianism, but when free speech became divisive in 1992 (as a result of reunification pressures, the skinhead movement, anti-foreigner activities, etc.) church attenders saw that democratic value as conflicting with the common good and withdrew their support.

Protest Behaviors

Protest against the government is contrary to the priestly tradition of the church. In general, church leadership is opposed to protest, as it disrupts order and threatens

Table 5.8 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Right to Free Expression on Selected Independent Variables

	Western Germany		Eastern Germany	
	1991	1992	1991	1992
Age Category(Older)	-.12 *	-.03	-.06 +	-.09 **
Attend Church	**-.11 ***	**-.04**	**-.10 ***	**-.05**
Secondary Education Complete	.09 *	.09 **	.02	.00
Higher Income	-	-	-	-
Left-Right Placement (Right)	-.12 *	-	-.07 +	-
Married or Living as Married	.08 *	-	.00	-
Female	-	-	-	-
Larger Community Size	-	.03	-	-.06 *
Union Member	-	-	-	-
Left Radical Vote Intention	-	-	-	-
Center-Left Vote Intention	.06 +	.07 *	.07 *	-.02
Center-Right Vote Intention	-	-	-	-
Right Radical Vote Intention	-	-	-	-
Unemployed	-	-	-	-
White Collar Occupation	.06 +	-	.00	-
Blue Collar Occupation	-	-	-	-
Self Employed	-	-	-	-
National Pride	-.06 +	-.06 +	-.04	-.03
Economically Satisfied	.09 *	-	.04	-
Interest in Politics	.16 *	.15 **	.11 *	.05 +
Adjusted R^2	.15	.05	.05	.01
N	964	1055	1013	1124

** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country

Sources: IfD 5055 (1991), IfD 5074 (1992)

authority. However, the prophetic tradition of the church, which calls upon individuals to speak out and act against injustice, often endorses protest as a means of addressing injustice. At several points in history church members have engaged in protest with varying degrees of institutional support. In East Germany, Poland and Hungary church members engaged in protest against the government, sometimes with institutional support and sometimes alone. However, the institution itself (both the Catholic Church and the various Protestant Churches) when speaking as a public body, always spoke out in favor of peace and against protest. Therefore, church members in these post-transition societies received a mixed message from the church. While the official organization publicly deplored protest activities, at the same time they witnessed the public protests of certain brave individuals and occasionally even church leaders against an oppressive regime. Consequently, church members in these post-transition societies are somewhat less conservative when it comes to public protest than we would expect church members to be. I stated in hypothesis four that I do not expect church attenders to support protest more than non-attenders, but I expect that opposition to protest might be somewhat lower for church attenders in these post-tradition societies than it is among western German church attenders.

Table 5.9 shows respondents' willingness to engage in political protest behaviors (See Chapter Three). A Guttman scale is formed of respondents' answers to a list of protest behaviors. Respondents are asked whether they have ever engaged in any of these protest behaviors, or whether they might ever engage in any of those behaviors.

Table 5.9 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Support for Protest Behaviors on Selected Independent Variables

	Western Germany	Eastern Germany	Hungary
Age Category(Older)	-.27 *	-.39 *	-.24 **
Attend Church	**.02**	**.00**	**-.04**
Secondary Education Complete	.12 *	.01	.05
Higher Income	-	-	-
Left-Right Placement (Right)	-.20 *	-.06 *	-.04
Married or Living as Married	-.02	.00	-.12 **
Female	-.07 *	-.15 *	-.10 *
Larger Community Size	.05 *	.08 *	.09 *
Union Member	.11 *	.02	.10 *
Left Radical Vote Intention	-	-	-
Center-Left Vote Intention	.00	-.05 +	.10 *
Center-Right Vote Intention	-	-	-
Right Radical Vote Intention	-	-	-
Unemployed	-	-	-
White Collar Occupation	-	-	-
Blue Collar Occupation	-	-	-
Self Employed	-	-	-
National Pride	-.22 *	-.15 *	-.04
Economically Satisfied	-.01	-.03	-.09 *
Interest in Politics	.26 *	.17 *	.24 **
Adjusted R^2	.43	.31	.24
N	1359	872	557

** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country, n/a not asked in survey
Source: WVS (1990)

Church attenders are no more or less willing to engage in protest than are non-attenders. Older persons are much less likely to indicate willingness to protest. Those who say they are interested in politics are much more likely to be willing to engage in protest. Males are more likely to protest, as are those from larger communities. Union members in western Germany and in Hungary are more likely to support protest, and in both parts of Germany those who would place themselves on the political left and those who say they are not proud to be German are more likely to support protest behaviors.

The next table (5.10) asks about respondents' tolerance for protest behavior. Again, a Guttman scale is formed from respondents answers about whether the same list of protest behaviors as above should or should not be allowed. This variable, then, addresses respondents' tolerance for protest, rather than their proclivity to engage in protest. As expected, church members in western Germany are not tolerant of protest behavior. But there is no significant relationship between church attendance and tolerance for protest in either eastern Germany or Hungary.

As I stated above, church attenders in these post-transition societies have been receiving mixed messages about protest from their religious leaders, and tend therefore to be somewhat less intolerant of protest than we would otherwise expect. This is a result of conflicting messages in these Eastern European churches coming from both the priestly and prophetic traditions. Normally, protest behaviors are not supported by the church, even in democratic societies, as these behaviors contradict the priestly tradition of obedience to authority. However, public protest is an acceptable means to fight oppression and injustice, well recognized from within the prophetic tradition of the

Table 5.10 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Those Who Would Tolerate Protest Behavior on Selected Independent Variables

	Western Germany	**Eastern Germany**	**Hungary**
Age Category(Older)	-.27 **	-.16 **	-.20 **
Attend Church	**-.10 ** **	**-.02**	**-.01**
Secondary Education Complete	.08 **	.08 +	.16 **
Higher Income	-	-	-
Left-Right Placement (Right)	-	-	-
Married or Living as Married	-	-	-
Female	-.04 *	-.08 +	-.17 **
Larger Community Size	.05 *	.03	.12 **
Union Member	-	n/a	n/a
Left Radical Vote Intention	-	-	-
Center-Left Vote Intention	-	-	-
Center-Right Vote Intention	-.08 **	-.13 **	.04
Right Radical Vote Intention	-	-	-
Unemployed	-	-	-
White Collar Occupation	.05	.03	-.14 *
Blue Collar Occupation	.03	-.02	-.15 *
Self Employed	-	-	-
National Pride	-	-	-
Economically Satisfied	-	-	-
Interest in Politics	.14 **	.14 **	.15 **
	-	-	-
Adjusted R^2	.19	.10	.18
N	2113	574	650

** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country

Source: ISSP 1990

church, and public protests were successfully used by several of the churches to promote the transition to democracy, particularly in Poland and East Germany. Therefore, church members in these post-transition societies tend to look on protest somewhat differently than their counterparts in western Germany, who still interpret protest as being dangerous to the common good, reflecting the priestly tradition.

The rest of the profile of those who would support protest remains substantially as it was in the previous table. Younger people are more tolerant of protest, as are those who say they are interested in politics, males, and those from larger communities (except for eastern Germany). Union membership was not asked here for either eastern Germany or Hungary, and neither political identification nor national pride were significant predictors in any of the countries.

The other side of protest is attitude toward government repression of protestors. Table 5.11 presents regression models of a factor score composed of attitudes about a variety of forms of government repression of protest activity (see Chapter Three). In general, as I said above, the priestly tradition of the church opposes protest and we would expect church members to endorse the necessity of government intervention to prevent protest. Table 5.11 shows that church attenders in western Germany do support government repression of protest. But church attenders in eastern Germany are not likely to either endorse or oppose government repression of protest. As before, church attenders in post-transition eastern Germany are ambiguous about the place of public protest in society. They are no more likely than non-attenders to favor government repression of protest. Older people do support government repression, as do males, those who say they

Table 5.11 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Those Who Oppose Government Repression of Citizens on Selected Independent Variables

	Western Germany	**Eastern Germany**
	1991	1991
Age Category(Older)	-.16 **	-.19 **
Attend Church	**-.10 ** **	**.04**
Secondary Education Complete	-	-
Higher Income	-	-
Left-Right Placement (Right)	-.19 **	-.12 **
Married or Living as Married	-	-
Female	.07 *	.11 **
Larger Community Size	-	-
Union Member	-	-
Left Radical Vote Intention	-	-
Center-Left Vote Intention	-	-
Center-Right Vote Intention	-.08 *	-.07 *
Right Radical Vote Intention	-	-
Unemployed	-	-
White Collar Occupation	.13 *	.02
Blue Collar Occupation	.11 *	.03
Self Employed	.07 +	.00
National Pride	-.23 **	-.14 **
Economically Satisfied	.02	.00
Interest in Politics	.09 **	.09 *
Adjusted R^2	.26	.11
N	1002	1059

** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country
Source: IfD 5055 (1991)

are proud to be German, those who place themselves on the right politically, and those who would vote for the prevailing center-right party. Females and those who express an interest in politics tend to oppose government repression of protestors.

Economic Issues

In general, economic issues are separate from democratic values. There exists within democratic governments a continuum of economic organization ranging from democratic capitalism on one end to democratic socialism on the other. Those who argue that the responsibilities of government should be limited fall toward the democratic capitalism end of the continuum. Democratic socialism, at the other end, favors more government involvement in the economy. Democratic socialism argues that the responsibilities of government include some level of involvement in the economy to ensure the welfare of all citizens. Therefore, questions about what should or should not be included in the responsibilities of government reflect particular economic orientations. That is, those who favor a restricted role for government would tend to align more closely with democratic capitalism than with democratic socialism. Neither orientation, though, would be defined as undemocratic or antidemocratic.

The orientation of the church, with its emphasis on the welfare of the community above the good of the individual, tends to be in the direction of democratic socialism. While the individual is highly valued and human rights are to be protected, the priestly tradition teaches that the good of the community transcends individual rights. The priestly tradition also admonishes that it is the responsibility of the community to ensure that the needs of individuals are met. The purpose of government, according to this

tradition, is to provide for the welfare of the community and ensure just treatment for all. Therefore, the priestly tradition of the church will influence church members to support the ideals of democratic socialism. As I stated in hypothesis five, I expect that church attenders will be no more likely than non-attenders in these post-transition societies to support government intervention in the economy. A question which asks whether it should be the responsibility of government to provide jobs for every person who wants to work would be answered in the affirmative by those who support democratic socialism. It would be answered in the negative by those who support democratic capitalism. Similarly, a question which asks whether it should be the responsibility of government to reduce income differences between the rich and the poor would be endorsed by those who support democratic socialism and opposed by those who support democratic capitalism.

Table 5.12 shows regression results for the question of whether the government should provide jobs. Models are provided here for all four countries, although the data are available for Poland only in 1991. In each model, except for Poland, it is males, those who place themselves on the political right and those who have completed secondary education who are most likely to agree that it is not the responsibility of government to provide jobs. For Poland it is males, those who are younger, those on the political right, and those who do not attend church who agree that the government should not provide jobs. For the 1990 models, those who have higher incomes agree that the government should not provide jobs but this relationship does not repeat in the 1991 models, except in eastern Germany. In general, church attenders do not have a clear opinion on this issue. Eastern German church attenders in 1990 were more likely to agree that the government

Table 5.12 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Those Who Say It Is Not the Responsibility of Government to Provide Jobs on Selected Independent Variables

	Western Germany		Eastern Germany		Hungary		Poland
	1990	1991	1990	1991	1990	1991	1991
Age Category(Older)	.07 **	.03	.01	.01	.00	.05	-.10 *
Attend Church	**-.03**	**-.05 +**	**.09 ***	**.03**	**-.04**	**.00**	**-.08 ***
Secondary Education Complete	.09 **	.13 **	.13 **	.08 *	.12 *	.22 **	.05
Higher Income	.11 **	.05	.10 *	.08 *	.08 *	.03	.05
Left-Right Placement (Right)	.06 *	.08 *	.07 +	.06 *	n/a	n/a	.08 *
Married or Living as Married	-	.00	-	-.06 +	-	.00	.02
Female	-.09 **	-.14 **	-.10 *	-.06 *	-.19 **	-.11 **	-.12 **
Larger Community Size	.04	.04	-.07 +	.02	.09 *	.02	.06 +
Union Member	.05 *	-.08 *	n/a	-.03	n/a	.00	-.01
Left Radical Vote Intention	-	-	-	-.06 *	-	-.03	-
Center-Left Vote Intention	-	-.07 *	-	-.07 *	-	.09 *	-.04
Center-Right Vote Intention	.04 +	-	.02	-	-.04	-	-
Right Radical Vote Intention	.04 +	-.01	.07 +	.05 +	-	-	.02
Unemployed	-.05 *	.00	-.01	-.06 *	.02	-.02	-.04
White Collar Occupation	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Blue Collar Occupation	-.05 *	-	-.02	-	-.02	-	-
Self Employed	-	.05	-	.00	-	.01	-.01
National Pride	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Economically Satisfied	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Interest in Politics	-	n/a	-	n/a	-	n/a	n/a
Adjusted R^2	.05	.06	.05	.03	.08	.07	.05
N	2060	1150	740	1334	763	924	954

** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country, n/a not asked in survey

Sources: ISSP 1990, ISSP 1991

should not provide jobs. Church attenders in western Germany and Poland in 1991 reflect more of a democratic socialist attitude; that is, they are more likely to agree that it is the responsibility of government to provide jobs.

This democratic socialist orientation of church attenders in western Germany and Poland is repeated in Table 5.13, which examines attitudes about government responsibility to equalize incomes. Church attenders in both of these societies agree that governments should work to reduce income differences between rich and poor. Eastern German and Hungarian church attenders do not reflect this same attitude. In general, it is better educated, higher income, political right oriented, males, and self-employed who agree that it is not the responsibility of government to reduce income differences between rich and poor.

Democratic Traditions Reflecting the Prophetic Tradition -- Power from Below

Interpersonal Trust

Just as trust in government is important for a successful democracy, so, too, is interpersonal trust important to democracy. When people share decision making power they must be willing to extend a certain level of trust to their fellow citizens. Democratic decision making relies upon cooperation among like-minded individuals who have organized themselves to promote their cooperative interests. This activity cannot take place without some level of interpersonal trust. And a notorious hallmark of totalitarian government is a carefully cultivated level of interpersonal distrust, because those who can trust one another are more likely to entrust one another with confidences and organized activity. It is in the interest of totalitarian government to keep levels of

Table 5.13 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Those Who Say It Is Not the Responsibility of Government to Equalize Incomes on Selected Independent Variables

	Western Germany		Eastern Germany		Hungary		Poland
	1990	1991	1990	1991	1990	1991	1991
Age Category(Older)	.02	.00	-.05	-.08 **	-.07 +	.05	-.09 *
Attend Church	**-.05 +**	**-.06 +**	**-.01**	**.03**	**-.01**	**.01**	**-.07 ***
Secondary Education Complete	.06 *	.05	.19 **	.13 **	.12 **	.16 **	.05
Higher Income	.16 **	.09 *	.14 **	.04	.09 *	.11 *	.08 *
Left-Right Placement (Right)	.12 **	.15 **	.05	.09 **	-	n/a	.11 **
Married or Living as Married	-	-.02	-	-.06 *	-	-.08 *	-.03
Female	.01	-.10 **	-.11 **	-.06 +	-.16 **	.03	-.08 *
Larger Community Size	.01	.08 *	.04	.04	.09 *	.02	.11 **
Union Member	.06 *	-	n/a	-	n/a	-	-
Left Radical Vote Intention	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Center-Left Vote Intention	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Center-Right Vote Intention	.08 *	.08 *	.08 +	.03	.01	.01	-.02
Right Radical Vote Intention	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Unemployed	-.04 +	-	.00	-	.02	-	-
White Collar Occupation	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Blue Collar Occupation	-.02	-.07 *	-.02	.00	-.08 +	.02	-.06
Self Employed	.03	.10 **	.10 **	.08 *	.09 *	.01	.07 +
National Pride	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Economically Satisfied	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Interest in Politics	-	n/a	-	n/a	-	n/a	n/a
Adjusted R^2	.06	.07	.10	.05	.09	.04	.06
N	2060	1150	740	1334	763	924	954

** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country, n/a not asked in survey

Sources: ISSP 1990, ISSP 1991

interpersonal trust as low as possible, in order to reduce the likelihood that people will organize themselves in opposition to the prevailing powers.

Trust in others is also a religious value, though it has little to do with the priestly tradition. It reflects more the prophetic tradition of a call to believers to return to community. The prophetic tradition is not as prevalent as the priestly tradition, and is only sporadically experienced in the church. But the prophetic tradition is heard most often during times of crisis, such as immediately prior to and during the democratic transition in Eastern Europe. I argue, therefore, that the influence of the prophetic tradition will be reflected more strongly among church attenders in Eastern Europe, and that this influence will be seen in their attitudes toward particular democratic values which mirror the same values. As I stated in hypothesis six, I expect that church attenders will express greater levels of interpersonal trust than do those who do not attend church.

Table 5.14 examines relative levels of trust in family members. Only in western Germany and Hungary are church attenders more likely to indicate they trust their family members. In eastern Germany and Poland trust in family members is not related to church attendance. Married people are more likely to trust their families, for each of the countries, as are those who say they are financially satisfied.

Trust in family members is not crucial to democratic success, however. It may be indicative of some level of interpersonal trust in society, but far more important to a democratic transition is the broader perception that people in general can be trusted. Table 5.15 examines this level of interpersonal trust. We can see from this table that

Table 5.14 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Attitude That Family Members Can Be Trusted on Selected Independent Variables

	Western Germany	Eastern Germany	Hungary	Poland
Age Category(Older)	-.09 *	.04	-.01	-.07 +
Attend Church	**.09 ***	**.00**	**.08 +**	**.04**
Secondary Education Complete	-	-	-	-
Higher Income	.03	.02	.13 **	.03
Left-Right Placement (Right)	.07 *	.00	-.07 +	.03
Married or Living as Married	.19 *	.22 *	.14 **	.08 +
Female	-	-	-	-
Larger Community Size	-.04	-.08 *	-.05	n/a
Union Member	-	-	-	n/a
Left Radical Vote Intention	-	-	-	-
Center-Left Vote Intention	.07 *	.01	.05	.03
Center-Right Vote Intention	.07 *	-.03	.01	-.04
Right Radical Vote Intention	-	-	-	-
Unemployed	-	-	-	n/a
White Collar Occupation	-	-	-	-
Blue Collar Occupation	-	-	-	-
Self Employed	-	-	-	-
National Pride	.07 *	.01	.09 *	.05
Economically Satisfied	.12 *	.07 *	.11 **	.05
Interest in Politics	-	-	-	-
Adjusted R^2	.10	.06	.08	.01
N	1715	1206	696	650

** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country, n/a not asked in survey
Source: WVS (1990)

Table 5.15 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Attitude That People Can Be Trusted on Selected Independent Variables

	Western Germany			Eastern Germany			Hungary	Poland
	1990	1991	1992	1990	1991	1992	1990	1990
Age Category(Older)	-.05 +	.01	-	-.05	.06 +	-	.02	.08 +
Attend Church	**.07 ***	**.06**	**.08 ***	**.14 ******	**.05**	**.03**	**.04**	**.08 +**
Secondary Education Complete	.06 *	.02	-	.07 +	.11 **	-	.11 *	.09 +
Higher Income	.02	-	-	.01	-	-	.08 +	.00
Left-Right Placement (Right)	-.03	-.07 +	-	-.06 +	.00	-	-.04	.00
Married or Living as Married	.04	.05	-	-.01	-.08 *	-	-.03	-.02
Female	.01	.01	-	-.05 +	-.05 +	-	-.01	-.01
Larger Community Size	-	-.08 *	-	-	.02	-	-	n/a
Union Member	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	n/a
Left Radical Vote Intention	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Center-Left Vote Intention	-	-.04	.06 +	-	.07 *	.13 **	-	-
Center-Right Vote Intention	.03	-	.03	.07 *	-	.10 **	-.01	-.02
Right Radical Vote Intention	-.05 +	-.08 *	-	-	-.05 +	-	-	-
Unemployed	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	n/a
White Collar Occupation	-	-	-.06	-	-	-.01	-	-
Blue Collar Occupation	-	-	-.09 *	-	-	-.08 +	-	-
Self Employed	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
National Pride	-.06 *	-	-	-.10 **	-	-	-.09 *	.03
Economically Satisfied	.09 **	.12 **	.22 **	.08 *	.07 *	.11 **	.07 +	.09 *
Interest in Politics	.06 *	.05	.12 **	.05 +	.07 *	.02	.08 *	.02
Adjusted R^2	.03	.04	.09	.05	.04	.04	.04	.01
N	1715	1002	1055	1216	1059	1128	696	650

** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country, n/a not asked in survey

Sources: WVS (1990), IfD 5055 (1991), IfD 5074 (1992)

church attendance is associated with greater levels of interpersonal trust, though the relationship is not always significant in all of the models. The most consistent predictor of interpersonal trust in all of these models is economic satisfaction. Those who are satisfied with their financial situation are more likely to agree that people can be trusted. Similarly, those who say they are interested in politics are more likely to say that people can be trusted. Those who have achieved at least a secondary education are also more likely to agree that people can be trusted.

Optimism

Optimism is not necessarily a democratic value, but it certainly has a positive effect on a democratic regime when citizens are optimistic about the course of their lives. This attitude again reflects the prophetic tradition, which exhorts people to take charge of their lives, to get involved, to take responsibility for themselves and to act in a positive manner. Hypothesis seven posits that church attenders in post-transition societies will be more optimistic than those who do not attend church.

Church attenders in the new democracies of Eastern Europe are more likely to describe their lives as happy (see Table 5.16). This relationship illustrates just how powerful an experience this transition has been for church attenders in these countries. There is no similar relationship between church attendance and happiness in western Germany. Church attenders in Eastern Europe have reason to celebrate, as they are finally out from under the shadow of repression, and they reflect this in their reported levels of happiness. As expected, younger people, married people, and those with higher incomes are also more likely to describe their lives as happy, in all four models.

Table 5.16 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Those Who Describe Their Life as Happy on Selected Independent Variables

	Western Germany	**Eastern Germany**	**Hungary**	**Poland**
Age Category(Older)	-.08 *	-.06 *	-.17 **	-.18 **
Attend Church	**.02**	**.10 ** **	**.09 * **	**.06 + **
Secondary Education Complet	.03	-.03	.06 +	.07 *
Higher Income	.14 **	.11 **	.11 *	.15 **
Left-Right Placement (Right)	.05	.03	n/a	.11 **
Married or Living as Married	.24 **	.11 **	.24 **	.17 **
Female	.04	-.01	-.04	-.08 *
Larger Community Size	-	-	-	-
Union Member	-	-	-	-
Left Radical Vote Intention	-	-	-	-
Center-Left Vote Intention	.01	.06 +	.01	.00
Center-Right Vote Intention	.01	.07 *	.04	.06 +
Right Radical Vote Intention	-	-	-	-
Unemployed	-.09 **	-.08 **	.00	-.12 **
White Collar Occupation	-.08 +	.01	.01	-.05
Blue Collar Occupation	-.08	.04	-.09 +	-.09 *
Self Employed	-	-	-	-
Adjusted R^2	.11	.06	.13	.11
N	1150	1334	924	954

** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country, n/a not asked in survey
Source: ISSP (1991)

We can see this same relationship reflected in the next table (5.17). Here we look at attitudes about reunification, for both parts of Germany. Church attenders in both western and eastern Germany expressed joy about the reunification of Germany in 1991. This was a most significant event for church members in Germany, who could rejoice in the reunification of a church that had been artificially divided by the state in 1969. For western Germany, economic satisfaction is the only variable in the model more strongly related to joy about reunification. That is, those who were not financially disadvantaged by reunification, as well as those who say they are interested in politics, city dwellers, and males were more likely to express joy about reunification in western Germany. In eastern Germany it was people who stood to gain the most from reunification who expressed joy, as well as those who supported the prevailing political party. Younger people, church attenders, those on the right politically, those who would vote for the center-right party (the party in power in the West at the time of reunification) were more likely to express joy about reunification in 1991. People who were proud to be German and those who had jobs or were satisfied with their financial situation also expressed joy about reunification.

By the next year the relationship between reunification joy and church attendance had moderated, for both parts of Germany, as the realities of the financial burden of reunification began to sink in. Those who were profiting from reunification -- who were satisfied with their economic situation and proud to be German, as well as those who supported the ruling center-right party -- were willing to express joy about reunification. But the rest of the population had more mixed feelings about reunification. In eastern Germany, the model in 1992 explains reunification joy even more explicitly -- more than

Table 5.17 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Reunification Joy on Selected Independent Variables

	Western Germany		Eastern Germany	
	1991	1992	1991	1992
Age Category(Older)	.06	.03	-.09 *	-.10 **
Attend Church	**.10 ***	**.04**	**.13 ***	**.04**
Secondary Education Complete	.01	-	.04	-
Higher Income	-	-	-	-
Left-Right Placement (Right)	.02	-.04	.21 *	.13 **
Married or Living as Married	-.06 +	-	.00	-
Female	-.07 *	-.05 +	-.04	-.06 *
Larger Community Size	.08 *	-	.02	-
Union Member	-	-	-	-
Left Radical Vote Intention	-	.00	-	-.15 **
Center-Left Vote Intention	-	-.07 *	-	-.02
Center-Right Vote Intention	.06	.08 *	.08 *	.08 *
Right Radical Vote Intention	-.06 +	-	.02	-
Unemployed	-.05	-.01	-.10 *	-.12 **
White Collar Occupation	-	-	-	-
Blue Collar Occupation	-	-	-	-
Self Employed	-	-	-	-
National Pride	.05	.10 **	.11 *	.10 **
Economically Satisfied	.14 *	.23 **	.19 *	.27 **
Interest in Politics	.07 *	-	.00	-
Adjusted R^2	.07	.10	.21	.26
N	1002	1039	1059	1116

** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country

Sources: IfD 5055 (1991), IfD 5074 (1992)

a quarter of the variation is explained by the model. The same variables as in 1991 explain reunification joy, with the exception of church attendance. That is, those who are gaining from reunification are joyful. Extremists are not joyful, the unemployed are not joyful. But young people, males, political rightists, economically satisfied, and those who are proud to be German are more likely to express joy about reunification.

Church attenders in the post-transition societies also evaluate their current situation and their future situation in more optimistic terms, relative to the past. Table 5.18 describes attitudes comparing the present situation relative to the past, for both parts of Germany in 1991 and 1992. At both times, church attenders in eastern Germany are more likely to say the present is better than the past; there is no such relationship in western Germany. Objectively, the situation now is much better than in the past for church attenders in the East. They are finally free to gather and associate without fear of repression by the authorities. As in the previous tables, those who are gaining by reunification are more optimistic. For eastern Germany young people, those on the political right, those who vote for the center-right, those who are proud to be German, and those who are economically satisfied are more likely to give a positive evaluation of the present relative to the past. For western Germans, too, those who are least impacted by reunification give a positive evaluation. Primarily, those who are economically satisfied and those who are urban (in 1991) or not married (in 1992) say the situation now is better than the past. Those who would vote for an extremist party are more likely to give a negative evaluation.

Table 5.18 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Those Who Say the Situation Now is Better Than the Past on Selected Independent Variables

	Western Germany		Eastern Germany	
	1991	1992	1991	1992
Age Category(Older)	-.03	-.01	-.07 *	-.11 **
Attend Church	**.03**	**-.04**	**.11 ***	**.08 ****
Secondary Education Complete	-	-	-	-
Higher Income	-	-	-	-
Left-Right Placement (Right)	-.03	-.02	.25 *	.19 **
Married or Living as Married	-	-.10 **	-	.02
Female	-	-	-	-
Larger Community Size	.10 *	-	.11 *	-
Union Member	-	-	-	-
Left Radical Vote Intention	-	.02	-	-.14 **
Center-Left Vote Intention	-	-.07 *	-	-.01
Center-Right Vote Intention	.03	.00	.10 *	.09 **
Right Radical Vote Intention	-.07 *	-.07 *	.05 +	-.06 *
Unemployed	.04	.01	-.08 *	-.09 **
White Collar Occupation	-	-	-	-
Blue Collar Occupation	-	-	-	-
Self Employed	-	-	-	-
National Pride	-.02	.03	.13 *	.09 **
Economically Satisfied	.22 *	.32 **	.25 *	.26 **
Interest in Politics	-	-	-	-
Adjusted R^2	.06	.11	.30	.29
N	1002	1039	1059	1116

** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country

Sources: IfD 5055 (1991), IfD 5074 (1992)

When they predict into the future, too, church attenders are more optimistic than non-attenders (Table 5.19). Even in western Germany, church attenders in 1991 were more likely to predict an optimistic future relative to the past. As before, younger people and the economically satisfied are more likely to be optimistic about the future. For eastern Germany, church attenders in both 1991 and 1992 are optimistic about the future relative to the past. Also young people, those on the political right, those who would vote for the center-right party , and those who are proud to be German say the future will be better than the past. A full thirty percent of the variation in this attitude is captured by this model for 1992 in eastern Germany. I expect that these models would behave similarly for Hungary and Poland had the data been available.

Efficacy and Attitude Toward Change

Political efficacy is the feeling that one has a say in the political process, that each citizen is an actor who has a voice which can be used to effect change in a democratic system. As I stated in hypothesis eight, church attendance is not usually associated with political efficacy. I expect that church attenders in these post-transition societies will be no more likely than non-attenders to express political efficacy.

A standard set of questions from the University of Michigan National Election Studies is commonly used to capture the concept of political efficacy. A factor score created from factor analysis of four of these questions forms the dependent variable for Table 5.20. We see in the table that church attenders are not particularly efficacious. In fact, the only significant relationship is for church attenders in western Germany in 1991

Table 5.19 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Those Who Say the Future Situation is Better Than the Past on Selected Independent Variables

	Western Germany		Eastern Germany	
	1991	1992	1991	1992
Age Category(Older)	-.10 *	-.04	-.10 *	-.09 **
Attend Church	**.08 ***	**-.03**	**.10 ***	**.06 ***
Secondary Education Complete	-	-	-	-
Higher Income	-	-	-	-
Left-Right Placement (Right)	.03	-.02	.23 *	.22 **
Married or Living as Married	-	-.06 +	-	.01
Female	-.06 +	-	-.03	-
Larger Community Size	.13 *	-	.07 *	-
Union Member	-	-	-	-
Left Radical Vote Intention	-	.02		-.14 **
Center-Left Vote Intention	-	-	-	-
Center-Right Vote Intention	.05	.08 *	.11 *	.11 **
Right Radical Vote Intention	-.06 +	-.07 *	.02	-.06 *
Unemployed	.04	.04	-.06 *	-.04
White Collar Occupation	-	-	-	-
Blue Collar Occupation	-	-	-	-
Self Employed	-	-	-	-
National Pride	.01	.06 +	.13 *	.11 **
Economically Satisfied	.18 *	.29 **	.22 *	.25 **
Interest in Politics	-	.08 *	-	.01
Adjusted R^2	.06	.11	.26	.30
N	1002	1039	1059	1116

** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country

Sources: IfD 5055 (1991), IfD 5074 (1992)

Table 5.20 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Political Efficacy Factor on Selected Independent Variables

	Western Germany		Eastern Germany	
	1991	1992	1991	1992
Age Category(Older)	-.09 *	-.07 *	-.14 *	-.15 **
Attend Church	**-.07 ***	**.04**	**.04**	**.05**
Secondary Education Complete	.11 *	.15 **	.09 *	-.03
Higher Income	-	-	-	-
Left-Right Placement (Right)	.02	-.09 **	.07 *	-.02
Married or Living as Married	-	.01	-	.01
Female	-.04	-.07 *	-.11 *	-.06 +
Larger Community Size	-	-	-	-
Union Member	-	-	-	-
Left Radical Vote Intention	-	-.05 +	-	.01
Center-Left Vote Intention	-	-	-	-
Center-Right Vote Intention	.10 *	.19 **	.03	.08 *
Right Radical Vote Intention	-	-	-	-
Unemployed	-.05	-	-.06 +	-
White Collar Occupation	-	-	-	-
Blue Collar Occupation	-	-.02	-	-.13 **
Self Employed	-	-	-	-
National Pride	-.09 *	-.06 *	-.04	.02
Economically Satisfied	.15 *	.10 **	.18 *	.16 **
Interest in Politics	.22 *	.27 **	.18 *	.20 **
Adjusted R^2	.16	.20	.13	.13
N	1002	1039	1059	1116

** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country

Sources: IfD 5055 (1991), IfD 5074 (1992)

who are less likely to say they have political efficacy. Younger people are more likely to claim political efficacy, as are the politically interested and the economically satisfied. Those who have completed secondary education are also more likely to claim political efficacy , except in the eastern German model for 1992. Among eastern Germans, males are also more likely to say they have political efficacy.

Personal efficacy, a similar concept, is the feeling that one has control over one's life. This form of efficacy is also not a concept that is normally associated with church attenders. In fact, the priestly tradition of the church teaches church members to be obedient to those in authority and to defer personal will to the will of God. The prophetic tradition, in contrast, calls church members to stand up and speak out against injustice. It exhorts church members to action, to do something to change their lives, to attain personal efficacy. But the priestly tradition if the church is the prevalent tradition. Church members for the most part tend to be somewhat conservative. Church attenders tend to be skeptical of change and resistant to social change. The final two tables in this analysis allow us to examine whether the prophetic call to social change was strong enough in Eastern Europe to cause church attenders there to have a more efficacious attitude toward social change.

In Table 5.21 the dependent variable is respondents' attitudes toward a statement that people can do little to change their lives. Agreement with this statement equates roughly to an admission of lack of personal efficacy. As can be seen from the table, church attenders in all four countries tend to agree that people can do little to change their

Table 5.21 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Attitude That People Can Do Little to Change Their Lives on Selected Independent Variables

	Western Germany	Eastern Germany	Hungary	Poland
Age Category(Older)	.16 **	.21 **	.04	.07 *
Attend Church	**.09 ** **	**.11 ** **	**.12 ** **	**.13 ** **
Secondary Education Complet	-.13 **	-.06 *	-.10 *	-.13 **
Higher Income	-.05 +	-.05	.00	-.15 **
Left-Right Placement (Right)	.01	.08 **	n/a	-.10 **
Married or Living as Married	.08 *	-.02	-.03	.02
Female	.05	.08 **	.10 **	-.03
Larger Community Size	-	-	-	-
Union Member	-	-	-	-
Left Radical Vote Intention	-	-	-	-
Center-Left Vote Intention	.05	.02	-.09 *	-.06 +
Center-Right Vote Intention	-	-	-	-
Right Radical Vote Intention	.03	-.05 +	-	.03
Unemployed	-	-	-	-
White Collar Occupation	-.07 *	-.08 *	-.06 +	.09 *
Blue Collar Occupation	-	-	-	-
Self Employed	-	-	-	-
Adjusted R^2	.09	.10	.07	.08
N	1150	1334	924	954

** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country, n/a not asked in survey
Source: ISSP (1991)

lives. From these models we would have to argue that the effect of church activism in the democratic transition has not been enough to cause church members in these post-transition societies to achieve personal efficacy. Older people are also less efficacious, as are females (in eastern Germany and Hungary). Those who have completed secondary education are more efficacious, as are white collar employees (except in Poland, where white collar workers claim less efficacy).

Finally, one more variable addresses the concept of personal efficacy. This is a factor score, created from factor analysis of three questions which ask people for their outlook on life, each ranked on a ten-point scale(see Chapter Three). In general, higher values indicate a more favorable attitude toward change in one's life. We see from Table 5.22 that western German church attenders have a more negative attitude toward change, as we would expect from the priestly tradition. As stated above, church members tend to be somewhat conservative and resistant to social change. The models show that older persons and females are also resistant to change, as we would also expect. These two groups are also typically seen as somewhat conservative and resistant to social change. And those who say they are interested in politics, as well as the more educated and economically satisfied (except in Hungary) exhibit a favorable attitude toward change, also as expected. The politically engaged, the more educated and the financially stable are all likely to have a more favorable attitude toward change in their lives.

What is unexpected in these models is the lack of association between church attendance and attitude toward change in the post-transition societies. We expect to see a negative relationship between church attendance and attitude toward change, as described

Table 5.22 Standardized Coefficients for OLS Regressions of Favorable Attitude Toward Change on Selected Independent Variables

	Western Germany	Eastern Germany	Hungary
Age Category(Older)	-.27 *	-.16 *	-.17 **
Attend Church	**-.09 ***	**-.04**	**.00**
Secondary Education Complete	.06 *	.10 *	.06
Higher Income	-	-	-
Left-Right Placement (Right)	-.07 *	.03	-.02
Married or Living as Married	-	-	-
Female	-.05 *	-.05 +	-.12 **
Larger Community Size	-	-	-
Union Member	-.03	.02	-.11 **
Left Radical Vote Intention	-	-	-
Center-Left Vote Intention	-.04	-.02	.10 *
Center-Right Vote Intention	-.07 *	.00	.03
Right Radical Vote Intention	-	-	-
Unemployed	-.03	.01	-.08 *
White Collar Occupation	-	-	-
Blue Collar Occupation	-	-	-
Self Employed	.05 *	.01	.03
National Pride	-.06 *	.08 *	-.02
Economically Satisfied	.12 *	.07 *	.06
Interest in Politics	.12 *	.15 *	.07 +
Adjusted R^2	.20	.09	.11
N	1839	1220	707

** p<.01, * p<.05, + p<.10, - not significant in any country, n/a not asked in survey
Source: WVS (1990)

above and as noted in the case of western German church attenders. But there is no relationship between church attendance and attitude toward change for either of the post-transition societies here. It is not possible to say that the influence of the prophetic tradition has caused attitudes of personal efficacy to change among church members in these societies. But the lack of relationship provokes speculation that something different has occurred in these two societies to dilute the expected negative relationship between church attendance and attitude toward change.

CHAPTER VI

DISCUSSION

Discussions of political values often ignore the importance of church affiliation in explaining democratic attitudes. This research shows that there is an important relationship between church attendance and democratic values, one which should not be ignored or minimized. A close reading of the tables from the previous chapter provides evidence that church attendance does affect democratic values, both in the established democracy of western Germany and in the new democracies of Eastern Europe. In the first two chapters I explained why this relationship should exist. In brief, many of the values that churches teach and promote are also values that support and promote democratic society, so it is to be expected that church attenders would support democratic values. Such values resonate with the ideals that they hear from their religious leaders. And democratic society is more favorable to the institution of the church. Democracy is agnostic, but the Soviet regime was consciously atheistic. So the church gets a better deal in a democracy. But there is more to church support of democratic values than institutional self-interest and convenience.

As I discussed in Chapter One, the relationship is more complex than this. It is true that many of the values taught by the church are democratic values. This is one way in which the church affects political culture. As an institution of civil society, the church interacts with the state to affect the political culture. And I have shown in Chapter Two that the church was virtually the only institution of civil society allowed some measure of

autonomous existence by the communist regimes in East Germany and Poland. Therefore, the church contributed substantially to the democratic transitions in those two countries.

But the situation in Hungary was somewhat different. In Hungary repression of the churches was less severe, and the churches selected a different strategy in their relationship to the state. From early on, the church in Hungary identified strongly with the state and chose to work within the existing power structure rather than in opposition to it. This course of action, while it may have preserved more political latitude for the church in Hungary, nevertheless necessarily stigmatized the church by its identification with the regime. As Tocqueville said, "religion cannot share the material strength of the rulers without being burdened with some of the animosity roused against them" (p. 297). Because the church accommodated to communism, church members lost touch with the Tocquevillian idea of getting along with each other. Therefore, the church in Hungary was less active in the democratic transition than it was in either Poland or East Germany and consequently had less of an impact on the political values of its church members. So the relationship between the church and the state becomes an important contextual variable which interacts with church support for democratic values on both the institutional as well as the individual level.

I have demonstrated that the church does influence the political culture, and not only as an institution but also through the actions of individual church members. Chapter Four looks at what remains of the churches in these post-transition societies. By examining patterns of church membership and church attendance in these post-transition

societies we begin to see how the state vs. civil society context affected individual church members in each of these countries.

The effect of official state repression is seen most strongly in East Germany, where the churches have suffered dramatic losses in affiliates since the end of World War II. And examination of church membership by age groups shows that these losses are consistent across all age groups -- it is not just the young who have left the church. State repression had the weakest effect on the church in Poland, where Roman Catholicism is deeply intertwined with Polish nationalism. To be identified as a practicing Catholic in Poland meant simultaneously that one was a member of the Polish nation and in opposition to the foreign-imposed power of the state. In Hungary, state repression had practically no effect on the oldest two age groups -- those who were already socialized before the imposition of communism. But in the younger age groups church membership tapers off substantially, with younger groups reporting significantly lower levels of membership, as they were increasingly assimilated into Soviet-controlled society.

This differential age effect on church membership makes sense in light of the different configurations of state vs. civil society in these three countries. In both East Germany and Poland the church was severely repressed -- church leaders were killed or threatened, most church-sponsored institutions were either transferred to state control or forced to close. People in both countries felt intense pressure to reject their religious faith. The people in East Germany tended to comply with the state and select the more politically expedient path of disaffiliation. But the people of Poland for the most part resisted this repression and continued to adhere to their religious faith, which was so

strongly bound up with their sense of national identity. For Poles, to disaffiliate from their religious faith meant to give up their Polish identity, and most Poles resisted this pressure.

In Hungary we see a different configuration between church and state. Churches were also repressed in Hungary; church leaders and church property there were also sacrificed. But the church in Hungary had always been closely aligned with the state, and church leaders quickly saw that they would have better prospects for survival if they cooperated with the state and participated in the reorganization of Hungarian society into the socialist model. Therefore, the reorganization of the Hungarian state resulted in far less disruption for Hungarian church members than it did for either Poles or East Germans. Older Hungarians continued to practice their faith relatively unhindered, just as they had before the time of Soviet occupation. Younger Hungarians were increasingly socialized into the model of Soviet citizenry, which rejected religious faith and religious instruction. Increasingly, younger people either disaffiliated from the religious faith of their parents or chose not to affiliate at all. This explains why Hungarian church membership remains high among the oldest age groups, then drops consistently by nearly 20 percentage points between each of the younger four age categories.

Church attendance patterns have similar characteristics as church membership patterns. And regressions of church attendance on a variety of religious beliefs and moral issues show that church attenders in the East are substantially like their counterpart in western Germany in their religious orientation toward these issues. Church attenders in post-transition societies support the same moral values as western German church

attenders, with two telling exceptions. In Table 4.3, a question about whether it is better to follow one's conscience or obey, western German church attenders are more likely to agree that it is better to obey. But eastern German and Hungarian church attenders are no more likely than non-attenders to hold this opinion. The priestly tradition of the church strongly advocates obedience to authority, and this position is reflected in the attitude of western German church attenders. The fact that it is not present in the post-transition societies suggests a change in attitude from what we would expect for church attenders. The other exception occurs in Tables 4.7-4.8, questions referring to traditional family arrangements. Here we note that Hungarian church attenders are no more likely than non-attenders to favor traditional family arrangements. Since family arrangements are also related to economic conditions, this anomaly may be reflecting a different attitude toward women in the work force in Hungary, rather than any particular change in moral attitude by Hungarian church attenders.

Chapter Five, then, examines thoroughly how individual church attenders feel about democratic values in these post-totalitarian societies. Here we can see more clearly the subtle way that the priestly and the prophetic traditions within the church interact to affect support for democracy. In the discussion from Chapter One we saw how these two countervailing traditions have always existed within the church. The priestly tradition tends to prevail at most times, advocating the need for obedience to authority in order to ensure public order. As long as the earthly authority allows the church some latitude to operate, the priestly tradition acknowledges and legitimates the power of that earthly authority. But the prophetic tradition can emerge as a voice from within the church

during times of stress and rapid change. The prophetic tradition advocates individual opposition to oppression as a response to social injustice. Certain democratic values are more expressive of the priestly tradition, others reflect the values of the prophetic tradition, and some democratic values are not advocated by either tradition. We see evidence of these two traditions by examining the tables in Chapter Five.

These tables are organized according to the democratic values which are shared by each of the traditions within the church. First, the democratic values which resonate with the priestly tradition are discussed. Confidence in state institutions and trust in government (Tables 5.1-5.3) are democratic values which are strongly supported by church attenders in all of the countries. These values reflect the priestly tradition's admonition to obey and trust in the earthly authorities whose legitimate power derives from God. In other words, authority exists on Earth because God knows we need it, as a result of our condition of original sin.

Next, there are democratic values which do not reflect clearly either the priestly or the prophetic tradition of the church. These are either democratic values which address the gray area between respect for individual rights and consideration of the common good, or else they are democratic values which have more to do with economics than with politics. One aspect of democratic values which falls into this "gray area" between individual rights and the good of the community is the whole concept of political freedoms and political rights. Tables 5.5-5.8 illustrate my point here. Depending on question wording, church attenders try to balance the democratic value of individual liberty (which can, under times of severe repression, be consistent with the prophetic

tradition of the church) with the priestly tradition's admonition to value order for the good of the community.

For example, Table 5.5 reflects strong church support for a preference for freedom and law over a higher standard of living. But in this question no one is being asked to favor the individual over the community. The next three tables (Tables 5.6-5.8), having to do with the right to freedom of speech, are either not supported by church attenders or in several cases church attenders reject these democratic values. The right of an individual to the free expression of his or her beliefs is interpreted generally as being threatening to public order.

The tables addressing public protest (Tables 5.9-5.11) illustrate this same point about individual rights vs. order, but they also more clearly point out the tension between the priestly and the prophetic tradition in these post-transition societies. Table 5.9 shows that church attenders are no more likely to engage in public protest than non-attenders. But Tables 5.10 and 5.11, where individuals are asked about their tolerance for protest (and against government repression of protest) show that church attenders in western Germany, where there has been no severe government repression, strongly oppose public protest and approve of government repression of protest. This is consistent with what one would expect of church members from the priestly tradition. But in the post-transition societies of eastern Germany and Hungary, where churches played a part in the democratic transitions, one does not see this expected relationship. Church members in those societies witnessed the effectiveness of the prophetic tradition of the church when church leaders and church members protested against unjust societies and successfully

contributed to change in those societies. This has had a profound and visible (but probably short-lived) effect on the strength of the priestly tradition in their world view.

Tables 5.12 and 5.13 illustrate the point that certain democratic values which have to do primarily with economic issues are not interpreted by church attenders as having anything much to do with their moral values. I expected that church attenders would tend to uphold communitarian values and would therefore favor some government redistribution of wealth. There is some evidence of this hypothesized relationship for western Germany and Poland in these tables, but the relationship is not strong. There is no evidence of such a relationship for either eastern Germany or Hungary. In fact, eastern German church attenders immediately after the transition tended to agree that it is not the responsibility of government to provide jobs. But there is no evidence of this relationship in the 1991 model. Church attenders in eastern Germany and Hungary apparently interpret these questions only on the level of economic interest, and do not see a relationship between the responsibilities of government and the moral values espoused by the church.

Finally, the last nine tables (5.14-5.22) provide evidence of what I expect to be a rather ephemeral effect of the prophetic tradition in post-transition Eastern Europe. These tables have to do with democratic values which reflect the prophetic tradition. Such democratic values as interpersonal trust, political efficacy, optimism, and openness to change are values which echo the prophetic tradition, calling for individuals to stand up and speak out to bring about change in an oppressive situation. As Brueggemann (1978, p. 13) describes the prophetic voice: "The task of prophetic ministry is to nurture,

nourish, and evoke a consciousness and perception alternative to the consciousness and perception of the dominant culture around us." These tables illustrate how church members in these oppressed societies were influenced, at least for a brief time, by this prophetic voice coming from their midst.

Tables 5.14 and 5.15 describe determinants of trust. Although the levels of explained variance are not high, church attenders do tend to trust family members and other people in general. Interpersonal trust was generally low in communist societies because people were encouraged to report non-sympathizers to the authorities, but church attenders show some evidence of rejecting this aspect of the dominant culture and instead declare their trust for family members and fellow citizens. These tables show evidence of the effect of the prophetic tradition in these oppressed societies in changing the attitudes of church attenders away from the attitudes of the dominant culture.

Levels of optimism in these post-transition societies are another sign of the prophetic tradition at work. Church attenders in eastern Germany, Hungary and Poland are more likely than non-attenders to describe their life as happy (Table 5.16). This relationship does not hold for western Germany; western German church attenders are no more likely than non-attenders to describe their lives as happy. I argue that this is because church attenders in these post-transition societies feel that they have something to celebrate. Life is qualitatively better for them now that they have religious liberty and freedom to associate with one another. However, this euphoric feeling is likely to fade with time, as they become adjusted to the realities of their new way of life.

Evidence that the effect of the prophetic tradition in these post-transition societies is probably transitory can also be seen from the models in the next three tables (5.17-5.19). These tables show how this optimism among church attenders, while still strong in 1991, already shows signs of decline by 1992. As the realities of reunification sink in among both eastern and western German church attenders their initial euphoria recedes. In both tables asking for evaluation relative to the past (5.18 and 5.19) eastern German church attenders are much more likely than non-attenders to express optimism; there is no such relationship among western German church attenders. This is evidence of the effect of the prophetic tradition on the optimistic attitude of eastern German church attenders. But already in the 1992 models this relationship shows signs of weakening, and I suspect that it will, in time, disappear entirely as the priestly tradition once again establishes itself in the attitudes of eastern German church attenders and they become more like their western counterparts.

Finally, the tables that explain efficacy and attitude toward change also show the prophetic tradition at work. Table 5.20, a factor of political efficacy, shows the expected negative relationship between church attendance and political efficacy for western Germany. But this relationship does not exist for eastern Germany. Church attendance in eastern Germany is not related to political efficacy. Perhaps eastern German church attenders feel a little more efficacious because they have recently witnessed the power of political action to change the system. However, this attitude is likely to be short-lived. Table 5.21 shows that post-transition church attenders have little sense of personal efficacy. Like their western counterparts, church attenders in the post-transition societies

of Eastern Europe agree that people can do little to change their lives. But Table 5.22 shows that, for right now, eastern German and Hungarian church attenders do not have the same negative attitude toward change as do western German church attenders. For the period immediately after the transition there remains evidence of optimism and efficacy, as church members identify with those who spoke up and brought about political change in their country.

CONCLUSIONS

So what does this examination of the political and moral values of church attenders in post-transition societies lead us to expect? This research shows that churches and church members in the post-transition societies of Eastern Europe are remarkably similar to the West, despite half a century of repression and isolation. The resilience of the institution in these societies is reflected in the similarity of attitude between East and West.

Once again I return to the role of the church in civil society. As Tocqueville pointed out so long ago in Democracy in America, there is a definite connection between the moral values of a society and its political practices. Democracy requires a functioning civil society to provide a medium for the formation of democratic consensus.

Dietrich Bonhoeffer, a German Lutheran pastor, writing in 1940 about experiences of oppression during his recent past, explained how he saw the church recovering democratic values out of totalitarianism:

> ...everything connected with Christianity was severely repressed. Against the worship of irrationality, blood, and the bestial instinct in man, it was necessary to counterpose reason, against arbitrary law -- the written law,

> against barbarism -- culture and humanism, against coercion -- freedom, tolerance and the rights of man, against the politicization of art and science -- the autonomy of these different spheres of life. And so it happened that among the defenders of these maligned values as well as among Christians, there grew a sense of a certain kind of alliance. It turned out that all of these values -- reason, scholarship, humanism, tolerance, autonomy -- which had until recently served as battle cries in the struggle against Christianity and the Church, were in fact extremely close to the Church. This was a time of the most unprecedented attacks on Christianity, a time when its most fundamental truths were harshly denounced in the most uncompromising manner, contrary to all norms of reason, culture, humanism, and tolerance. And the more Christianity was persecuted and oppressed, the stronger became its alliance with these values, which unexpectedly widened Christianity's horizons (as cited in Michnik 1993, p.122).

The churches in the totalitarian societies of Central and Eastern Europe experienced much the same sort of conditions as Bonhoeffer describes. And out of these experiences the churches, especially the churches of Poland and eastern Germany, have made a heart-felt conversion to democracy. They have learned democracy, just as Tocqueville reported of the civil institutions of American democracy, through the process of recreating civil society in their societies. Through the actions of church members and others committed to promoting a democratic transition who came together within the protective spaces provided by the churches themselves, they began a process of democratic discourse which led, inevitably, to democratic transitions.

Adam Michnik, the Polish leftist intellectual, recognized the importance of civil society to a democratic transformation. First, he said, transformation can only come through reform from below -- that is, through concerted action on the part of individuals without political power to associate and negotiate a democratic transformation. Second, the only way those seeking such a transformation could succeed was to recognize the

commonality of their democratic commitments and use that as a bridge to overcome political, cultural, and religious differences. Michnik (and Vaclav Havel, the Czech intellectual, as well) argued that to achieve a democratic transformation of totalitarian society one must create a civil society "as if":

> People should act as if they lived in a free society, and in the process they would constitute moments and places for a free existence. They should speak primarily to one another, not to their political overlords, expressing their differences but with mutual respect. In this way, at least some aspects of an independent social existence would be created (Goldfarb 1992, p.15).

This experience of coming together, usually within the protective confines of the church, in order to recreate civil society caused church members to become the carriers of democratic values within these societies. Out of this process of recreating civil society church members in these post-totalitarian societies have learned how to be democratic citizens.

And as Putnam (1993) suggests in his recent book, the shape of this civil society is important to the success of a democratic outcome. Putnam argues that even within a democratic society, when civil society is organized along a vertical dimension, when patronage and favors determine allegiance, and interpersonal relationships are marked by distrust, exploitation and powerlessness, democratic outcomes are less likely to occur. But when civil society is organized along a horizontal dimension, with dense networks of local associations and active engagement in community affairs marked by trust and efficacy, democratic outcomes are more likely to occur.

I have shown in this research how civil society in these post-transition societies of Eastern Europe has been shaped to some extent by the churches operating to preserve and recreate civil society within these formerly totalitarian societies. I extend Putnam's work on the importance of the horizontal links of civil society for democratic outcomes by exploring how the churches contributed to support for democracy in these totalitarian societies. I showed in Chapter Two how churches in the vertically organized, totalitarian societies of Eastern Europe preserved democratic values and promoted horizontal linkages in society, especially in places such as Eastern Germany and Poland, where all associations of civil society were severely repressed. The discussion of church support for democratic values in Chapter Five showed how church attenders continue to support democratic values in these post-transition societies of Eastern Europe. I expect that the churches of these post-transition societies will continue to work toward strengthening and broadening the scope of civil society and contributing to the network of horizontal linkages between people that are so important to the success of democracy. Evidence of such activity is already being seen in Poland, where new democrats have strongly opposed efforts by entrenched conservatives to reimpose measures such as a ban on legalized abortion in the country. And in eastern Germany the churches are continuing to work with environmental groups and others to improve the quality of life for eastern German citizens. All of these efforts will help to broaden and enrich the horizontal linkages within civil society which were so carefully preserved by the churches during the years of totalitarianism.

As the new democracies consolidate and routinize in eastern Europe, it will be interesting to see how church/state relationships evolve. Further research should explore what happens as the prophetic tradition recedes in influence and the priestly tradition once again attains precedence in these churches. I expect that church attenders in these post-transition societies will become increasingly like their democratic counterparts in western Germany as time goes on. That is, I expect that church members will continue to express strong support for democratic values, but primarily those democratic values which reflect the priestly tradition. The church is once again in a favorable situation in civil society within the newly emergent democracies. I expect that the expressions of optimism, efficacy, and trust that I saw among church attenders in the data from 1991 will recede with time.

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VITA

Mary L. Gautier was born in Columbia, South Carolina and grew up in the Midwest. She has been a resident of Louisiana for the past eighteen years, and earned her post-secondary degrees from Louisiana State University in Baton Rouge. She has been married to Elwood Gautier for twenty-five years and they have two grown children.

An employee of the Diocese of Baton Rouge for six years before leaving to pursue graduate studies, she brought a deep appreciation for Tocqueville's view of the instrumental role of religion in society to her studies of political sociology. Personal experience of assisting young Polish refugees, escaping martial law in their homeland in 1981, to assimilate into American culture also contributed to her interest in the religious values of church members in those totalitarian societies of Central Europe.

DOCTORAL EXAMINATION AND DISSERTATION REPORT

Candidate: Mary L. Gautier

Major Field: Sociology

Title of Dissertation: The Church in Post-Transition Societies: Evidence From Eastern Europe

Approved:

Major Professor and Chairman

Dean of the Graduate School

EXAMINING COMMITTEE:

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